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JOHN MILTON AND THE POETICS OF SOLITUDE 
At a time when religion, community, and family formed the basis of society, John Milton 
openly advocated separation and difference, whether through divorce, through division of 
church and state, church disestablishment, or through his own assertions of poetic superiority 
and the singular ability to “justify the ways of God to men” (PL, 1.26). My five-chapter 
dissertation examines each of these ruptures via a concept intrinsic to all of them, the concept 
of solitude. Even as solitude was beginning to emerge as a positive notion and practice of 
individuation within early modern society, Milton was complicating it. Instead of a practice, he 
theorized solitude as a mode of being essential to human creatures, modeled on his God, who is 
“alone / From all eternity” (PL, 8.405). Different from us, God invites us to be different from 
each other, an invitation we answer through our individual solitudes. This emphasis on solitude 
opens my dissertation to readings both historical and theoretical. Historically, I situate Milton 
as a radical dissident, whose notion of solitude overturns an Aristotelian system based in 
human sociability. For Aristotle, sociability defines the human, insofar as “he who is unable to 
live in society [...] must be either a beast or a god” (Politics, 1130). In this way, Milton departs 
from the solitude-opposing philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, while also finding a kindred spirit 
in the writing of Lucy Hutchinson. Theoretically, I identify Milton with a line of thinkers that 
includes figures such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques Derrida.  
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Solitude and Difference in Milton’s Poetry and Prose 
In a central passage from Areopagitica, John Milton identifies a connection between 
reading morally ambiguous texts and living in a morally ambiguous world. Whether one is 
reading a written text or interpreting the text of the moral universe, Milton believes, in both 
cases, what “purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary” (YP 2, 515).1 Though not stated 
here, Milton imagines these purity-producing trials as occurring in solitude, as even a cursory 
glance at his poetry will serve to indicate. Moments before creating a mate for Adam, for 
instance, God explains that his foregoing solitude was only meant to “try” him, adding that the 
various creatures Adam hitherto encountered were “for trial only brought, / To see how thou 
couldst judge of fit and meet” (8.437-448). Similarly, when Eve desires solitude in Book 9 of the 
epic, Adam implores her to “trial choose / With me, best witness of thy virtue tried” (9.316-317). 
Upon the Son’s entrance into the desert in Paradise Regained, “the better to converse / With 
solitude,” Satan appears in order “to try” him (1.191; 123). “[A]lone and helpless,” the Lady of 
Comus will “in the happy trial most glory prove” (582, 591). Samson’s solitude at the mill also 
ends in a “trial” of “strength” (1643-1644). More than coincidental, Milton intentionally 
describes these characters as existing in solitude during times of trial. Whatever the situation, and 
more could be named, images of the solitary invariably precede moments of trial throughout 
Milton’s texts, both poetry and prose, suggesting solitude’s indispensability to his conception of 
Christian virtue and human freedom.  
Insofar as we cannot know in advance when trial will occur, however, Milton presents us 
with a dilemma, one that guides my research in the following chapters. Is not the ultimate trial 
one of grasping trials of moment amidst the struggles of everyday life—of grasping kairos in the 
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linear unfolding of chronos? Assuming solitude serves as a precondition of trial, in what sense 
must we always be alone, then, and thus always prepared for trial, should one happen to occur? 
Rather than offer a dichotomized solution to this dilemma, in which humans are either alone and 
prepared for trial or else together and unprepared, Milton intensifies the problem over the course 
of his literary career by imagining humans as simultaneously alone and together, different and 
alike, hierarchically separated and monistically one. This dual commitment to solitude and 
society appears as early as the companion poems, L’Allegro and Il Penseroso, a literary diptych 
dating from sometime between 1629 and 1631. In these poems, Milton holds in balance the 
opposing virtues of mirth and melancholy. Not until the early 1640s, however, does the 
emotional equilibrium originally found in L’Allegro and Il Penseroso begin to shift, as Milton 
confronts growing divisions in church and state, the isolation of a failed marriage, the death of 
his friend, Charles Diodati, the difficulty of finding intellectual companions in England, as well 
as his degenerative blindness. While still committed to both solitude and society as 
complimentary concepts, the nature of those commitments starts to change in the face of these 
hardships. Increasingly, Milton writes of solitude as a permanent human condition, and 
companionship as a human ideal, something to be desired but perhaps never (or only partially) 
attainable, at least in this life.2 In 1647, for instance, Milton writes to Florentine friend and 
polymath, Carlo Dati, to let him know that he is “forced to live in almost perpetual solitude,” a 
sentiment whose adverbial qualification “almost” will drop from the equation when writing his 
greatest verse (YP 2, 763). If Milton’s allegiance seems divided between the goddess of mirth 
and “divinest Melancholy” in the L’Allegro and Il Penseroso, that indecisiveness certainly ends 
by the time he writes Paradise Lost, a poem which justifies to men the ways of a God “alone / 
From all eternity,” who, like the enshrouded personification of melancholy in Il Penseroso, 
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appears “Throned inaccessible,” except when he “shad’st / The full blaze of [his] beams” (8.405-
406; 3.377-378). This is the same God in whose image we are made, “Inward and outward both, 
his image fair” (8.221). 
His growing belief in permanent human solitude should not be taken as a sign of 
resignation, though. As the precondition of trial, solitude enables and even prepares a person to 
engage in free and virtuous action in a world in which evil always exists as a potential. Without 
naming it as such, Milton’s emphasis on the importance of solitude to Christian society serves as 
the basis for his argument against imprimatur in Areopagitica, and will continue to appear in 
various forms in prose tracts after it. Claiming he “cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, 
unexercis’d & unbreath’d,” Milton deems solitary trials like those described above as necessary 
to the “true warfaring Christian” (YP 2, 515). This emphasis on physical exercise returns again 
later, where he relates how  
our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion. Truth 
is compar’d in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetuall 
progression, they sick’n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition. A man may be a 
heretick in the truth; and if he beleeve things only because his Pastor sayes so, or the 
Assembly so determins, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the 
very truth he holds, becomes his heresie. (YP 2, 543) 
If lacking in movement, truth will necessarily atrophy, according to Milton, who regards exercise 
performed for the body as analogous to the maintenance of faith. Without this active seeking, 
which must occur in solitude, a “man may be a heretick in the truth,” but for the wrong reason, 
holding the right information, but without testing that information for himself. In his 
theologically radical and posthumously published tome, Christian Doctrine, Milton summarizes 
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the necessity of Christian solitude in writing that godly truth reveals itself “only to the individual 
faith of each man, and demands of us that any man who wishes to be saved should work out his 
beliefs for himself,” and, separately, that “Every believer is entitled to interpret the scriptures; 
and by that I mean interpret them for himself” (YP 6, 118 and 583). His is not merely a theology 
sola fide, by faith alone, but also a faith in aloneness itself, an aloneness that differentiates us 
from each other, even as it enables us to make a difference in the world.3   
Milton certainly experienced solitary trials of his own, the greatest occurring during the 
middle and end of his life. Writing in the Second Defense, his polemical rejoinder to Salmasius, a 
pro-royalist writer from the continent, he asserts that “In time of trial, I was neither cast down in 
spirit nor unduly fearful of envy or death” (YP 4, 552-553). He describes himself as a man of 
“greater strength of mind than of body,” who avoided the “toils and dangers” of actual war in 
order to service the state through a different sort of battle. While admitting that he “admire[s] the 
heroes victorious in battle,” he nevertheless regards his solitary task of “defending the very 
defenders” as akin to a physical confrontation: “I met [Salmasius] in single combat and plunged 
into his reviling throat this pen, the weapon of his own choice” (YP 4, 552-556). The comparison 
between writer and warrior emerges at other moments throughout his texts, as well, most 
notably, in Colasterion, where he compares his vituperations against an anonymous pamphleteer 
to “Hercules […] carry[ing] dung out of the Augean stable” (YP 2, 756). Whether carrying dung 
from the stable or turning a “muddy pool” into a “streaming fountain,” Milton insists that 
Christian purity involves trial, and that trial entails an active, solitary, and perhaps (based on the 
metaphors used) unsanitary searching for truth, a search made all the more difficult because of 
the fact that “Good and evill we know in the field of this World grow up together almost 
inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involv’d and interwoven with the knowledge of 
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evill, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discern’d” (YP 2, 514). Absent the 
“incessant labour” that goes into separating good from evil, a labor of trial and solitude, we risk 
slipping into that “muddy pool of conformity and tradition.” In Tetrachordon, he describes labor 
of this sort as the primary occupation of a Christian, relegating marital conversation to that which 
occurs only because “No mortall nature can endure either in the actions of Religion, or study of 
wisdome, without somtime slackening the cords of intense thought and labour” (YP 2, 596). As it 
turns out, not even Hercules could fling dung all the livelong day, even if such flinging is 
necessary for understanding Christian truth. 
Yet, critics routinely disagree about the nature of Miltonic religious truth and the role of 
solitary dissent in its creation or discovery.4 Constructivists such as Joanna Picciotto argue that 
Milton participated alongside other seventeenth-century thinkers in a “labor of truth production” 
(5). She claims that Milton regarded truth as an “ongoing collaborative construction,” and that, 
for him, as for many in his cohort, “Diversity of opinion was only tolerable to the extent that it 
offered a means toward ultimate consensus” (5). Furthermore, Picciotto believes participants in 
this ongoing collaboration “gain an anticipatory experience of that oneness” during their labors, 
asserting that “Even the ‘I’ of seventeenth-century spiritual autobiography registers the 
displacement of the personal voice by another, impersonal one” (8-9). In her account, then, 
differences of mind (if they exist at all) eventually give way to worldly consensus, in a process of 
assimilation that sees the individual subsumed by a transcendental ideal. A provocative claim, 
indeed, and, as with all provocative claims, it is also one worth investigating. How impersonal is 
Milton’s first-person, autobiographical statement, “I met [Salmasius] in single combat and 
plunged into his reviling throat this pen, the weapon of his own choice”? The innocent labors 
heralded in Picciotto’s title would have us believe that humans were made in the image of 
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Raphael, the mild-mannered and congenial angel, and not his more cantankerous and solitary 
God, whose conspiratorial defense of himself against suspected allegation more closely 
resembles how Milton the polemicist actually wrote. Even assuming we were made in the image 
of Raphael, however, that would not by itself preclude dissent and difference. As the work of 
N.K. Sugimura demonstrates, the angelic world consists in a “totality of oneness in which 
differences nonetheless abound,” as Milton tries to reconcile “the Many and the one,” 
“difference with unity,” while at the same time not “compromising the idea of the individual, the 
union, or the theodicy in the process” (159; 195).  
Sugimura claims Milton “falls short” in his attempt to theorize a “transcendental unity or 
oneness” among the angels (195). However, I regard the persistent tension between the one and 
the many as a deliberate textual complication in Milton’s work, and, as such, one of his greatest 
achievements as a writer. Without it, solitude would have no place in his poetry and prose, or, for 
that matter, in the greater world. By intentionally withholding transcendental unity, Milton 
produces a version of solitude that locates the individual in a complex world of difference and 
division. Using the metaphor of God’s spiritual church, he writes in Areopagitica that  
there must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, 
ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid artfully together, it 
cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this world; neither can 
every peece of the building be of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that 
out of the many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes arises the goodly and the 
gracefull symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure. (YP 2, 555) 
In this life, at least, there can be no consensus among believers, much the same way that the 
architecture of a church consists not in a “continuous” and unified structure, but rather 
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“contiguous” subdivisions that “commend” the whole without elevating it to some transcendental 
status that dissolves the ontic divisions separating one individual from another, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of solitude. Truth is constructed in Milton’s world, but those 
constructing it do so through division and dissimilitude, not an unconditional commitment to 
worldly consensus. In fact, Milton seems intent on postponing consensus until the next life, if it 
should occur at all. As Balachandra Rajan observes, Milton identifies himself as among those 
Puritans committed to “multiplying dissensions as a creative ferment within which the collective 
search was to be launched and out of which the redeemed consensus would emerge” (11).5 While 
the teleological end still remains the “gracefull symmetry” of the redeemed church, it is a goal 
best achieved through “brotherly dissimilitudes,” which persist as palimpsestic traces that ensure 
solitude as a possibility, whether in heaven or hell, in Eden or the postlapsarian world.  
The metaphor of the church turns arborescent in the following passage, as Milton defends 
the “firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches” (YP 2, 556). The shift from rigid 
and lifeless stone and timber to the living root and its outspread branches, responsive to wind and 
weather, emphasizes change over time, but change that produces more variety, not less, as the 
tree grows into a labyrinthine network of intermingling (though not interpenetrating) branches. 
This image recalls Raphael’s description of spiritual growth in Paradise Lost, connecting 
Milton’s notion of solitary dissent with his monism. Describing the universe as “one first matter 
all / Indued with various forms, various degrees / Of substance, and in things that live, of life,” 
Raphael claims that humans might be able to “body up to spirit work,” a process he compares to 
a pullulating tree:  
So from the root  
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves,  
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More aerie, last the bright consummate floure  
Spirits odorous breathes: (5.472-482).  
By feeding on these “Spirits odorous,” Raphael implies that we, too, might become angelic, 
participating in conversation by intuition rather than discourse. Of course, that time is not yet 
come, and the convoluted syntax of Raphael’s speech works to remind us that we are very much 
still discursive beings, operating within the imperfect medium of words. Take, for instance, the 
start-stop of the lines following the colon of line 482, which read “flours and thir fruit / Mans 
nourishment, by gradual scale sublim’d / To vital Spirits aspire, to animal, / To intellectual, give 
both life and sense, / Fancy and understanding” (482-486). As an attempt to accommodate our 
understanding of spiritual rarefaction, this passage in many ways has the opposite effect on the 
reader. The phrase itself seems to restart multiple times, recreating in the mind of the reader the 
bifurcating structure of the very tree he is in the midst of describing. Its ramose feel enacts at the 
sentence level a process of growth that depends on a grammar of incongruity, which, 
extrapolated to the community, results in what John Rogers labels an “inflexible stratification” 
that complicates Milton’s otherwise “massive liberalization of the cosmos” (111; 113). Rogers 
attributes this hierarchy to Milton’s post-Restoration oligarchical politics, a late-in-life 
concession to rule by minority. Meanwhile, I would suggest that Miltonic hierarchies are 
consistent with his commitment to solitude and difference, in prelapsarian Eden and beyond. 
“Wherever beings are arranged in orders,” writes Diane McColley of Milton’s universe, “the 
arrangement is made for the augmentation of each member, for greater individuation through 
manifold relations, and for the greater splendor of their mutual joy” (Milton’s Eve, 39).  
The operative term in Raphael’s phrase “body up to spirit work” is the last one, since the 
task of ascending toward God is by no means easy, nor, I would add, is it collaborative among 
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humans, at least insofar as that term denotes perfect unity. Like God himself, who is “alone / 
From all eternity,” and in whose act of creation he casts down the “The black tartareous cold 
infernal dregs / Adverse to life,” we must all experience solitary trials that find us siphoning the 
“muddy pool of conformity and tradition” and cleaning “dung” from the “Augean stables” 
(8.405-406; 7.238-239). Christian freedom in fact depends on solitary acts such as these, in 
which we produce truth by separating good from evil, right from wrong. To be made in God’s 
image, “Inward and outward both, his image fair,” is to be made alone, which itself serves as the 
prerequisite for free thinking and choice (8.221). Without the “freedom to choose, for reason is 
but choosing,” writes Milton in Areopagitica, Adam would have been “a meer artificiall Adam, 
such an Adam as he is in the motions” (YP 2, 527). Similarly, the God of Paradise Lost describes 
Adam and Eve as “authors to themselves in all / Both what they judge and what they choose; for 
so / I formed them free, and free they must remain, / Till they enthrall themselves” (3.122-125). 
In what does this freedom consist, if not the freedom to make choices on their own, as solitary 
individuals, a freedom that a good marriage encourages, and a bad one impedes? Though 
expressed in the language of freedom and choice, Milton voices his ideal definition of solitude 
through God at this moment, a solitude that brings with it the ability to think and act in a manner 
completely and unimaginably free. In solitude, a person can choose to “stand and wait,” or, if the 
occasion demands it, Samsonically rise up, “Like that self-begotten bird / In the Arabian woods 
embossed,” who suddenly reemerged, “vigorous most / When most unactive deemed” (1699-
1705). Rather than an effect of these decisions, Miltonic solitude functions as their precondition. 
We must be alone when choosing; otherwise, choosing itself fails to be a free action, becoming 
instead a version of group-think. While many Christians can (and should) make the same choice, 
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they must make that choice individually, hence Milton’s emphasis on reading and interpreting 
the Bible by oneself.  
Nor does marriage automatically eliminate an individual’s solitude. For all of Milton’s 
talk in the divorce tracts about marriage as a union of like minds—and there is a lot of such 
talk—he ultimately conceives this union not as complete unity, but as a peaceful opportunity to 
manifest individual difference. “[T]he soul,” writes Milton in Tetrachordon, “cannot well doe 
without company, so in no company so well as where the different sexe in most resembling 
unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but please best and be pleas’d in the aptitude of 
that variety” (YP 2, 597). Many scholars assume Milton conceived of marriage in terms of an 
Aristotelian model of friendship based in the likeness of the partners, and to a certain extent this 
is clearly the case. After all, God proclaims in Paradise Lost that Eve was created in Adam’s 
“likeness” (8.450). Yet, Milton’s emphasis here in Tetrachordon and elsewhere in his poetry and 
prose on the “different sexe” and the “unlikenes” of the partners suggests he was as much or 
more influenced by a Greek pederastic model of friendship. Adapting this model to suit a 
heterosexual union, he replaces the hierarchy of man/boy found in the works of Plato and other 
Greek texts with the hierarchy of husband/wife, as reified in the much-discussed description of 
Adam and Eve as “He for God only, she for God in him” (4.299). While Eve is created in 
Adam’s “likeness,” implying the Aristotelian model, it is important to remember that likeness is 
not sameness, and that differences abound even between the partners of an ideal marriage. True 
as it might be that husband and wife offer “mutual help / And mutual love” to each other, the 
help and love they bring to marriage necessarily differs depending on the individuals involved 
(4.727-728). So committed is Milton to this idea of individual difference in marriage that he 
chooses to endorse it even when that endorsement means disrupting the gendering of the 
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aforementioned hierarchy. In the event that a woman should “exceed her husband in prudence 
and dexterity,” Milton writes, “the wiser should govern the lesse wise, whether male or female” 
(YP 2, 589). The sheer radicality of this statement demonstrates the importance of hierarchy to 
Milton’s conception of marriage, a hierarchy that imports difference and solitude into the marital 
arrangement, no matter which gender takes the lead. 
Milton returns to the idea of individual difference only a few pages later in Tetrachordon. 
To the extent that “the unity of minde is neerer and greater then the union of bodies,” he argues,  
so doubtles, is the dissimilitude greater, and more dividuall, as that which makes between 
bodies all difference and distinction. Especially when as besides the singular and 
substantial differences of every Soul, there is an intimat quality of good or evil, through 
the whol progeny of Adam, which like a radical heat, or mortal chilnes joyns them, or 
disjoyns them irresistibly. (YP 2, 606) 
Though written in the service of defending divorce, this passage also reveals a lot about Milton’s 
understanding of marital unity, which always must account for the “the singular and substantial 
differences of every Soul.” Nor is this the only passage in which unity of mind involves degrees 
of difference. In the same way the “the unity of minde is neerer and greater then the union of 
bodies” in marriage, so too is marriage “the neerest resemblance of our union with Christ,” a 
passage that itself recalls Abdiel’s claim that God intends “to exalt / Our happy state under one 
head more near / United” and Raphael’s description of spirits “nearer to [God] placed or nearer 
tending” (YP 2, 606; 5.829-831; 476, my italics). Similarly, in Milton’s manifesto on pedagogy, 
Of Education, he writes that “The end then of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by 
regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like 
him, as we may the neerest by possessing our souls of true vertue, which being united to the 
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heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection” (YP 2, 367, my italics). In all these 
cases, unity consists in “nearness,” not sameness, suggesting residual and permanent difference 
via proximity. This is in contrast to Pico della Mirandola’s Orations on the Dignity of Man, a 
central text in Renaissance humanism. Pico’s work outlines a neo-platonic process by which a 
person might “gather himself into the centre of his own unity, thus becoming a single spirit with 
God in the solitary darkness of the Father, he, who had been placed above all things, will become 
superior to all things” (121). Whether in marriage in particular or his theology more broadly, 
Milton strategically and repeatedly avoids defining unity as consisting in what Pico calls a 
“single spirit.” Instead, unity involves a version of likeness that must always take into 
consideration the “singular and substantial differences of every Soul,” enabling solitude to 
persist within godly society, even the society of marriage. These differences of soul, which exist 
among the angels, too, as demonstrated during Satan’s decision to rebel, but also Abdiel’s 
decision to stand firm, maintaining a “constant mind / Though single,” create opportunities for 
solitary trial “by what is contrary” throughout Milton’s moral universe (5.902-903).  
Reading these passages alongside one another, I am inclined to qualify Stephen Fallon’s 
monistic interpretation of Milton’s “union of minds,” which, he argues, “is more than 
metaphorical” (76). In the first passage cited above, Milton identifies the soul as merely 
“resembling unlikeness,” but the second passage reveals that “every soul” contains “singular and 
substantial differences,” a statement that accords with Milton’s metaphor of the church 
consisting in “brotherly dissimilitudes,” and often using the same language. Unlike the divine 
union of God and Son, where, despite Milton’s anti-Trinitarianism, the two are still “one” to the 
extent that “they speak and act as one,” the union of husband and wife still admits of individual 
differences (YP 6, 220). The Son might unite with God “in the same way as we are one with 
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him,” but the union of like minds in marriage is a unity that in many ways still actively promotes 
difference (YP 6, 220).6 In short, then, Miltonic marriage ends not in perfect unity, much less the 
conformity (literally, having the same form) implied by Fallon’s monistic and non-metaphoric 
union. The unity of marriage emerges as an effect of preliminary and permanent individual 
differences, and while the “one flesh” of marriage constitutes a “union of the most intimate 
nature,” it is not therefore “indissoluble or indivisible,” as Milton states in Christian Doctrine 
(YP 6, 371).  
That these individual differences signal a good version of marital solitude, and not simply 
individuality, is paradigmatically registered in the final image of Milton’s epic, in which Adam 
and Eve “hand in hand with wandering steps and slow, / Through Eden took their solitary way” 
(12.648-649). The apparent contradiction of these final lines—a couple together, yet still alone—
flustered eighteenth-century critic Richard Bentley to such a degree that he emended them to suit 
his own understanding of marriage based, much as critics after him, on mutuality and likeness. 
This is not to deny that the language of likeness pervades the divorce tracts, and, furthermore, 
that solitude is roundly condemned. Fallon’s argument in favor monism insists “the dualism of 
the tracts is conscious and strategic,” and that Milton “separat[es] his audience into wise monists 
and blind dualists.” I would add to his observation that Milton’s use of monism is also strategic. 
Milton argues for the inseparability of properly married couples in terms that verge on monistic 
because this argument, the monistic one, actually affords him the opposite argument, which 
states that improperly married couples should be able to separate lawfully. However, his 
emphasis on individual difference still appears at key moments throughout the divorce tracts, 
beginning with the prologue to The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, where Milton describes 
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himself as “the sole advocate of a discount’nanc’t truth,” suggesting the solitude he denounces 
throughout the tracts is not the same solitude that attended their literary production (YP 2, 224).  
The following chapters take as their starting point the idea that Milton’s world is one of 
trial, that trial entails making a difference, and, finally, that this difference is both a sign and 
surety of our solitude. Of course, as with any trial, physical or spiritual, defeat is always a 
possibility. Despite his best efforts to convince her to “trial choose / With me, best witness of thy 
virtue tried,” Eve wanders off, a wandering that recalls the Latin meaning of “error,” to stray 
mentally or geographically. Contending that God has prepared them for trials “single or 
combined,” Eve insists they work alone, since “virtue unassayed” is really no virtue at all (9.339; 
335). In terms of its logic, this statement is strikingly similar to Milton’s claim in Areopagitica 
that he “cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d.”7 Yet, Adam’s 
desire that she “trial choose” with him complicates matters by calling into question not only what 
constitutes trial, but also, insofar as trial involves solitude, what it means to be “single,” both 
here and elsewhere in Milton’s works. How will we know when a real trial manifests, as opposed 
to some lookalike? Moreover, is not this waiting itself a form of trial, one that tests our ability to 
differentiate between trials real and those spurious? If solitude is necessary for trial, must we 
always be alone, and thus always ready to contend with adversity in the event of its appearance? 
Must we, as Eve suggests to Adam, “divide our labors” (9.214)? The answers to these questions 
are complex, and often differ, depending on the situation. Stanley Fish has built a career around 
the possibility of our reading these contexts incorrectly, which, for him, is less a possibility than 
inevitability. For Fish, the reader is always already unfit, and thus doomed to misread Milton’s 
work, a situation that has many feeling as though perhaps the only fit reader of Milton is Fish 
himself, whose panoptic glance in Surprised by Sin sees the poem as a “unity, infused at every 
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point with a single stable meaning” (354). I take a much different approach to Milton’s poetry. 
Through my analysis, I demonstrate that Miltonic trials, including the trial of reading the poet’s 
own words, need not end in interpretive failure, though we must, indeed, “divide our labours” as 
critics. To read aright, we must read alone, according to Milton, who believes that trials must be 
confronted individually, even trials such as those posed by his own poetry, which involve many 
people reading the same text, responding to the same general problem set. Readers may treat 
these chapters, then, as exercises in the Miltonic sense of that term, a grasping at the “truth” of 
his poems through five solitary trials. 
That Milton so consistently associates solitude with moments of trial and interpretation 
might suggest an affinity between the poet and the new scientists, who likewise hailed solitude as 
necessary for trials of their own. The scientific experiments conducted by members of the Royal 
Society, while certainly generating lively public debate, also initiated what Steven Shapin calls 
“a retreat to a redefined and relegitimatized solitude,” as an older faith-based solitude was 
repurposed into a site to test a very different sort of faith, this one founded on reason and 
practices of empiricism (203). Following the precepts outlined in Francis Bacon’s Novum 
Organum, which promotes an inductive methodology that insists practitioners “travel always 
through the forest of experience and particular things,” the new scientists routinely use the words 
“try” and “trial” to describe their solitary activities (10). When discussing an experiment that 
involves heating various objects using a magnifying glass, for instance, Bacon invites readers to 
“Try an experiment with burning-glasses,” later commanding them, “the experiment should be 
tried” (123-124). Milton himself seems keenly aware of the potential connection between the 
solitary trials of his characters and the experiments conducted by the scientists while alone. As a 
number of critics have noted,8 the language of scientific empiricism surrounds Eve’s decision to 
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eat the fruit, a decision that occurs away from Adam, enabling a possible crossover between his 
version of solitude and the solitude of the scientists. The trials conducted by the solitary 
scientists, however, generally differ from those of Milton’s solitary characters. Whereas the 
scientists use solitude to search for a truth independent of the person performing the search, 
Milton believes that a person can actually be, as he puts it in Areopagitica, a “heretick in the 
truth,” yet believe for the wrong reason, placing much greater emphasis on the disposition of the 
person conducting the search than that which the search reveals. When God parades the animals 
before Adam, the point is not to perform a scientific experiment, since, as Adam admits, his 
spontaneous taxonomy is the result of God-endued apprehension. Rather, the trial is meant to test 
Adam himself, to see how well he can “judge of fit and meet.”  
Milton’s emphasis on the interrelation between solitude and choice can be traced back to 
God’s original creation, wherein he “retire[s]” from the world, appointing the Son, “His Word,” 
to take the “golden compasses” and “circumscribe this universe,” separating the heavens and 
earth from chaos, that “vast profundity obscure,” while “Cherub and seraph” observe this action 
“from the shore” (7.170-231). God’s solitude, his decision to separate and retire from the Son, an 
act that accords with Milton’s anti-Trinitarianism, sets the standard for all future Miltonic 
relationships. Importantly, Milton’s narratorial self-reference during the invocation to Book 7 
involves a separation conspicuously similar to the separation that occurs between God and Son 
only two hundred lines after it. Describing himself as a man “fallen on evil days, / On evil days 
though fallen, and evil tongues, / In darkness, and with dangers compassed round, / And 
solitude,” Milton quickly turns this pervading sense of loss into labor, instructing his muse to “fit 
audience find, though few,” and, furthermore, to “drive far off the barbarous dissonance / Of 
Bacchus and his revellers” (7.23-33). Replace the “fit audience” with “Cherub and seraph,” 
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among other angelic orders, and the “barbarous dissonance” with the “black tartareous cold 
infernal dregs,” and the scene begins to resemble God’s command that the Son circumscribe and 
order the universe, expelling any aleatory elements, while he withdraws to a place of solitude. 
Here, it is the muse, Urania, who performs the expulsion, and Milton who describes himself as 
alone. Though outsourced to his muse, this cleanup project resembles the decontaminations of 
the “Augean stables” or the “muddy pools.” Lest we confuse these acts of decontamination differ 
from the aforementioned “brotherly dissimilitudes,” we must remember that “brotherly 
dissimilitudes” imply organized difference through “gracefull symmetry,” whereas “barbarous 
dissonance” suggests complete and utter chaos in need of purgation. Different from each other, 
Milton and his God are also different from their respective creations, which are themselves 
different from all possible creations. In Milton’s view, differences are created, not ready-made, 
and solitude is the mode of that creation. Whereas the universe is the singular manifestation of 
God’s superior will, Milton’s discursive output attests to his own intellect and the ability to 
conjure “Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme” (1.16). In both cases, then, solitude 
coincides with a creation whose uniqueness guarantees the continued solitude of its author. 
In the postlapsarian world, the greatest threat is not difference, whose presence in God’s 
creation-by-division finds itself differentially repeated in seventeenth-century England. Rather, 
the real threat entails confusing difference for sameness. Solitude predicated on individual 
difference is therefore not the problem; in fact, it is concomitant with creation. This might seem 
counterintuitive, given that the fall is often figured in the early modern period as a moment of 
separation. In Milton’s view, however, the worst consequence of the fall is not more fracturing, 
but instead the opposite, a process of fusion, indeed, confusion. With this sort of confusion 
comes conformity, as evidenced by Catholics, whose servility Milton attributes to their continued 
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refusal of reformation theology. In refusing reformation, they refuse difference itself, since 
Reformation theology is an essential difference upon which depend any future theological 
differences. The way out of this predicament is not through more conformity, but more 
difference, since “out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly 
disproportionall arises the goodly and the gracefull symmetry that commends the whole pile and 
structure.” The “gracefull symmetry” of God’s reformed church, Milton implies, actually 
depends on the freely willed “dissimilitudes” of its members, whose differences function to 
ensure their solitudes. By this logic, solitariness is not one possible attitude among many; rather, 
it is the original and necessary comportment of a Christian living in a world constantly 
threatened by sameness and conformity.  
As the correlative of creation and difference, Miltonic solitude better facilitates our 
understanding of his unorthodox religion and politics than an analysis based solely on his 
tolerationist principles, which, Sharon Achinstein rightly observes, are largely absent from his 
epic poetry. “While Areopagitica praised the combat of ideas, singing admiringly of the noisy 
and diverse city of London,” she claims that, “in his epics, however, a positive representation of 
human difference and diversity is difficult to find” (227). Not difficult to find in his epics, 
though, are representations of solitude. Through each of their solitudes, Milton’s characters 
variously enact their ideological differences from each other, as well as from God, Satan, angels, 
animals, and even the reader. That Milton includes so many representations of solitude suggests 
his commitment to a wide range of belief and experience, while also registering his hesitancy 
concerning toleration, which, if applied without discretion, could actually limit difference 
through its emphasis on universal acceptance. If everyone is tolerated, then toleration itself 
becomes something of a categorical imperative, and, as such, a new version of conformity. This 
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perhaps explains Milton’s rampant anti-Catholicism. Unable to tolerate others, they are 
themselves intolerable, according to Milton. Instead of focusing on his principle of toleration, 
then, I contend that we must critically examine Milton’s solitude if we are to gain access to his 
complex political and religious convictions. Unlike the universal logic operative in toleration, 
which assumes a priori the potential worthiness of all, Milton prefers the experiential model of 
solitude, which serves as a space of trial, in which solitary figures must prove their worth, while 
also confirming his belief, first espoused in Areopagitica, and then again in Christian Doctrine, 
that “unto the pure all things are pure[,] but unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing 
pure, but even their mind and conscience is defiled” (YP 6, 535). Milton does not merely tolerate 
difference, as others suggest, he actively promotes it in and through solitude.  
If Miltonic solitude coincides with singular moments of creation, then it differs from the 
early modern notion of privacy. Often associated with the space of the closet, the word “privacy” 
typically involves property, and, for that reason, would call to the early modern mind the notion 
of oikos, or household economy. As Lena Orlin observes, the “Tudor closet had its genesis in the 
accumulation of valuable goods,” not the “self-expression possible in solitude” (299; 306). 
Orlin’s distinction between “valuable goods” (associated with privacy) and “self-expression” 
(associated with solitude) is often overlooked by other scholars of the period. Diana Webb, for 
instance, uses the terms “solitude” and “privacy” interchangeably, arguing that Renaissance 
privacy actually modeled itself on medieval religious solitude. In the late medieval period, she 
writes, the two phenomena intersected over a goal common both to religious solitaries and the 
emerging bourgeoisie alike, namely, the pursuit of secular knowledge. Eventually, she claims, 
solitude was no longer just a religious compulsion, but also a personal choice. “If Petrarch had 
had the word at his disposal,” she writes, “he might well have spoken of privacy rather than 
 20 
solitude” (155). According to Webb’s logic, by the time Italian humanism entered early modern 
English discourse, solitude was already coterminous with the privacy of the rights-based 
individual.  
To help explain these scholarly differences, one needs to examine how the word 
“privacy” evolved between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Orlin suggests, privacy 
was associated with property during the earlier of these centuries, not “the self-expression 
possible in solitude,” so that, contrary to Webb, Petrarch would likely not have used the word 
privacy when discussing his solitude. This arrangement changes by the mid seventeenth-century, 
however, as privacy begins to designate a specific variety of self-expressive solitude, but one that 
still preserves its connection to property. Retaining its affiliation with oikos, privacy of the 
seventeenth century specifies a version of solitude attached to certain locales and sets of religious 
and scholarly practices.9 Take, for instance, George Mackenzie’s “A Moral Essay, Preferring 
Solitude to Publick Employment,” which directly links the closet, a room considered private (and 
thus non-solitary) by current scholars, with a moment of self-expressive solitude. Mackenzie 
asserts that God “hath commanded us to retire to our Closets (the most solitary of all our rooms) 
and to make these yet more retired, hath ordained us to close the doors behind us when we make 
any religious applications to him” (51). When Mackenzie discusses the solitude of the closet, he 
identifies it with routine practices of devotion, including the simple habit of closing the door, 
which he says God “ordained.” For him, as for many other writers of the seventeenth century, the 
closet now does enable solitude, something it could not have done (or only very rarely done) in 
the sixteenth century of Orlin’s scholarship. However, it is solitude still attached to a specific 
place and a routine devotional practice, and for that reason it might more accurately be called 
privacy.  
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Milton also associates the solitude of privacy with specific places and practices. Every 
night in prelapsarian Eden, for instance, reason “retires / Into her private cell” while we sleep, as 
Adam explains to Eve in Paradise Lost (5.108, my italics). The practice occurs nightly, the place 
is always the same, which suggests that Milton identifies privacy with routine activities of 
everyday life. A similar use of privacy appears at the end of Paradise Regained. Inviting us to 
read the Son’s solitude in the desert as a supernatural—possibly even allegorical—experience for 
the better part of the poem, the narrator then employs bathos in its final two lines, emptying the 
poem of any metaphorical content when describing how “he unobserved / Home to his mother’s 
house private returned” (638-39). What began as an abstract solitude in the woods ends when the 
Son returns to his status as a “private” individual and to the private property of his “mother’s 
house.” In general, then, it might be said that Milton reserves the word “privacy” and its variants 
for domestic places and habits, while he employs the word “solitude” when referring to moments 
of trial, which, in all his poems, occur outside, typically in a thickly wooded setting. Despite 
these geographic differences, however, it is not always easy to decide when an everyday solitude 
of privacy might become the solitude of trial. Just because the Son (and narrator) easily 
distinguishes between the spiritual call to solitary trial in the desert and the “private” return to his 
“mother’s house” does not make the task any easier for the rest of us. I address the difficulties of 
this distinction in Chapter 3, when discussing Eve’s desire to exchange the domestic privacy of 
the bower for the solitary trial of the open field in Book 9 of the poem.  
Because of its affiliation with trial and overcoming, I find that Milton’s understanding of 
solitude prefigures the counter-Enlightenment’s orientation to solitude, especially that of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Though subscribing to vastly different belief systems, and situated on 
different sides of Enlightenment history, Milton and Nietzsche nevertheless represent what 
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theorist Jacques Derrida would describe as “friends of solitude, […] inaccessible friends, friends 
who are alone because they are incomparable and without a common measure, reciprocity or 
equality,” who will receive their messages within “the darkness of a friendship which is not yet” 
(35; 42-43). Specifically, Derrida has in mind those passages from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, in which the titular character, himself a prophet descended from his solitary 
residence on the mountain, seeks to teach not the common herd, but those “living companions 
who follow me because they want to follows themselves” (51). In a chapter from the book 
entitled “Of the Way of the Creator,” Zarathustra (and through him, Nietzsche) commands 
“Solitary man” to depart from the herd, but in such a way that he might become an Übermensch, 
a person who “create[s] beyond himself, and thus perishes” (91). Of course, despite these 
similarities between Nietzschean and Miltonic solitude, differences still abound between the two 
authors. Nietzsche’s Übermensch is someone who moves beyond Christian morality, a thought 
anathema to Milton. Yet, their mutual search for what Nietzsche (through Zarathustra) calls 
“living companions” and Milton calls his “fit audience” finds both thinkers alone for the same 
reason, each of them awaiting intellectuals who think like them by thinking on their own, that is, 
away from the herd. Writing from the shadows, to the shadows, both thinkers hope to find an 
intelligentsia of this sort, and, though they exist centuries apart, I would argue that each is an 
appropriate audience for the other. In the same way that Milton’s God keeps his back turned 
toward creation, “Throned inaccessible, but when thou shad’st / The full blaze of thy beams,” so 
these thinkers keep their metaphorical backs to each other, not as a sign of animosity, but in 
acknowledgment of their mutual commitment to the nonconformist principles of solitude (3.377-
378). 
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 Through the intersection of solitude and difference, then, my dissertation intervenes in 
critical debates that began in the seventeenth century, reemerge in the thinking of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and other counter-Enlightenment writers, and continue to matter today. Is it possible to 
be alone in the age of Internet and wireless devices, in which connectivity seems to encourage 
cultural conformity? Though his solitude is a response to conformity of a different sort, namely, 
the return to old political categories following the restoration of the king, as well as the proto-
Enlightenment value of democratic and/or scientific unity, Milton’s solitude not only teaches us 
about his own heterodox views, but also about the value of heterodoxy in a world of increased 
obedience to norms, where both the political left and right partake in a consumer culture that 
markets sameness in the guise of difference, where to be unique paradoxically means to be 
customizable. Whether I am discussing the original solitude of Adam in Paradise Lost or the 
solitude of Samson, that of Eve by the forbidden tree or the Son in the desert setting of Paradise 
Regained, I demonstrate the continued importance of solitude to Milton as a religious and 
political radical, whose commitment to a separatist ethic resulted in arguably the best poetry of 
his generation, as well as some of his generation’s most incendiary politics.  
 
Chapter Breakdown 
In chapter one, “‘Through Eden took their solitary way’: Solitude and Marriage in 
Paradise Lost,” I question Adam’s debate tactics before the fall, arguing that his consent to 
Eve’s departure marks his own departure from an individualist ethic he first learns while alone in 
Eden. My analysis begins with an examination of how Adam’s understanding of solitude 
coincides with the recognition of his profound difference from beast and God. I contend that this 
difference (as well as the solitude that attends it) persists through Eve’s creation and into their 
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marriage. Theirs is not a marriage based on exact likeness, but likeness in difference, society 
through solitude. Expanding on James Grantham Turner’s work, One Flesh, which finds their 
relationship a “vision of equality-in-difference,” this chapter argues that Eve’s “likeness” to 
Adam paradoxically results from the fact that both of them must learn to recognize difference in 
the world, indeed, their own differences from each other (Turner, 280; 8.450).  
In chapter two, “Satanic Solitude in the Works of Hobbes and Milton,” I demonstrate 
how solitude performs a critical task in each of their political philosophies. Hobbes believes 
solitude short-circuits the imagination, resulting in delusions of grandeur that perpetuate the state 
of nature, a “war of every man against every man.” Relying on Aristotle’s notion that a solitary 
person must be either a beast or a god, Hobbes considers solitude a state of exception, to borrow 
a phrase from Agamben. After delving into Hobbsian epistemology, and the way in which 
solitude disrupts its proper functioning, I turn to Milton’s Paradise Lost, and specifically his hell, 
which closely resembles the delusions of grandeur that Hobbes claims persist in his solitary state 
of nature. Milton’s Satan, I argue, bears a strong resemblance to Hobbes’s solitary man in nature. 
However, Milton’s solution to this Hobbesian problem is not the conformity that his philosopher 
counterpart imagines. In place of Hobbes’s either/or philosophy, which presents society and 
solitude as opposing ends of a political ultimatum, Milton advocates for a society comprised of 
solitary individuals, and similarity through and because of difference.  
My third chapter, “Placing Blame: Otium and Shade in Paradise Lost,” theorizes the 
entangled concepts of solitude and otium. Like his predecessors, Milton understands otium as a 
temporary retreat from the business of public life intended to cultivate the vita contemplativa, the 
life of the mind. In Eden, otium always occurs in umbra, or shade, while physical labor occurs in 
the sun, associations Milton adapts from classical and biblical sources. Eve breaks this spatial tie 
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the day of the fall, as she seeks knowledge in broad daylight, away from the “faithful side” that 
“still shades” her (9.265-266). A violation of Eden’s sacred geography, Eve’s decision turns the 
blissful otium of prefallen Eden into what Milton describes as “intense thought and labor” after 
the fall (YP 2, 596). Rather than place all the blame on Eve, however, I also use this chapter to 
discuss the many similarities between her desire for more knowledge, and the idleness that 
results from that desire, and Milton’s well-nigh constant concerns over his own use of otium and 
good time management. Like Eve, Milton feels as though he cannot produce literary fruits (in 
Eve’s case, literal fruits) until he has learned more, leading him to a five-year retirement 
following his master’s degree, during which time he lived on his father’s dole.  
I test the aforementioned connection between geographical and metaphorical loci in 
chapter four, “Allegory and Aloneness in Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,” a 
comparative analysis that examines the Son’s and Samson’s different responses to storms. 
Confronted by a storm that is made to appear allegorical, the Son immediately affirms its reality, 
even while tacitly admitting it could be read allegorically. In Samson Agonistes, a very different 
situation unfolds. Experiencing his own storm, Samson initially refuses to assign much meaning 
to it, claiming his “riddling days are past” (1064). Ultimately, though, he reads within the 
meteorological event an allegory of his own singular end, slaughtering the Philistines “As with 
the force of winds and waters pent” (1646). By relating his final act through the Messenger’s 
report, the poem suggests that any account of the event is already allegorical, thus confronting 
readers with their own fallen tendency toward allegoresis. If, as I suggest, reading Milton 
necessarily involves dividing our critical labors, this is the poem that proves it. More than any 
other poem in Milton’s corpus, Samson Agonistes divides critics ideologically, a division that 
Milton intends. The amicable disagreement among critics of the poem shows Milton’s “brotherly 
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dissimilitudes” in action, as we all strive to locate meaning in a poem that ultimately showcases 
our readerly differences and our solitudes.  
The fifth and last chapter, “Authorizing Solitude: Lucy Hutchinson and John Milton, 
Dalila and Samson” examines Hutchinson’s repurposing of the Samson and Dalila narrative. 
Aligning herself with Dalila, Hutchinson allegorizes a heroic image of the publicly dishonored 
Colonel, whom she identifies as a Samson figure. While doing so implicates her in an act of 
wifely betrayal, whether real or imagined, it also narrativizes her solitude as a self-authorizing 
act. Channeling the solitude of widowhood into an allegorical reworking of her marriage to the 
Colonel, Hutchinson complicates Milton’s notion of solitude by depicting it as the middle term 
in a negotiation between her family values and personal freedom. If Milton associates solitude 
with nonconformity, Hutchinson demonstrates that this sort of nonconformity poses different 
risks for women than it did for men, risks she is willing to take.
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“Through Eden took their solitary way”: Solitude and Marriage in Paradise Lost   
 
In Book 8 of Paradise Lost, Adam prefaces the world’s first autobiography with a basic 
observation: “For man to tell how human life began / Is hard” (8.250-251). Though spoken by 
Adam, this comment also directly implicates John Milton, who, not there to witness Adam’s 
beginning, must imagine the history of his formation. Apparently, Milton is up to the task. 
Through a vividly conceptualized account of Adam’s solitude, his longest treatment of the 
subject, Milton does more than just speculate about Edenic origins; he also intervenes in 
important debates about human nature and its assumed sociality. Using the Genesis myth, Milton 
overhauls Aristotle’s belief, a near constant in early modern thought, that man is a naturally 
social creature, and that our humanity depends on likeness. For Aristotle, solitude functions as 
the limit point of our humanity, in which its defining feature, our sociality, suddenly 
discontinues, and in place of the human there stands “a beast or a god” (1130).1 Alluding to 
Aristotle’s account of humanity, Milton depicts Adam alone and attempting to converse with 
animals and the deity. These conversations frustrate him, however, precisely because he is not a 
beast or a God, despite the fact that Aristotle’s maxim dictates that, while alone, he should be 
either one or the other. This revision on Milton’s part is especially crucial to understanding his 
conception of the human. In Aristotle’s account, a subject loses his/her humanity in solitude. 
Those who willfully leave society relinquish their likeness to other humans, and instead adopt 
the characteristics of a beast or a god. By contrast, Milton’s subject gains humanity while alone, 
a humanity that depends on his ability to differentiate himself from both beast and God. Rather 
than a humanity based in likeness, then, Milton’s humanity consists in radical otherness, as 
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Adam establishes his humanness via negativa, by what he is not. He knows he is human 
precisely because he differs from the solitary beasts around him, who “answer none returned,” as 
well as from God, whose solitude (“alone / From all eternity, for none I know / Second to me or 
like, equal much less”) renders him the physical embodiment of absolute difference (8.285; 405-
407). For Milton, then, solitude makes a world of difference, literally.2 Adam’s human ontogeny 
coincides with the dual realization that he is alone, and that to be alone is to be different from 
beast and God. If Milton promotes the “J” text of creation, which prioritizes Adam’s creation 
over Eve’s, it is primarily because this difference proves essential to his understanding of human 
development.3  
 Different from beast and God, Adam is also different from Eve, whose God-decreed 
“likeness” to him consists, first and foremost, in the fact that, like Adam, she too is born alone, 
and she too must establish her subjectivity via negativa (8.450).4 Even this likeness, however, 
contains a difference, since, contrary to her male counterpart, who differentiates himself from 
beast and God, Eve is forced to choose between different versions of herself, one which appears 
as a “shape within the watery gleam,” and another in the form of godly Adam, her “other half” 
(4.461; 488). Born into different solitudes, Adam and Eve recognize and respond to different 
differences. As a result, they bring to marriage different understandings of difference itself.5 
Whereas God is so different that his difference cannot be thought (he truly is “alone / From all 
eternity”), Eve represents difference within reason, a recognizable difference, rendering both 
their solitudes finite, and therefore manageable. A union of idealized difference, Milton uses the 
first couple to show that, as he writes in Tetrachordon, there are “singular and substantial 
differences of every soul,” and that couples are to some degree always apart, even while in the 
presence of one another (YP 2, 606). In this way, the poet builds on the work of a diverse range 
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of writers, including Montaigne (“real solitude […] may be enjoyed in the midst of cities and the 
courts of kings” even if it “is best enjoyed alone”), Francis Bacon (“little do men perceive what 
solitude is, and how far it extendeth[,] For a crowd is not company”), and Robert Burton, who 
diagnoses his entire generation as one affected by solitude, among others (Montaigne, 176; 
Bacon, 37). Opposite these texts, though, which often deal in platitudes, Milton’s poem is a 
dynamic and evolving system, where solitary figures interact and respond to one another, all the 
while preserving their essential difference.6  
 Adam and Eve try to establish this fit society of solitary members in Eden, and eventually 
they succeed, though only after it is too late. Leaving paradise, the narrator describes how they 
“hand in hand with wandering steps and slow, / Through Eden took their solitary way,” a way 
that is solitary because, anatomically, clasped hands originate on opposite sides of the body, and 
interfacing palms meet at perpendicular angles, suggesting likeness through difference, society 
through singularity (12.648-649). This is precisely the sort of society that John Rumrich denies 
as a possibility in Matter of Glory when writing that, during the separation scene, “One of them 
must get his or her way—they cannot both stay together and be apart” (124). But perhaps they 
can “stay together and be apart,” or else be apart physically and still “get his or her way” by 
agreeing to disagree, to be together in and through their mutual commitment to difference. Much 
depends, then, on how we read the separation scene, in which Adam and Eve set out to debate 
the role of solitude within their marriage, a process that likewise finds them holding hands 
(“from her husband’s hand her hand / Soft she withdrew”) (9.385-386). Referring to this scene, 
Mary Beth Long argues that “Adam considers solitude a test he has already endured, while Eve 
thinks of it as a privilege she has yet to attain” (106). Though he has “already endured” physical 
solitude, Adam seems unable to endure it any longer, as he tries and fails to persuade Eve to keep 
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their differences between them. “[T]rial choose / With me, best witness of thy virtue tried,” he 
tells her, attempting to convince her that he represents the differential ideal, not Satan (9.316-
317). Not only does Adam fail to persuade Eve, however, he ultimately consents to her choice, 
even commanding her to “Go,” not once, but twice (9.372-373). That Adam fails because he 
appeals to Eve as an authority figure, thereby disrupting the harmonious balance of a marital 
conversation that depends on differences of mind, we eventually learn from the Son, who arrives 
in Book 10 to pass judgment on the couple. “Was she thy God?” he asks Adam, in a question 
that applies as much to the consent he gives prior to her departure as it does to his decision to 
partake of the fruit (10.145). During his previous solitary conversation with God, an authority 
figure if ever there was one, Adam maintains his composure, logically arguing for and receiving 
a mate whose difference from him is like his difference from her. When that very same mate 
argues with him in favor of physical solitude as a way to test those differences, though, Adam 
falters mid-conversation, agreeing with Eve’s decision to leave not based on the merits of her 
argument, with which he clearly disagrees, but simply owing to the fact that she is his wife.  
In Milton’s Eve, Diane McColley argues that Adam’s “final speech changes direction” 
because he “finds in his own word ‘obedience’ illumination for his rapidly working mind and 
comprehends what true obedience is” (181). The obedience to which McColley refers here is the 
obedience of Eve. She must prove her constancy to God while away from Adam, and, finally 
realizing this fact, Adam instantly (some might argue overhastily) insists that she go. McColley 
defends this reading by suggesting that Adam’s “rapidly working mind” “incorporates” Eve’s 
logic into his own argument, an “integration” that shows his acumen as a critical thinker (180-
181).7 Her argument thus seems to imply that the ideal conversation for Milton consists in 
sameness of mind, as Adam recognizes his mistake, and, agreeing to Eve’s decision, he actually 
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integrates his thought into hers. Adam thinks quickly only, it seems, to realize he must think 
more slowly, like Eve. Is Adam’s consent an instance of “integration,” though, or is it more 
along the lines of acquiescence? Moreover, should sameness of mind be the conversational goal 
in Eden, or perhaps likeness through difference, unity through singularity? Though McColley 
acknowledges that, “On the whole, singular virtue is commended in the poem,” her argument 
clearly privileges Eve’s singleness over Adam’s at this moment (173). Eve gets her solitude; 
meanwhile, Adam “incorporates” himself, at least discursively, into her line of thinking. I will 
save the discussion of Eve’s desire for solitude for another chapter. Now, I wish to focus on 
Adam’s consent, contrasting his audacity before God in Book 8 with his acquiescent attitude 
toward Eve prior to her departure. As the Son’s admonishment reveals, Adam is in some ways 
worse than those who “beleev things only because his Pastor sayes so, or the Assembly so 
determins, without knowing other reason” (YP 2, 543). He does have “other reason” for denying 
Eve, yet gives her permission anyway. Make no mistake: I am not suggesting that Adam should 
turn contrarian, adopting disagreeable beliefs simply for argument’s sake. Until the moment he 
tells her to go, however, Adam does evince real and pressing concerns about Eve’s departure. 
Whether he is right or wrong about those convictions is less important than the fact that he 
genuinely believes them. Why he renounces those beliefs, as well as the effect of that 
renunciation, will be the subject of discussion in the pages that follow. I argue that Milton is not 
interested in human equality per se, at least insofar as equality implies sameness, but instead 
what James Grantham Turner labels a “vision of equality-in-difference,” which has the 




 Adam’s humanness develops out of his attunement to animal otherness, a process that 
begins shortly after God places him in solitude.9 To explain this development, I integrate into my 
analysis aspects of Agamben’s The Open, an exegesis of Heidegger’s theory of animality. Much 
as Heidegger did before him, Agamben identifies humanness as consisting of different stages of 
profound boredom. Though Adam temporarily enjoys an animal existence, as indicated through 
his description of how he “gazed” at the “ample sky,” then “By quick instinctive motion” stood 
up, “thitherward endeavoring,” implying a birdlike ambition, nevertheless, this happiness quickly 
turns to despair, and despair gives way to boredom (8.258-260). As this youthfulness exuberance 
subsides, and Adam begins to recognize his difference from the sun, the earth, the hills and dales, 
rivers, woods, plains, and the other fair creatures, he starts to question himself, leading to the 
first-ever existential crisis:  
But who I was, or where, or from what cause, 
Knew not; to speak I tried, and forthwith spake, 
My tongue obeyed and readily could name 
Whate’er I saw. Thou sun, said I, fair light 
And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay, 
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains, 
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, 
Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here? 
Not of myself; by some great maker then, 
In goodness and in power pre-eminent; 
Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, 
From whom I have that thus I move and live, 
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And feel that I am happier than I know. 
While I thus called, and strayed I knew not whither, 
From where I first drew air, and first beheld 
This happy light, when answer none returned, 
On a green shady bank profuse of flowers 
Pensive I sat me down; there gentle sleep 
First found me, and with soft oppression seized 
My drowsed sense, untroubled, though I thought 
I then was passing to my former state 
Insensible, and forthwith to dissolve. (270-291, my italics) 
In the twenty-one lines of poetry cited here, the first-person singular pronoun “I” appears sixteen 
times. Twice during the first six of these lines the pronoun “I” directly contrasts with the deictic 
“thou,” as in “thou sun” and “thou enlightened earth,” indicating a nascent I-Thou relationship, a 
fact Thomas Luxon also notices (102). Here, Adam recounts to Raphael his trouble in separating 
himself from his environment using language resembling that struggle. As Adam relates how he 
became more aware of his own subjectivity, the frequency of the first-person pronoun increases, 
until, at last, a frustrated Adam gives up his attempt to commune with nature “when answer none 
returned.” Rather than delight, as Diane McColley suggests in her article on Edenic 
creatureliness, Adam’s initial encounter with the creaturely world manifests a complete lack of 
interest that results in ennui, a difficult but necessary phase on the way to humanness (61). 
Explicating Heidegger’s most important term, Agamben writes that “Dasein is simply an animal 
that has learned to become bored,” an education that animals simply cannot receive (70). While 
the animal is in the world, it cannot comport itself to its being-in the world, and therefore it 
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lingers in a doubly closed off space, suspended between itself and its environment, while 
unopened to either of those realities (54). Meanwhile, the human learns to recognize its 
unopenedness during profound boredom, which Heidegger styles “that solitariness in which each 
human being first of all enters into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to 
world” (8). This is the solitariness that Adam begins to recognize after the creatures “answer 
none returned.”  
 Despite its importance in activating his humanness, ultimately this version of solitude-as-
boredom proves unsustainable. Knowing this, God quickly intervenes. As Adam lingers between 
the human and animal worlds, bored by the latter, yet not fully occupying the former, God places 
Adam in a trace-like state. “[S]uddenly,” he says, there “stood at my head a dream”  
Whose inward apparition gently moved 
My fancy to believe I yet had being, 
And lived: one came, methought, of shape divine, 
And said, Thy mansion wants thee, Adam, rise, 
First man, of men innumerable ordained 
First father, called by thee I come thy guide 
To the garden of bliss, thy seat prepared. 
So saying, by the hand he took me raised, 
And over the fields and waters, as in air 
Smooth sliding without step, last led me up 
A woody mountain; whose high top was plain, 
A circuit wide, enclosed, with goodliest trees 
Planted, with walks, and bowers, that what I saw 
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Of earth before scarce pleasant seemed. (292-306) 
Commanding him to “rise,” for his “Mansion wants thee,” God effectively prevents Adam from 
reverting to his previous animalism. In Adam’s recasting, God functions as a “disinhibitor,” 
which, Agamben writes, deactivates the not-open by revealing it as such, a circular process, 
insofar as the disinhibitor is also revealed through this deactivation. While Adam begins to 
realize the animal world is not open to him once he enters his pensive state, it is not until God 
becomes apparent as a disinhibitor that Adam concludes his anthropogenesis.10 With God 
revealed to him as such, Adam explains to Raphael how he “named” the animals “as they passed, 
and understood / Their nature, with such knowledge God endued / My sudden apprehension: but 
in these I found not what methought I wanted still” (352-355). If the first stage of Adam’s 
profound boredom commences “when answer none returned,” and the second stage begins when 
he pensively retires to the shady embankment, then the third and final stage of bored solitude 
occurs once God “endued” Adam with the “sudden apprehension” that allowed him to 
understand the animal’s “nature” as a closing off.  
 Profoundly bored by the surrounding creatures, whose difference from him he just now 
understands as difference, Adam next tries to converse with God. Whereas the creatures bore 
Adam, God completely overwhelms the first man. As Luxon astutely observes,  
Conversation with God could make Adam even more godlike, but in the end friendship 
with God the Father is out of the question, even though Milton fancies that Adam 
conversed at length with God and together they made a new being, a woman to be 
Adam’s proper friend. God does not need a friend, so the two cannot get the same things 
from each other as friendship requires; they are hopelessly unequal. Until Adam lives in 
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heaven, he cannot live with God; besides, carrying on a conversation with God appears to 
overwhelm Adam. (113) 
Luxon is right to point out that God is “hopelessly unequal.” At the same time, I question what it 
means to be Adam’s “proper friend.” According to Luxon, who locates Aristotle in Milton’s 
thinking on friendship, a proper friend is a friend of likeness, and God cannot be a proper friend 
because he is so different. Though I agree about God’s radical difference, I hesitate to say that 
the ideal friendship for Milton is one of equality, assuming equality implies likeness. If Eve 
makes an ideal companion, it is because she is hopefully unequal, in contrast to God, who is 
“hopelessly unequal.” The problem for Adam is not difference itself, but that God is too 
different, his alterity too great for Adam to comprehend. Meanwhile, Eve is perfectly different. If 
not for reasons of difference, why else would God make them in such a way that “He [is] for 
God only, she for God in him” (4.299)? This basic dissimilitude suggests that Milton’s 
understanding of friendship is not based in likeness, but in difference, though, to be sure, 
difference within reason. God’s difference is extrarational, the creatures’ difference is irrational, 
while Adam and Eve’s difference is perfectly rational, which is what allows them to recognize 
and respond to their difference from each other.  
 Eve’s difference from Adam also means that his solitude does not end with her creation; 
rather, it continues into their marriage. Though it might seem counterintuitive, this understanding 
of marriage helps explain both the importance of the separation scene, as well as the final image 
of the text, in which the couple makes their solitary exit out of paradise. Unlike Aristotle’s notion 
of friendship based in likeness, Milton conceives of friendship, for which Puritan marriage is the 
ideal, as involving two people “most resembling unlikeness and most unlike resemblance.” 
When God tells Adam that he  
 37 
Knew it not good for man to be alone, 
And no such company as then thou sawst 
Intended thee, for trial only brought, 
To see how thou couldst judge of fit and meet: 
What next I bring shall please thee, be assured, 
Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, 
Thy wish, exactly to thy heart’s desire (8.445-451) 
we must read his lines within a general understanding of Milton’s notion of friendship-as-
difference. Eve’s “likeness” to Adam actually consists, paradoxically, in her “most resembling 
unlikeness,” which has the effect of proliferating difference, thereby prolonging solitude. To 
rephrase God’s edict, then, it is “not good for man to be alone” by himself. Adam is not capable 
of living like God, “alone / From all eternity” (8.405-407). Adam needs a mate whose difference 
from him resembles (is “like”) his difference from her, and in that way they are alike through 
their difference from one another. The “single imperfection” that Adam laments is not solitude 
per se, but a solitude that is so radically different from the solitudes of beast and God that it 
confounds thought. Adam needs a companion who can help him contemplate what it means to be 
alone, though without giving up that aloneness, and Eve is that person. Initially, Adam seems to 
mistake Eve for another version of himself. Enthralled by her new presence, Adam declares, “I 
now see / Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh, myself / Before me” (8.494-496). As God states, 
however, Adam is able to “judge of fit and meet,” and eventually he revises this initial 
assessment, claiming “her the inferior, in the mind / And outward also her resembling less / His 
image who made both” (8.541-544). Nor are these gender differences, outward and inward, 
faults of nature. “Accuse not nature,” Raphael admonishes Adam, advising him to “weigh with 
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her thyself,” and also that love “hath his seat / In reason, and is judicious, [and] is the scale / By 
which to heavenly love thou mayst ascend” (8.561; 570; 590-592). Using metaphors of “weight” 
and “scale,” Raphael has to remind Adam that Eve is different, but that this difference is entirely 
necessary, lest he return to a beastlike state, “sunk in carnal pleasure” (8.593).  
 Adam’s difference from Eve, then, depends upon an even greater difference between 
human and animal, and it is this latter difference that informs Milton’s reasoning for divorce, as 
well as his vitriolic response to the “swainish” respondent to his divorce tracts. As Julia Lupton 
appositely remarks, “To be single, without a helpmeet (either outside marriage or within an 
unhappy one), is for Milton the sign of an unfinished or decompleted creature” (186). If solitary 
Adam ascends toward godliness but stops at humanness, the unhappily married spouse, also 
described as solitary, descends from humanness to a state of absolute beastliness. This is the 
same solitude Adam initially experiences, which foments his existential crisis. On the verge of 
returning to the beastly state from which he just emerged, Adam would have persisted in this 
condition, were it not for the disinhibiting presence of God, whose intervention completes his 
humanness. While Adam narrowly avoids returning to a state of beastliness, Milton worries that 
an unhappily married spouse might not be so lucky, believing such a person might actually revert 
to a beast. Thus, he emphasizes a marriage of minds of “unlike resemblance,” whose difference 
prevents the marriage from becoming one wherein the only dissimilarity is bodily, leading to 
animal lusting. There must be difference of thought and opinion, not simply difference of sexual 
organs. Milton argues passionately, if perhaps incorrectly, that God ordained marriage not to 
assuage “meer motion of carnall lust” or “the meer goad of a sensitive desire,” since “God does 
not principally take care for such cattel” (YP 2, 251). In place of the more conventional reading 
of Pauline doctrine, Milton maintains that 
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mariage is a human society, and that all human society must proceed from the mind 
rather then the body, els it would be but a kind of animal or beastish meeting; if the mind 
therefore cannot have that due company by mariage, that it may reasonably and humanly 
desire, that mariage can be no human society, but a certain formalitie, or gilding over of 
little better then a brutish congresse, and so in very wisdome and purenes to be dissolv’d. 
(YP 2, 275) 
Already more than a metaphor, the language of “kind” will eventually give way to language of 
animal equivalence. “Since wee know it is not the joyning of another body will remove 
lonelines, but the uniting of another compliable mind,” Milton writes in The Doctrine, it will 
therefore be “no blessing but a torment, nay a base and brutish condition to be one flesh, unlesse 
where nature can in some measure fix a unity of disposition” (YP 2, 327). Many would “regain 
from [this] dissolute and brutish licence,” Milton insists, if divorce were permitted (355). 
Instances such as these—and many more occur in Tetrachordon and Colasterion—attest to the 
fact that Milton does not merely use animals analogously; he actually believes humans will 
become beasts in a bad marriage.11  
 Similar references to brute conjugality appear in Erasmus’s marriage colloquies, though 
in service of defending marriage against divorce. While in The Godly Feast, Erasmus, through 
the voice of Timothy, blames the husband for a failed marriage (“Often it’s our own fault that 
our wives are bad, either because we choose bad ones or make them such, or don’t train and 
control them as we should”), his other colloquies are more critical of the shrewish wife for a 
marriage gone wrong (187).12 In Marriage, for instance, Eulalia tells her friend, Xanthippe, the 
stock termagant, that “As a mirror, if it’s a good one, always gives back the image of the person 
looking at it, so should a wife reflect her husband’s mood, not being gay when he’s sad or merry 
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when he’s upset” (313). However, Xanthippe refuses to forgive her husband, lambasting his 
behavior as “too savage,” claiming she would prefer to “sleep with a brood-sow than with such a 
husband” (317, 310). Acknowledging that divorce used to be “a remedy for irreconcilable 
differences,” Eulalia nevertheless observes it “has been entirely abolished,” essentially telling 
Xanthippe that she must remain with her husband, even though he acts like, and possibly is, an 
animal (311). Whereas Erasmus maintains the institution of marriage even in the case of a 
husband who shows signs of beastliness, Milton argues that such beastly behavior contradicts the 
purpose for which marriage was first decreed, in effect, siding with Xanthippe.  
 By a “desire and longing” emplaced within him by God, Adam “put off an unkindly 
solitarines” through “the cheerfull society of wedlock,” Milton writes in The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce (YP 2, 251). The word “unkindly,” evocative of the unnatural, again 
establishes a link between the animal and the unhappy spouse, who will return to this “unkindly” 
state without the ability to divorce. Whereas Adam evolved from an animalistic state to his 
present humanness through God’s disinhibiting grace, ultimately declaring his desire for a mate, 
the unhappily married person, already having desired a mate but ending up with an incompatible 
one, loses his or her humanity, forced to persist in an “unkindly solitarines.” The only way out of 
this predicament is through divorce, since “the solitarines of [an unhappily married] man […] 
hath no remedy, but lies under a worse condition then the loneliest single life; for in single life 
the absence and remoteness of a helper might inure him to expect his own comforts out of 
himselfe, or to seek with hope” (YP 2, 246-247). Seek with hope, yes, but for what? I contend 
that Milton hopes for someone different not only in body, but also in mind, whose inherent 
inequality will prolong solitude within marriage, alongside a helpmeet. This is the very person 
Adam receives in the form of Eve. Their differences, both physical and mental, are not at issue; 
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in fact, they are the positive sign of a healthy relationship, which, for Milton, always involves 
difference, and ultimately solitude. Returning to Paradise Lost, we will see that Adam seems to 
forget this fact the day Eve requests leave from him to work alone. While her rationale for 
leaving is important, my focus here is primarily on Adam’s reaction to that decision. Until he 
agrees to let her leave, Adam and Eve exemplify the perfect married couple, challenging each 
other, and through that challenge guaranteeing solitude’s continuation. They are different, and 
this difference is a sign and surety of their solitudes. By agreeing to let her go, though, Adam 
proves himself too much of “like” mind, thus decreasing his solitude. Ironically, his agreeing to 
her solitude is a diminution of his own.  
 
II. 
 The scene is a familiar one. A couple working together begin to bicker, and that bickering 
turns into a full-on argument. Yet, in this case, the couple consists of the ideal man and woman, 
and the argument takes place in a paradise made specifically for them. Some might find this 
situation odd, given that paradise would seem to signify harmony, not the sort of disunity we find 
in Adam and Eve’s dispute. For Milton, however, conflict is not something to be avoided; his 
perfect mate is not weak of will, but rather someone with whom he can meaningfully debate. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, their first debate in paradise concerns solitude itself. “Let us divide our 
labours,” Eve tells Adam, attempting to make literal/physical a division that already exists 
between them mentally (9.214). Her desire for geographic solitude is an outward expression of 
an inward disposition; she is already alone in her mind, but feels as though a physical separation 
might also benefit them, allowing them to ramp up production in the garden. Responding to her 
request, Adam does not debate her leaving on principle, even admitting that “solitude sometimes 
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is best society” (9.249). He recognizes the importance of physical solitude, which, it should be 
noted, Eve has already experienced on numerous previous occasions. Besides her initial solitude 
at the lake, she also tends to her nursery alone, gathers fruits for Adam and Raphael, and 
eavesdrops on their conversation from behind a “shady nook” (9.277). If Adam is opposed to her 
most recent bid for solitude, it is not on ideological grounds, but for reasons more specific. 
Believing her time spent alone poses a real threat to her virtue, Adam models a cruder version of 
an argument that has been adopted recently by certain American politicians, who seek to prevent 
rape by arguing that women should “avoid / The attempt itself” (9.294-295). We need not agree 
with Adam’s reasoning at this moment, any more than we need to agree with Eve’s request for 
time away from Adam. Of greater importance is the fact that they debate at all. Initiating this 
debate, Eve embodies the very independence she seeks from Adam through argumentation, an 
irony apparently lost on her. As Milton so eloquently states in Areopagitica, “that which purifies 
us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary” (YP 2, 515). Focused on trials to come, Eve 
temporarily forgets that the present debate is its own form of trial, the contrariness of their 
individual wills a test of their purity. Stanley Fish remarks in How Milton Works that “In the 
course of answering the question of what it means to garden, they garden themselves—that is, 
they encourage and/or retard the growth of the thoughts by which their situation in all of its 
aspects is conceived” (530). For Fish, this means “to grow in the exercise of obedience by 
discerning its imperatives in a number of situations,” the present one included (532). I, too, find 
the separation scene to be one of self-cultivation, though the model of growth Milton has in mind 
is supplied by Raphael, whose description of spiritual growth explains how “from the root / 
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves, / More aerie, last the bright consummate 
floure / Spirits odorous breathes” (5.472-482). Phrased with similar verdancy in Areopagitica, 
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the image becomes the “firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches” (YP 2, 556). 
In other words, spiritual growth entails a process of diversification, as each branch grows up next 
to and apart from those around it, creating unity of the whole plant through division of its 
branches.  
 Though not at first, Adam eventually recognizes this fact, and so attempts to shift the 
locus of her desired trial from further afield to right next to him, commanding her to “trial choose 
/ With me, best witness of thy virtue tried” (9.316-317). Adam sees in Eve a potentially wayward 
branch, and, as such, the topiarian within him tries to bend her will back towards him, that they 
might grow alongside each other, though still apart. In the same way that God tested Adam, 
whose solitude “for trial only brought,” Adam tries to convince Eve that her solitude is best 
tested with him, during the present “trial” of their debate (8.447). Unlike Adam, however, whose 
solitude was tested in God’s presence, Eve seeks her solitary trial away from Adam. This desired 
relocation effectively sidesteps Adam, her differential ideal, and thus the perfect witness of her 
solitude, a movement that also disrupts the Miltonic logic of “He for God only, she for God in 
him.” Much as Adam’s solitary conversation with God found him “Expressing well the spirit 
within [him] free,” he expects Eve to express a similarly self-assertive attitude in his presence, 
during the present trial of their conversation (8.440). Less experienced than Adam, though, Eve 
desires to test her solitude at a distance. The problem, then, concerns how Adam can persuade 
Eve to test her solitude in his presence, and to do so without coercion. To force Eve to test her 
solitude in his presence defeats the entire purpose of Miltonic solitude, which involves freely 
asserting oneself, “Expressing well the spirit within thee free.” Adam must convince Eve to test 
her solitude in his presence in such a way that her solitude is not compromised in the process. 
Milton himself was quite familiar with the rhetorical dilemma surrounding this version of 
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persuasion. In his prose tracts, he seeks an audience at once skeptical and convincible of his 
argumentative claims. Lacking skepticism, his readers might accept his arguments 
unquestioningly, exposing them to brainwashing. Yet, Milton still needs a convincible 
readership. If his readers prove too intransigent, then he lacks a reason to write altogether. 
Rhetorically, then, Milton’s aim must be to convince his prose readers to convince themselves of 
the veracity of his claims. His “fit audience” is one receptive to his arguments, though still 
discriminating. In other words, he seeks solitary readers capable of independent decision. While 
he supplies the argument, his readers must decide on their own the truthfulness of his words, or 
else risk believing him for the wrong reason, turning polemic into propaganda, persuasion into 
brainwashing.  
Adam encounters a similar rhetorical dilemma during his debate with Eve. He must 
convince her that he is her “fit audience,” the “best witness” of her solitary trial, thus “find[ing] a 
way out of the command/permission dichotomy that has entered the conversation,” in the words 
of Joan Bennett (114). Support for this understanding of solitary debate emerges at crucial 
moments in Milton’s divorce tracts, as well. Besides openly admitting that God’s edict against 
aloneness “holds not always,” Milton also tacitly argues for a marriage based on likeness of mind 
that still admits of individual difference (YP 2, 605). These differences are necessary to prevent a 
marriage of complete conformity, wherein two minds become indistinguishably one, thereby 
inhibiting the free agency of one or both parties. Despite his unwavering insistence that marriage 
consists in likeness of mind, Milton also claims that a good marriage occurs between two people 
“different [in] sexe, [that] in most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but 
please best and be pleas’d in the aptitude of that variety” (YP 2, 597). In passages such as this 
one, readers are made to realize that, for Milton, likeness of mind is decidedly not sameness of 
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mind, and that difference remains an important element of the marital arrangement. While the 
“unity of minde is neerer and greater then the union of bodies,” nevertheless, it is still only 
“neerer,” not the exact same, and nor should it ever be the same, according to Milton (YP 2, 
606). Still, his insistence on both likeness and difference in marriage, society and solitude, raises 
some interesting questions. If a “meet and happy conversation is the chiefest and the noblest end 
of marriage,” and marriage itself involves partners “most resembling unlikeness,” then exactly 
what does that conversation involve, and, moreover, how (and to what degree) does it permit 
differences of mind (YP 2, 246)? These questions are further compounded by Milton’s 
conspicuous reticence over their answers. In Colasterion, for instance, he vilifies the anonymous 
respondent to his divorce tracts for even asking them. Defending his claim that a good marriage 
consists in “pleasing conversation,” Milton vehemently rebukes his anonymous opponent for 
claiming not to know what conversation means, arguing that “if ignoble and swainish mindes 
cannot apprehend” what he means by the term, then clearly that person is in no position to 
understand the meaning of a good marriage (YP 2, 246; 740).  
Yet, I would argue Milton does provide an answer regarding what makes for “pleasing 
conversation,” just not directly. Instead, he models the pleasing conversation of a good marriage 
in the divorce tracts themselves through his engagement with an imagined audience that he 
assumes to be ideologically different than himself. Whereas Colasterion finds Milton locked in 
debate with a churlish and cretinous man, thus demonstrating what a bad marriage of 
mismatched minds looks like, a point convincingly articulated by Thomas Luxon in Single 
Imperfection, his other divorce tracts appeal to the consciences of those whose disagreement with 
him does not for that reason prevent them from engaging in the act of debate (68). However, 
such a conversation presupposes, and in many ways even depends upon, the inherent differences 
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of the interlocutors, which Milton implicitly acknowledges when describing himself at the start 
of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce as the “the sole advocate of a discount’nanc’t truth,” 
emphasis here on “sole” (YP 2, 224). A little later in the exordium, Milton vacillates between 
standing apart from the crowd to whom his doctrine is addressed and fully identifying himself 
with them, a tension registered through the alternating third-person singular (“he”) and first-
person plural (“us”) pronouns: 
He therefore who by adventuring shall be so happy as with successe to ease & set free the 
minds of ingenuous and apprehensive men from this needlesse thraldome, he that can 
prove it lawfull and just to claime the performance of a fit and matchable conversation, 
[…] he that can but lend us the clue that windes out this labyrinth of servitude to such a 
reasonable and expedient liberty as this, deserves […] to be reck’n’d among the publick 
benefactors of civill and humane life; above the inventors of wine and oyle. (YP 2, 240, 
my italics). 
Imploring those “minded to judge hardly” to “be still and heare all out, nor think it equall to 
answer deliberate reason with sudden heat and noise,” Milton asks his audience to remember that 
“many truths now of reverend esteem and credit, had their birth and beginning once from 
singular and private thoughts; […] and had the fate at first to be generally exploded and 
exclaim’d on by many violent opposers” (YP 2, 240). Rhetorically, then, Milton assumes from 
the outset an incredulous audience, but an audience whose powers of judgment enable them to 
decide for themselves—and by themselves—the tenability of the ensuing discourse. Milton’s 
ideal audience, then, like his ideal spouse, resides somewhere between those entirely unfit for 
conversation, such as the churlish respondent of Colasterion, and those who would consent to an 
argument through an appeal to authority, such as people who “beleev things only because his 
 47 
Pastor sayes so, or the Assembly so determins, without knowing other reason” (YP 2, 543). In 
short, the pleasing conversation of a good marriage resembles the pleasing conversation of 
polemic insofar as both involve differences of mind, differences that in a certain way protect the 
solitudes of those participating in it.  
Not only does Adam fail in this form of conversation, but he also succumbs to the very 
conformity he hopes to avoid imposing on Eve, “end[ing] the deliberation by acquiescing, out of 
his passion for Eve, to their separation” (Bennett, 155).13 Though he disagrees with her 
reasoning, he ends up consenting to it anyway. In an odd shift, Adam proves himself a poor 
witness of trial during the very conversation in which he tries to persuade Eve he is the “best 
witness” of her trial, which only reinforces Eve’s initial decision to leave. Verbally, Adam 
begins to falter the moment love turns into conformity: “Not then mistrust, tender love enjoins, / 
That I should mind thee oft, and mind thou me” (9.357-358). The verb “mind” has a number of 
possible meanings, but concomitant with the verb “enjoins,” we can assume its primary use in 
this context is to denote obedience. This reading finds further evidence a few lines later, when 
Adam exhorts Eve to “approve thy constancy” by “approv[ing] / First thy obedience” to him 
(9.367-368). In other words, the conversation no longer involves marshaling evidence for and 
against Eve’s departure. Rather, the discussion becomes a contest of wills, which assumes in 
advance that one of them must ultimately comply with the other, ending in conformity. Adam 
shifts the terms of the debate, which now concerns whom will capitulate first, him or her. 
Though Adam insists that Eve comply with his will, in reality, he is the one that assents to her 
reasoning. Exasperated, he finally commands her to leave: 
But if thou think, trial unsought may find  
Us both securer than thus warned thou seemst, 
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Go; for thy stay, not free, absents thee more; 
Go in thy native innocence, rely 
On what thou hast of virtue, summon all, 
For God towards thee hath done his part, do thine. (9.370-375) 
Employing a number of imperatives, Adam commands Eve to leave him, telling her to “Go,” to 
“rely,” to “summon,” and, finally, to “do” her part in protecting herself against potential threats. 
These imperatives give the illusion that Adam has retained power over the situation, and in some 
ways he still maintains control. Yet, in a larger sense, Adam loses power at this argumentative 
juncture. His belief that involuntary companionship (“thy stay, not free, absents thee more”) will 
create more solitude between them, and, correspondingly, that Eve’s departure will render them 
less alone, and thus more like each other, falsely assumes that conformity should be the end goal 
of marriage, that togetherness necessarily involves compliance. If compliance is the 
argumentative objective, however, then it only matters to be seen which side will comply with 
the other, and, in this case, that person is Adam. Though he frames it as a command, Adam’s 
final argument is derivative of Eve’s initial desire, as he tries to pass off (or integrate, to use 
McColley’s word) as his own idea the very argument that he receives from her.  
 As readers of the debate scene, our first inclination might be to speculate about how 
Adam might have acted differently in order to avoid this turn to conformist rhetoric. Should he 
have continued the debate to the point of complete exhaustion? At what point is it acceptable to 
concede defeat? These questions themselves provide their own answers, however, insofar as 
they, too, assume conversation is a contest of wills, in which struggle finally gives way to victory 
for one side. In other words, Adam’s failure is not his concession, but the shift he initiates in the 
conversational ethos that makes the idea of concession seem like a rational choice. Rather than a 
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piecemeal truth that proceeds in fits and starts, whose discontinuous temporal unfolding 
eventually yields a final form that might be likened to the “gracefull symmetry” of a church 
constructed of irregular blocks, as described by Milton in Areopagitica, or else a mature tree, 
whose branches, though growing in different directions, and to different lengths, still manage to 
create a pleasing gestalt, Adam instead chooses to endorse a version of truth whose emphasis on 
immediate results forecloses conversation, which now concerns who is right, and who wrong, 
who has “the” truth, and who does not. From this perspective, Adam’s concession, though still 
not appropriate, at least makes some sense. If truth is a thing to own, and if Adam, in the end, 
feels he is its owner, then his resignation is no different than the businessman, who, trying to sell 
his wares, ultimately loses the sale, or the doctor, who, believing he has the proper prescription, 
encounters an uncooperative patient, who refuses the medication. His changed perspective on the 
nature of truth makes it seem like he has no choice but to give up. 
That Adam does not initially or always think this way we gather from his claim that 
“from the influence of [Eve’s] looks” he “receive[s] / Acfcess in every virtue, in thy sight / More 
wise, more watchful, stronger, if need were / Of outward strength” (9.309-312). Derivative of 
neo-Platonic conceptions of love, in which the beloved’s presence motivated the lover—in this 
case, Adam—to become “More wise, more watchful, stronger,” the version of “influence” 
Milton poeticizes here also departs from his predecessors to the extent that Eve’s stay is not 
meant to alleviate conflict, but incite it (“trial choose / With me”). The point of this trial is not to 
be right, if by “right” we mean unilaterally imposing one’s will, nor is the goal to submit to 
another’s reasoning, as Adam does when he tells Eve to go “if thou think, trial unsought may 
find / Us both securer than thus warned thou seemst.” The conditional “if” of the opening phrase 
“if thou think” renders Adam’s subsequent imperative, in which he tells Eve to “Go,” dependent 
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on her argumentative reasoning, not his, while still registering his continuing uncertainty about 
her convictions. Instead of agreeing to disagree, Adam does the exact opposite, disagreeing with 
Eve for fifty lines of the poem, only to agree against his will to her desired departure in the last 
five lines of their conversation.  
 Adam’s conformist rhetoric redoubles upon seeing fallen Eve. Encountering his wife for 
the first time after she has eaten the fruit, he experiences another existential crisis, similar to the 
one he experienced prior to her creation. “How can I live without thee,” he exclaims, “how forgo 
/ Thy sweet converse and love so dearly joined, / To live again in these wild woods forlorn” 
(9.908-910)? Adam feels that Eve’s fall and subsequent transformation has rendered her too 
different, too knowledgeable, and thus too much like God, whose solitude overwhelmed him. He 
believes—perhaps correctly—that he must now give up their “sweet converse,” the same way he 
had to end his converse with God, whose difference completely overpowered him. This is a real 
and pressing concern, though one that Adam will rather quickly move past. Worried about Eve’s 
difference from him, and whether or not it is now too great for him to continue their “sweet 
converse,” Adam unexpectedly reverses his position and begins emphasizing her sameness. No 
sooner has he raised the specter of her difference than he returns to the idea of exact equivalence 
when designating her “flesh of flesh, / Bone of my bone thou art, and from thy state / Mine never 
shall be parted, bliss or woe” (9.914-916). In other words, fallen Eve is simultaneously too 
different from Adam and too similar. Ultimately, however, his belief in their sameness succeeds, 
as he claims to feel  
The bond of nature draw me to my own, 
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine; 
Our state cannot be severed, we are one, 
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One flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself. (9.955-959) 
In the space of four lines, Adam manages entirely to disavow the foremost precept of Miltonic 
friendship, which is based in difference. Though he claims that “to lose thee were to lose 
myself,” it is clear that Adam has already lost his own sense of identity, which is now entirely 
subsumed within Eve’s, despite the fact that, only a moment ago, he claimed she newly 
represented a difference so profound it would necessarily foreclose their “sweet converse.” 
Contrary to what he believes, though, Adam cannot “be severed” from Eve precisely because 
that severance has already occurred, beginning the moment God extracted a rib from his side. 
Though made from the same fleshly material, they were made different people, in the same way 
that God divided “one first matter all” into “various forms, various degrees / Of substance” 
(5.472-474). In his present state of mind, however, they are self-identical, “one flesh,” both 
physically and mentally. If ever there was a “single imperfection,” this is it, as Adam 
passionately defends their relationship as consisting in Platonic unity. His passion for Eve at this 
moment overrides his more rational faculties. Inebriated, Eve fully supports his decision, 
encouraging him to indulge in the fruit. Adam eats, and she immediately celebrates this “glorious 
trial of exceeding love,” praising him for “engaging me to emulate” (9.961; 963). If difference is 
the sign of solitude, then emulation is the utmost sign of conformity, solitude’s opposite, and 
Adam’s current modus operandi. Eve’s characterization of this dramatic moment as a “trial of 
exceeding love” attempts to transform Miltonic trial from a solitary expression of individual will 
into an instance of emulation and self-negation.  
 As James Grantham Turner notes, Adam’s error might be as much the work of the poet as 
the first man. According to him, Milton problematizes Eros in Paradise Lost by unconsciously 
holding in tension two modes of understanding gender relations: 
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Milton has succeeded in bringing to life, in the praxis of his art, two quite different 
models of the politics of love: one is drawn from the experience of being in love with an 
equal, and the mutual surrender of ‘due benevolence’, the other from the hierarchical 
arrangement of the universe, and the craving for male supremacy. His treatment of 
Genesis stands out from all others because his imagination responds generously to both 
of these, to the ecstatic egalitarian love of ‘one flesh’ as well as to the patriarchal love of 
superior and inferior; he has hatched the contradictions in the text and the tradition that 
elsewhere lie dormant. (285) 
The dichotomy Turner identifies between loves egalitarian and hierarchical is complicated, 
however, by the fact that, as I have argued repeatedly, egalitarianism for Milton involves the 
equal ability to be alone. Turner seems keenly aware of this predicament, as evident in his 
describing Milton’s mind as “respond[ing] generously to both” accounts of love. The situation is 
not a matter of choosing either egalitarianism or hierarchy, but rather concerns the tough task of 
finding likeness in difference, equality among unequals, something Adam either forgets or 
forgoes upon Eve’s return. His permissiveness weakens his solitude by manifesting his 
dependence on Eve, a dependency that is at once physical, emotional, and intellectual. While 
Eve’s decision making throughout Book 9 has its flaws, nevertheless, Adam fails at this epic 
juncture, first, by conceding the debate, and, later, by agreeing to “emulate” Eve by eating the 
fruit. Though occurring at different times, each of Adam’s decisions is motivated by the same 
underlying logic, which involves subordinating one’s will to the will of another. 
 Not long after ingesting the fruit, Adam will realize the error of his ways, and, fittingly, 
he seeks a return to solitude. Regaining his composure after a lust-filled act of sex, the very kind 
of animal sex Milton warns that a bad marriage will occasion, Adam cries out, exclaiming, “Oh 
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might I here / In solitude live savage, in some glade / Obscured” (9.1084-1086). Though it took 
him a while, Adam finally realizes that Miltonic humanness demands solitude, and that solitary 
relationships consist of some level of disunion, the bringing together of minds “most resembling 
unlikeness.” But it is too late. Rather than amicable disagreement, the marital ideal, the two 
instead spend the next few hours in “mutual accusation” (9.1187). When the Son finally appears 
to pass judgment on the couple, he states in no uncertain terms that Adam’s failure has to do with 
his disregard of difference. He failed to protect his solitude by heeding the dissimilitude between 
him and Eve: 
Was she thy God, that her thou didst obey 
Before his voice, or was she made thy guide, 
Superior, or but equal, that to her  
Thou didst resign thy manhood, and the place 
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection far excelled 
Hers in all real dignity[?] (10.145-151) 
Adam has “resign[ed]” his “manhood,” a manhood that consists in the hierarchical “place / 
Wherein God set thee above her.” Though the Son seems to imply their equality (“or but equal”), 
the following lines clarify that he does not mean equality in the sense of sameness, but an 
equality of the sort Raphael suggests when discussing weights and scales, a balance that occurs 
through their differences from one another, one side more fit to lead, the other follow. Had Adam 
“known [himself] aright,” the Son goes on to say, he would have known it was his prerogative to 
“bear rule” over Eve, not her over him (10.155-156). Here, equality means the equal ability to be 
and think alone, which, for Adam, means alone and “above” Eve, who remains his inferior. The 
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Son’s emphasis on “know[ing] aright” takes us right back to Adam’s description of his original 
solitude, and God’s claim that Adam “couldst judge of fit and meet” (8.448). Adam’s initial 
solitude, God explains, prepared him to distinguish between himself and others, especially Eve, 
his “other self” (8.450). A sign of his alterity from beast and God, Adam’s solitude provided him 
the education necessary to recognize differences great and small, an education that tragically 
fails him at the most crucial moment.   
 
 Conclusion 
 Forced to leave paradise, the final image of the poem is one of a couple in solitude, alone 
and yet together, a befitting conclusion to a tragedy about the failure to proliferate difference 
within marriage:  
The world was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and providence their guide: 
They hand in hand with wondering steps and slow, 
Through Eden took their solitary way. (12.646-649) 
This image—a couple “hand in hand” and yet “solitary”—tormented eighteenth-century critic 
Richard Bentley. Never of the mind to tolerate literary blunders, Bentley was not about to let his 
1732 edition of John Milton’s Paradise Lost end with, of all things, a contradiction. Frustrated 
by the thought of an Adam and Eve, who leave paradise both together and alone, Bentley 
famously emended the final lines of the poem to exclude that possibility. Under his care, the last 
lines read “Then hand in hand with social steps their way / Through Eden took, with heav’nly 
comfort cheer’d” (106). While Bentley defended his emendation as a necessary corrective 
against the faulty typography of an unreliable amanuensis, his reason for changing the lines 
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might have been as much personal as academic. In a sermon preached years earlier, Bentley 
expresses his belief that humans cannot be alone, since 
Our Creator has implanted in mankind such appetites and inclinations, such as natural 
wants and exigencies, that they lead him spontaneously to the love of society and 
friendship, to the desire of government and community. Without society and government, 
man would be found in a worse condition than the very beasts of the field. (267)14 
As an apparent contradiction, then, the final two lines of Paradise Lost directly conflicted with 
Bentley’s ideological investment in a society without solitude. Channeling Aristotle, Bentley 
suggests that without society “man would be found in a worse condition than the very beasts of 
the field.” Nor is Bentley the only critic to find the final lines of the poem troublesome. Another 
eighteenth-century critic, Joseph Addison, recommended the final two lines of the poem be 
expurgated entirely. These frustrations—of Bentley and Addison both—continue to haunt the 
scholarship of modern critics who assume that Milton’s notion of society is one based in likeness 
and “heav’nly comfort,” rather than a community founded in likeness through difference, and a 
God whose alterity renders him inconceivable. If, however, we understand that Milton’s society 
is comprised of solitary individuals, each working alone and alongside one another, then the final 
lines make for an appropriate ending. Their leaving solitarily together is not a punishment, as 
indicated in the hopeful line “the world was all before them,” but rather a renewed commitment 




Satanic Solitude in the Works of Hobbes and Milton 
 
 In Wayward Contracts, Victoria Kahn writes that “Hobbes’s eloquence was almost always 
in the service of absolute obedience, [whereas] Milton’s imaginative energies were far more 
often engaged by breach of contract and dissent” (222). Building on Kahn’s work, this chapter 
examines how the political differences between Hobbes and Milton influence their disagreement 
over the role of solitude in political and spiritual life. As an exponent of absolute obedience, 
Hobbes declares solitude “an enemy” in Philosophical Rudiments, a position he maintains 
throughout his philosophical career (2: 2).1 In his dualistic account, one chooses difference or 
sameness, solitude or society. His philosophy therefore depends on the very binaries that 
Milton’s poetry consistently disrupts. Whereas Hobbes seeks to elide individual difference 
through absolute conformity to the sovereign’s demand, Milton understands difference as a 
necessary component of life and a protection against conformity of will and world. Of course, 
the character of Satan significantly complicates this otherwise tidy distinction between 
philosopher and poet. Through his belief that the “mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make 
a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven,” Satan introduces delusions into the world of Milton’s epic 
that A.B. Chambers rightly connects with “those phantasms of the mind” found in the philosophy 
of Hobbes (1.254-255; 101). Nor is this the only connection between Satan’s thinking and 
Hobbes’s state of nature. In Leviathan, for instance, Hobbes claims that 
Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be 
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, 
yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so 
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considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another 
may not pretend as well as he. (3: 110) 
Similarly, in his opening monologue, Satan argues that “furthest from him is best / Whom reason 
hath equalled, force hath made supreme / Above his equals” (1.247-249). According to Satan, he 
and God would be perfect equals if not for the latter’s physical strength, an exception that recalls 
Hobbes’s stipulation that sometimes “there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in 
body or of quicker mind than another.” God is “Above” his hellish “equals” only in strength, not 
in reasoning, according to Satan. In his mind, their “difference […] is not so considerable” that it 
should prevent the demons from again attempting to “try / Who is our equal” (5.866). 
 That Satan embodies many of the traits Hobbes assigns to humans in the “the war of every 
man against every man,” however, does not mean that Milton automatically follows Hobbes in 
condemning solitude as an “enemy,” any more than he completely endorses Hobbes’s notion of 
political conformity (3: 117). Rather, Milton strikes a balance between the radical individualism 
of Satan and the absolute obedience demanded by Hobbes’s philosophy, a balance perfected in 
the figure of Abdiel, whose “constant mind / Though single” shows him simultaneously 
committed to sameness and difference, society and solitude (5.902-903). Discussing Milton’s 
angelology, N.K. Sugimura initially argues that the action of Milton’s good angels “feels like 
some sort of charade,” since, according to her, they lack the “individuation” necessary to 
separate one angel’s deeds from another (192). No sooner has she made this distinction, 
however, than Sugimura begins to qualify it, admitting that Milton understood “the dangers 
inherent in depicting his good angels as omniform intellect,” and that, ultimately, the poet resists 
any easy “reconciliation between the Many and the One” (194). These “dangers” include the 
possibility of turning omniformity into conformity, thereby converting Milton’s community of 
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good angels into a commonwealth much like the one envisioned in Hobbes’s Leviathan. In 
associating Satan with a conspicuously Hobbesian problem, it might seem as though Milton 
would likewise advocate Hobbes’s authoritarian solution. Nothing could be further from the 
truth, however. Whereas Hobbes asks us to trade solitude for society, Milton proposes a version 
of angelic solitude within godly society itself. They might appear an undivided legion, but the 
first day of fighting finds Milton’s good angels operating “single as in chief” (6.233). 
 Though Milton’s Satan marks the endpoint of my analysis, the bulk of the chapter 
focuses on the philosophy of Hobbes, and in particular that telling passage from De homine, 
wherein he opines that “Truly the greatest” benefit of speech concerns the human ability to 
“command and understand commands,” 
For without this [ability] there would be no society among men, no peace, and 
consequently no disciplines; but first savagery, then solitude; and for dwellings, caves. 
For though among certain animals there are seeming polities, these are not of sufficiently 
great moment for living well; hence they merit not our consideration; and they are largely 
found among defenseless animals, not in need of many things, in which number man is 
not included; for just as swords and guns, the weapons of men, surpass the weapons of 
brute animals (horns, teeth, and stings), so man surpasses in rapacity and cruelty the 
wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry and not cruel unless 
provoked, whereas man is famished even by future hunger. From this it easily understood 
how much we owe to language, by which we, having been drawn together and agreeing 
to covenants, live securely, happily, and elegantly; we can so live, I insist, if we so will. 
(39-40, my italics) 
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Using the Latin subjunctive verb esset, Hobbes here describes a hypothetical condition, in which 
there “would be no society,” but “first savagery, then solitude” without the ability to follow 
commands, and in particular he means the commands of the covenant established through the 
sovereign. Without referencing it directly, Hobbes implicitly relies on Aristotle’s beast/god 
formulation of solitude when imagining this return to a state of nature, a veiled allusion that will 
appear again in Leviathan. I am referring to Book 9 of Politics, wherein Aristotle describes the 
solitary person as “either a beast or a god” (1130). Though not mentioned overtly, Hobbes 
believes the only person capable of acting alone is the sovereign, whose solitude is godly, and 
whose commands we must therefore follow. Were it not for the godly solitude of the sovereign, 
then all would devolve into the beastly and troglodyte existence Hobbes details in De homine, 
whose description of natural “man” as “surpass[ing] in rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, 
and snakes” guarantees a miserable life outside the commonwealth. 
 Aristotle’s definition of solitude, in particular, the idea that the “natural outcast” is a 
“lover of war,” also resonates with Hobbes’s man in solitude. The quote from Homer’s Iliad that 
Aristotle employs to describe the solitary being—“Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one” (1129)—is 
tantamount to how Hobbes describes man’s natural condition in what he calls “the war of every 
man against every man” (3: 117). But Hobbes also departs from Aristotle’s teleological 
worldview and the idea that humans are born naturally fit for society, as Helen Thornton points 
out (54). Rather than posit solitude as the exception, as Aristotle does, Hobbes revises his 
definition, assuming solitude to be the natural condition of humans. Not just some, but all life, in 
Hobbes’s materialist view, is naturally solitary, and in an exclusively beastly way, as is apparent 
from the other adjectives he attaches to this condition: “poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (3: 113). 
While certain solitary individuals might imagine themselves as godlike—a “Hercules or an 
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Alexander,” in his words—their actions will necessarily be selfish and beastly (3: 6). The way to 
avoid such delusions of grandeur, in his opinion, involves the construction of Leviathan, an 
artificial apparatus created through social contract and managed by the sovereign.  
 Hobbes subtly imports Aristotle’s “beast or god” formulation to convince his readers that 
by supporting the godly solitude of the sovereign they are simultaneously preventing society 
from backsliding into beastly solitude, what contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben would 
call bare life, a condition of total bodily exposure. As a means to convince them of the 
advantages of sovereign rule, Hobbes describes beastly solitude in Leviathan and elsewhere as a 
nightmarish place characterized by an overactive imagination, in which a person might convince 
his or herself of godly qualities not actually in his or her possession. Beastly solitude, in other 
words, can deceive a person into believing that his or her solitude is actually godly, while 
simultaneously imperiling his or her body. Through this thought-experiment, wherein Hobbes 
and reader collaboratively imagine what they might imagine in solitude, Hobbes convinces the 
reader not only of what bare life looks like but also of the imagination’s ability to furnish an 
uncontested image of that debased condition. Hobbes’s description of solitude is therefore 
crucial to understanding the basis of his epistemological system, the imagination. If both the 
reader and Hobbes can agree about what a solitary person might imagine, then Hobbes already 
possesses the epistemological foundation his philosophy requires, which is itself based on an 
agreement about what the imagination is and does.  
Hobbes consistently depicts the solitary individual throughout his works as a being turned 
away from society, indeed, selfish in disposition (2: 2). This belief in a solitude that denotes 
selfishness is not new. It can be found in works at least as old as Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, as 
well as numerous texts throughout the early modern period. However, Hobbes’s adoption of the 
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solitude-as-selfishness stance by necessity differs from that of other early modern writers 
because his political philosophy already assumes selfishness as the basis of all human action. 
The way we survive, according to Hobbes, is through constant vigilance over our own interests 
and ourselves. For this reason, Hobbes must prove why the particular version of selfishness that 
occurs in solitude is especially harmful to society, which he does by linking it to a perversion of 
the imagination. Solitude, for him, adversely impacts the proper workings of the human 
imagination, impeding action by frustrating a human’s ability to discern fact from fiction. The 
better to understand the relationship between solitude and bare life, I begin with an analysis of 
Hobbesian reason, following that with a discussion of what he believes will happen to reason and 
the imagination while alone. During this latter section, I extend and complicate Christopher Scott 
McClure’s claim that Hobbes’s fear tactics are simply rhetorical. Unlike his discussion of hell, 
the focus of McClure’s article, Hobbes’s discussion of solitude goes well beyond rhetoric, 
performing a critical task in his epistemology relating to the imagination.  
 
I. 
 The one time Thomas Hobbes refers to John Milton by name, he disparages the poet for 
the execution of an argument, not of Charles. Rhetoric, not regicide, occupies Hobbes’s thought 
when, in Behemoth, his fictional interlocutors begin discussing two treatises recently published 
in England: the first, Salmasius’s Royalist apology, Defensio Regia, the second, Milton’s 
antimonarchical rejoinder, Defensio Populi Anglicani. Upon hearing his friend mention the 
treatises, the second interlocutor affirms that he has “seen them both,” claiming, “They are very 
good Latin both, and hardly to be judged which is better; and both ill reasoning, hardly to be 
judged which is worse; like two declamations, pro and con, made for exercise only in a rhetoric 
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school by one and the same man” (6: 368). More of a concern to Hobbes than the specifics of 
their “ill reasoning,” or so his fictional character would have us believe, is the fact that both 
documents, the pro and con, were “made [as though] for exercise only in a rhetoric school” and 
could have been written “by one and the same man.” This is the same man, Hobbes writes in 
Leviathan, who wishes to see his own private reason made universal law. If unchecked, this same 
man, he explains, will surely introduce “as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the 
Schools” (3: 256). While his immediate goal in the passage from Behemoth involves rebuking 
Milton and Salmasius for their schoolboy antics, Hobbes cleverly invokes Leviathan to 
accomplish this task, proving that, in the Hobbesian world, rhetoric and regicide, school and law, 
are never too far apart.  
 Hobbes intentionally likens the Republican Milton to the Royalist Salmasius in Behemoth 
because doing so allows him to dismiss both their arguments simultaneously from a rhetorical 
position beyond them. Like the sovereign he wishes to enthrone, Hobbes himself comes to 
resemble the person of “right reason,” who alone acts as “arbitrator or judge to whose sentence 
they will both stand,” as he states in an early passage from Leviathan (3: 31). If only for a 
moment, Hobbes, through the voice of his character, adopts the trappings of a sovereign, using 
the fictional setting of the dialogue to enact in microcosm the tenets of the commonwealth he so 
desires. Unlike Milton and Salmasius, whose arguments rely on the private passions within, 
Hobbes, the arbiter, assesses arguments publicly, according to precepts available to all 
reasonable creatures, while retaining his power to “judge of what opinions and doctrines [are] 
averse, and what conducing, to peace” in the commonwealth (3: 164). To some, Hobbes’s 
rhetorical tactics seem radical, but I see in them a sincere concern for a country in peril. Stanley 
Fish observes, and I partially agree,2 that Hobbes will often “try to put something over on the 
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reader, but [only] because, as he passionately believes, no other engineering, grounded in 
something more substantial than words and the conclusions they compel, is available.” For this 
reason, Fish continues, Hobbes “bears an uncanny resemblance to the faith-based creed 
proclaimed by his great opposite, John Milton” (86-7).  
 In what does Hobbesian right reason consist if not the private reason he assigns to Milton 
and Salmasius? Furthermore, what is the connection between private reason and solitude? To 
begin answering these questions first requires an understanding of the way Hobbes conceives of 
the difference between natural law (lex naturalis) and natural rights (ius naturalis). In Hobbes 
and the Law of Nature, Perez Zagorin claims that Hobbes breaks rank with his political 
predecessors by not positing natural law as the a priori source from which natural rights derive. 
Zagorin notes Hobbes’s “unrivaled” ability to differentiate between natural right and law at a 
time when “the law of nature was generally thought to be the source of rights and natural rights” 
(28). While contemporaries like Hugo Grotius continued to subordinate ius (right) to lex (law), 
Hobbes designed a political system in which natural law and natural right function as 
“correlative concepts,” as Zagorin aptly states, without privileging one over the other (28). In the 
Hobbesian world, “natural rights do not derive from natural law,” but “have an independent 
existence as a primordial entitlement to freedom bestowed equally by nature on every individual 
and fully operative in the state of nature” (55).  
 In divorcing natural right from natural law, Hobbes opposes nature to itself, creating two 
domains of reason, private and public. Private reason convinces us of our “[natural] right to 
every thing; even to one another’s body” in our efforts to preserve life (3: 117). Meanwhile, 
public reason, or right reason, as Hobbes refers to it, encourages us to abide by natural law, 
whose first precept requires that we “lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so 
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much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself” (3: 117). While 
his predecessors sought ways to reduce natural right to natural law, Hobbes demonstrates their 
fundamental incompatibility, offering an implacably discordant view of nature. Humans can 
either abide by their natural right to everything, or they can surrender their right and seek peace 
through natural law. A difficult decision—or is it? So long as humans obey private reason and 
their right to everything, Hobbes tells us they will remain in a state of “war of every man against 
every man” (3: 117). No justice will exist in this condition, since “notions of right and wrong, 
justice and injustice, have there no place,” and humans will live in a perpetual state of fear, in 
which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (3: 115). Perhaps the decision is not so 
difficult after all. 
 Given this exceedingly bleak assessment, in which death is forever imminent, Hobbes 
assumes humans will ultimately wish to relinquish their natural right to everything (with the 
exception of self-defense) in exchange for the security provided by natural law. To ensure that 
natural law prevails, Hobbes introduces the covenant, a pact to which everyone voluntarily 
consents, guaranteeing each person will “divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the 
benefit of his own right to the same,” provided that such a divestiture, and any others that follow 
from it, do not immediately endanger the person’s life (3: 118). Only the fool would “breaketh 
his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so,” since he will 
surely “be left or cast out of society,” like Aristotle’s lover of war, and thus will have acted 
“against the reason of his preservation” (3: 134). To make sure no execrable fools remain, 
however, and all covenants are kept, Hobbes proposes that all “men agree amongst themselves to 
submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him 
against all others” (3: 159). Enter the Hobbesian sovereign—a figure, writes Giorgio Agamben, 
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who retains the state of nature within him or herself. Occupying a state of exception, only the 
sovereign can visit on his people the very sort of violence/justice the civil state was created to 
prevent (35). 
 Unlike Aristotle’s description of nature, which consists of a natural hierarchy of 
inherently social beings, Hobbes’s state of nature consists of naturally equal but innately 
antagonist beings, all seeking power over a limited supply of resources in order to perpetuate 
their own lives, even if doing so requires them to kill one another. In exercising their natural 
right over everything, humans operate solely using private reason, in which each person decides 
right and wrong on a personal basis, thus precluding the existence of justice. This, too, separates 
Hobbes’s philosophy from that of Aristotle, who understood justice as inextricable from nature, 
and nature itself as inseparable from divine order. For Hobbes, the state of nature represents 
discord, not order, a “war of every man against every man,” in which “nothing can be unjust” 
because everyone relies on the private reason within (3: 115). It is Hobbes’s hope that the 
opposite choice—an artificial state founded on right reason and natural law—will prove the more 
attractive alternative.  
 Hobbes believes his ability to predict the apocalyptic state of nature follows logically 
from the tenets of his epistemological system, which subordinates reason to speech, and speech 
to imagination. The subordination of reason to speech (a public phenomenon) is readily apparent 
from the passage above. There, Hobbes predicates reason on our ability to speak, claiming our 
faculty to “understand commands is a benefit of speech.” This statement corroborates what 
Hobbes writes in Leviathan, wherein he defines reason as “nothing but reckoning […] of the 
consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” (3: 
30). Without speech there would be no reason, according to Hobbes, since reason results when 
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humans properly employ speech, those “general names agreed upon” by all. In moments like 
these, Hobbes’s nominalist tendencies emerge, as he reaffirms his belief in the capacity of 
“general names” to stand in for things, but things without a universal form or idea. Daniela Coli, 
referring to this set of relations as “Hobbes’s revision of nominalism in an anti-ontological 
sense,” argues that Hobbes’s notion of “certainty and universality of knowledge do not […] lie in 
some principle or principles innate in our minds, but are relative to men’s images” within 
themselves (79-80). In this system, Hobbes defines truth as “consist[ing] in the right ordering of 
names in our affirmation,” which, given the necessarily relative status of naming, ultimately 
renders it an agreement among people to name in the same way, hence the need for a sovereign 
to control definitions, establishing reasonable speech (3: 23). Hobbes’s subordination of reason 
to speech leaves unaccounted the relationship between speech and imagination. Furthermore, if 
truth consists of “the right ordering of names,” then presumably reason must exist in some form 
prior to speech. How else would it be possible to order names properly, thereby demonstrating 
truth, if not by means of some kind of prelinguistic reason? Hobbes agrees, identifying this 
nascent form of reason occurring prior to speech as judgment, which entails the ability of the 
imagination to order past and present sensory input to produce thought.  
 I will return to this discussion of reason and imagination momentarily. In the meantime, 
what of solitude? So far, I have focused almost exclusively on Hobbes’s categorical division of 
ius naturalis and lex naturalis, the effect of this division in the formulation of right reason, and 
how right reason naturally prepares the way for contractual government and, ultimately, the 
installation of a sovereign to oversee such covenants. Nothing at all has been said of solitude, 
though, which, it will be remembered, Hobbes calls an “enemy” in Philosophical Rudiments, the 
precursor to Leviathan. Steven Shapin argues that “solitude figured importantly in rhetoric 
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surrounding the new experimental science, and even in practical measures for its 
institutionalization” throughout the seventeenth century, but not so for Hobbes, who says that 
solitude prevents the creation of justice, which cannot “be in a man that were alone in the world” 
insofar as both justice and the covenants required to keep it “relate to men in society, not in 
solitude” (Shapin 202; Hobbes 78). While Boyle, Bacon, Newton, and others engaged a rhetoric 
of praise, championing the “retreat to a redefined and relegitimized solitude,” Shapin suggests 
that Hobbes, conversely, offered no such optimism (202, 203). His contrarianism on this point 
stems not just from the different projects in which these groups of people are engaged (Bacon 
and company interested in scientific experiment, Hobbes in justice), which would only require 
that Hobbes quietly decline solitude and be done with it. Hobbes outright denigrates solitude, 
though, precisely because it fits into his project of defending his own version of selfish (and the 
justice that self-centeredness allows) from the debased selfishness of solitude.  
 Many, including Zagorin, label Hobbes a positivist, whose notion of law excludes 
metaphysical abstractions, depending on nothing other than a highly regulated aggregate of 
utterances, monitored by the sovereign, beginning with the articulation of first definitions.3 Yet, 
for legal positivism to function properly requires a belief in the ability of human reason to 
interpret sensory reality and express those findings in language. Hobbes’s faith in human reason 
derives, in part, from Genesis and the idea that the “first author of speech was God himself,” as 
he claims early in Leviathan (3: 18). But Hobbes, in his desire to convince atheists, must also 
prove his positivism on secular grounds.4 It is my contention that, despite (or rather because of) 
his outward disdain for it, solitude provides him the rhetorical tool to do just that. To help 
explain how reason and the sensory world unite, Hobbes imagines a story about what would 
happen were they not united. This story takes place in the fictional setting of solitude and serves 
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as a warning to his readers, one that he hopes will convince them, through fear, of his positivist 
agenda. Availing himself of its meaning in early Christian texts, in which solitude was the arid 
battlefield on which eremites fought demons without and demons within, Hobbes allegorizes 
solitude as a farraginous hellscape, swarming with figments of the imagination—madmen, liars, 
pagans, wastrels—any entity he thought might deter readers from ever wanting to venture there.  
 In Wayward Contracts Victoria Kahn cogently argues that Hobbes, in keeping with the 
fashion of the time, understood “politics as a realm of poetics, even fabrication,” and government 
as “the product of a contractualist poetics, of mimesis construed not simply as imitation but also 
as the productive capacity of the human imagination to create new artifacts” (15). Kahn cites as 
evidence of this view the Introduction to Leviathan, in which “Hobbes made it clear that consent 
to the political contract depended on consent to a literary contract: a prior agreement about the 
dangers of romance, the limits of metaphor, and the right construction of analogy” (18). While 
Hobbes “claimed to have modeled his construction of the commonwealth on Euclidean 
mathematics,” nevertheless he “understood the metaphor of the political contract as requiring a 
narrative” (19). Ultimately, Kahn argues that Hobbes’s narrative requires that his citizen-readers 
imagine themselves as “female subject[s] of romance or of seventeenth-century domestic 
manuals, the wife who consents to be bound by her own passions to the hierarchical, inequitable, 
irrevocable marriage contract,” a far cry from Stanley Fish’s take on Hobbes, in which the 
philosopher merely wants to defend a country in peril (170).  
 Focusing attention on Kahn’s claim about the metaphoricity sustaining Hobbes’s political 
theory, I would like to expand on it by showing how Hobbes imagines solitude as a place of 
failed metaphor. While Hobbes pays homage to Euclidean geometry in claiming to begin with 
definitions and work from these toward their consequences, in fact, the opposite might be true. In 
 69 
actuality, Hobbes might begin with a narrative about the consequences of solitude—humans 
imagining themselves as godlike, but acting like beasts—using this narrative to coerce his 
readers into believing his vision for society. Admittedly, this narrative about solitude shares 
many of the same plot devices as Hobbes’s narrative about the state of nature, and, in a way, the 
two narratives are the same. Both are fictions involving characters who subscribe to private 
reason—ius naturalis instead of lex naturalis—and both end with these same characters 
engaging in brutish, gladiatorial action. If, however, the state of nature is a “war of all against 
all,” solitude is better described as a war of the self against the self, in which an individual battles 
against his or her own inner being.  
 
II. 
 That Hobbes redeploys Aristotle’s beast/god formulation should come as no surprise to 
those familiar with Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, a text that unites the two philosophers in 
demonstrating how both consent to a Western mode of reasoning that assumes “bare life in the 
political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power” (6). 
Opposite the good life, and therefore more closely resembling the life of the beast, “[b]are life,” 
writes Agamben, “remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something 
that is included solely through an exclusion” (11). Bare life, or sacred life, represents one form of 
exception in Agamben’s theory, insofar as the homo sacer (sacred man) can be killed by anyone 
with impunity but not ritually sacrificed. The other form of exception in Agamben’s text is the 
Hobbesian sovereign, whose right to violence “presents itself as an incorporation of the state of 
nature in society” (35). Because of his or her exceptional status, the sovereign reserves the right 
to enact the very sort of violence found in the state of nature, using this exception to enforce the 
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rules by which society will operate, lest it once again devolve into that state described in the 
passage from De homine. As complimentary states of exception, then, the homo sacer and the 
sovereign are mutually exclusive inclusions, the sovereign representing “the sphere in which it is 
permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice,” and the bare 
life of the homo sacer representing “the life that may be killed but not sacrificed[,] […] the life 
that has been captured in this [sovereign] sphere” (83).  
 Hobbes fully endorses this power dynamic and uses solitude as a rhetorical device to 
convince his readers to do the same. The success of his narrative depends on how convincingly 
Hobbes can describe that hypothetical condition using his own imagination. In his 
epistemological system, imagination (imaginatio) performs the critical task of transforming the 
motions of sensory perception into eidetic imagery, which, when ordered correctly in speech, 
enables reason (ratio). To ensure its uninterrupted operation, the imagination is “regulated by 
some desire and design,” Hobbes explains (3: 13). Desire tells us what we want, then recruits the 
imagination to generate the concatenation of thoughts that lead us toward its completion. “Not 
only is reason a calculus at the service of the passions” in Hobbesian epistemology, Daniela Coli 
observes, “but the very rationality of the calculus is defined by the capacity of passion to guide 
the imagination and identify the means for reaching the desired objective” (75). As Todd Butler 
elucidates, “The key to right thinking” in Hobbes’s philosophy, “and thus by extension right 
action, […] lies in [one’s] retaining proper control over the provision of such images” (163). 
Even the will is reduced to a desire in Hobbesian epistemology, it being labeled the last appetite 
in deliberating (3: 48). Animals can only witness and react to their desires, seeking the means to 
achieve them, whereas humans can use imagination to “imagine what we can do with [that 
desired object], when we have it[,]” allowing us to predict future outcomes, perhaps even the 
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apocalyptic outcome, in which “there would be no society” in the absence of speech, only 
“savagery” and “solitude” (3: 13). 
 The epistemological priority Hobbes assigns the imagination also includes the ability to 
embellish. This emphasis on embellishment places Hobbes, according to Quentin Skinner, within 
a longstanding humanist tradition that includes Cicero and Quintilian. Skinner notes how Hobbes 
makes use of ornatus, “the addition of ‘ornament’ or ‘adornment’ to our utterances in the form of 
figures and tropes,” which “is treated by Hobbes at all times as the distinctive product of a 
powerful imagination or fancy” (363). The sequence from imaginatio to ratio would not be 
complete with elocutio, which, for the Hobbes of Leviathan, means the use of ornatus in 
producing the right rhetorical effect. Used correctly, metaphors and other tropes can empower 
ratio, convincing a skeptical audience through “fresh and arresting” images, according to 
Skinner (366, 368). The misuse of ornatus, however, produces “monstrous and deformed” 
images that “tend to darken rather than illuminate our meaning, producing confusion and 
puzzlement” (368).  
 Skinner focuses primarily on the proper use of ornatus in the construction of puissant 
imagery, which, in the Hobbesian world, can only be achieved after “cultivating the virtue of 
discretion” (370). The most telling example of Hobbes’s own use of ornatus, though, occurs 
when he discusses what happens when a person without this “virtue of discretion” lets his or her 
imagination run wild. Not coincidentally, this kind of imagining affects “men that are not only 
without company,” that is, in solitude, “but also without care of anything,” that is, idle men, men 
who are bored, whose thoughts “are as busy as at other times,” but continue on “without 
harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man, or in tune, to one that 
could not play” (3: 12).5 As though to convince his audience of the power of imagination, 
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Hobbes tells them an elaborate story about what happens to the imagination in solitude, when it 
no longer operates using the cost-benefit analysis supplied “by some desire and design,” but 
instead persists “unguided, without design, and inconstant,” when “thoughts are said to wander, 
and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream” (3: 12). Normally, “if the good” of an 
imagined action “be greater than the evil,” the action is deemed worthy (3: 50). In solitude, 
however, the imagination malfunctions, resulting not in the exercise of rational self-interest, but 
irrational self-seeking. In this “wild ranging of the mind,” as Hobbes describes it, which 
resembles a dream, humans “possessed with fearful tales and alone in the dark” will “believe 
they see spirits and dead men’s ghosts walking in churchyards” (3: 9-10). “From this ignorance 
of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense,” Hobbes adds, “did 
arise the greatest part of the religion of the gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, 
nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and 
goblins, and of the power of witches” (3: 9).  
 In solitude, like in the state of nature itself, humans believe in private fictions that do not 
correspond to reality. Absurdities abound. The distinction between inside and outside collapses, 
disorienting the imagining subject, who can no longer tell which direction he or she faces, or if 
what he or she sees is real or an apparition. The world literally deforms, insofar as the outside 
forms one envisions no longer correspond in any way to reality. Whereas the proper use of 
imagination eliminates possibilities “till we come to some beginning [cause] within our own 
power” on which to act, this imagination run rampant, occurring in solitude, multiplies 
possibilities, convincing us of powers we do not possess (3: 13). Most of the time, imagination, 
under the command of the telos of rational self-interest, orders sensory data until it arrives at an 
actionable cause. This version of imagination, however, interferes with that process, upsetting 
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causality and allowing for contradiction. Truth disappears, and in its place occurs absurdity, 
which Hobbes defines as “senseless speech” (3: 32). Hobbes describes these absurdities as 
uniquely human, owing to our ability to use language. However, the actions that follow from 
them are decidedly brutish, proving that in solitude and without contract “man surpasses in 
rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry and not 
cruel unless provoked, whereas man is famished even by future hunger.” Lest his audience doubt 
him, Hobbes assures them this is the condition among “the savage people in many places of 
America,” who “live at this day in that brutish manner” (3: 114).  
 Diego Hernán Rossello argues for the way in which Hobbesian melancholy, a close 
synonym with solitude in the Renaissance, indicates an “unchecked irruption of the beast in man 
[that] resembles the re-emergence of the natural condition in the civil state, the emergence of 
liberty in subjection and the emergence of the passions in reason” (6-7).6 For Rossello, “solitude, 
causeless fears, roaming the cemeteries and turning into an animal,” particularly a wolf, a 
condition known as lycanthropy, are all “symptoms of melancholy in the period and Hobbes 
seems to have been aware of them” (6, my italics). Though I generally agree with Rossello’s 
assessment, I also feel he undervalues the role of solitude in his findings. Solitude is not simply a 
“symptom” of melancholy, as Rossello would have it. Rather, melancholy and solitude function 
reciprocally throughout Hobbes’s texts, with solitude inducing melancholy and melancholy 
resulting in the “haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing 
some one, some another particular thing,” to quote Leviathan (3: 62). To the extent that 
melancholy is an involuntary bodily response to environment, Hobbes seems more interested in 
convincing his readers of the dangers of solitude than in telling them to avoid the disease that 
results from it. While it might not be possible to avoid the “haunting of solitudes” once afflicted 
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with melancholy, it is possible, in Hobbes’s mind, for a person not already afflicted with 
melancholy to avoid solitude. Thus, melancholy and the lycanthropy to which it gives rise are, 
ultimately, scare tactics Hobbes employs to ensure that his readers actively avoid solitude. It is 
for this reason that solitude, not melancholy, is the “enemy,” since it is within a person’s power 
to defeat.  
 In the midst of this unguided imagining, a person remains free from concatenated 
thought, unbound by calculated self-interest. It is a solitude marked by the experience of akrasia, 
in which a human, “without care of anything,” as Hobbes says, romanticizes his or her being and 
“compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as 
when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander” (3: 6). Any action resulting from this 
delusional state, in which a person remains convinced of his or her own godlike abilities, will 
inevitably be beastly. In imagining him or herself a god, the solitary individual will act without 
prudence in an attempt to satisfy his or her every appetite, disrupting a philosophical system that 
has calculated self-interest, that “long chain of consequences,” as its basis (3: 50). According to 
Todd Butler, it is “within such slippage between reality and representation that the failures and 
misdirection of the individual imagination, magnified by language and communicated to others, 
carry the potential for political disruption” (167). In the highly metaphorical setting of Hobbesian 
solitude, this is precisely what happens, in which humans, operating on private reason alone, 
commit actions that, like those of Aristotle’s “natural outcast,” are both self-serving and self-
destructive.   
 To prove that his account of the perils of solitude remains consistent with Scripture, 
Hobbes must still explain Adam’s understanding of God’s command to name the animals, a 
command he receives while alone. Discussing the book of Genesis, the Hobbes of De Homine 
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asks, rhetorically, “in what manner could Adam have understood that command of God, when he 
did not yet know what was meant by eating, fruit, tree, knowledge, and lastly, good or evil” (38). 
If solitude designates a space in which language fails and reasonable humans cannot exist, then 
how did Adam, the first man, understand the highest form of speech, the command? Hobbes 
explains “that Adam understood that divine prohibition not from the meaning of the words, but 
in some supernatural manner” (38, my italics). In Leviathan Hobbes remarks similarly that God 
“instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight” before admitting that 
“the Scripture goeth no further in this matter” (3: 18). Hobbes would rather concede Adam’s 
supernatural ability than suggest a normal human can properly use language in solitude, opting to 
integrate the exceptionality of the Genesis myth, so as to avoid altering his own epistemology, 
which depends rhetorically on solitude’s dangers.  
 Hobbes’s seemingly straightforward description of what happens to a solitary person is 
complicated by the fact that the imagination is both that which supplies him the compelling 
narrative about solitude and that which malfunctions while in solitude. How, then, do we know 
that Hobbes himself is not alone in thinking of solitude as a state of degeneracy? In the 
positivist/mechanist world that Hobbes imagines, wherein truth consists of the right ordering of 
names, from whose meanings humans create syllogisms and, afterward, actionable claims, 
solitude presents him with a definitional dilemma. Solitude is the effect of incorrect imagining, 
but also the cause of it.7 As an effect, solitude occurs when, imagining himself other than he is, a 
subject becomes isolated within his own fiction, speaking in absurdities, “as a bird in lime twigs, 
the more he struggles the more belimed” (3: 23). But solitude is also the cause of incorrect 
imagining, since Hobbes identifies people “without company” and “without care of anything” as 
the demographic most likely to imagine incorrectly. In this way, solitude constitutes a singularity 
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in Hobbes’s texts—a seventeenth-century Bermuda Triangle—in which the words “cause” and 
“effect” themselves lose meaning.  
 Rather than ignore this dilemma, Hobbes intentionally exploits it rhetorically by 
imagining solitude quite literally as hell on earth, enlisting the reader to view it like him so as to 
avoid appearing himself like “a bird in lime twigs.” In the materialist world envisioned by 
Hobbes, a world divested of all metaphysical conceits, he hopes that solitude, as well as the 
hellish nightmare it might signal, will retain enough metaphysical afterglow to captivate his 
readers through a diabolic image of the otherworldly. Not that Hobbes himself believes in 
“satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like” or “the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and 
goblins, and of the power of witches.” But his narrative about solitude suggests that one lonely 
day, if left to his own devices, he might start to believe in these ghastly figures, and this same 
fate might befall the reader, too, should he or she ignore Hobbes’s warning. It is the fear of one 
day believing in these hallucinations that he hopes will be enough to convince his audience of the 
relative safety of his commonwealth. “It is a hard matter,” Hobbes writes, “and by many thought 
impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming” (3: 7). Unlike Descartes, whose 
solipsistic “withdrawing into solitude” culminated in a similar conclusion concerning how 
difficult it is “to distinguish being awake from being asleep,” Hobbes does not emerge from his 
meditation believing in an infinite and immaterial God capable of permanently expelling doubt 
(13, 14). Ironically, Hobbes’s only hope is the fear that his fictional narrative about solitude will 
inculcate in his readers, warning them of the deformed life imagined wrongly. While it might be 
a “hard matter” to “distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming,” it is not impossible. So 
long as readers imagine as Hobbes does, by imagining that they can tell the difference between 
sense and dreaming, all will be fine. 
 77 
 Christopher Scott McClure also points to the way in which Hobbes uses fear to the 
success of his own political agenda. Writing of Hobbes’s equivocation over the eternity of hell, 
McClure argues that Hobbes’s perplexing “interpretation of hell is meant to redirect individuals’ 
anxiety about whether they are destined for heaven or hell into anxiety about whether there is a 
heaven or hell, and if so, how they could know anything certain about either” (3). Hobbes hopes 
to instill a similar anxiety when discussing solitude, though the motivation for doing so, I would 
argue, is different. In addition to inculcating within his readers a fear of the unknown, Hobbes’s 
discussion of solitude also serves the more important task of proving to readers that they can 
actually imagine what they might imagine in solitude. In other words, the purpose of his 
discussion of solitude is not an attempt to confuse the reader about what solitude (or the state of 
nature) is or is not, but instead to convince them of what Hobbes and the reader, collectively, can 
imagine imagining it is, assuming they were subject to it. This meta-imaginative moment serves 
as the ur-covenant upon which all future covenants will depend. Imagining together what they 
might imagine alone, Hobbes can more easily convince them of what the imagination is and how 
it functions. What better way to explain the imagination than to ask his readers if they can 
imagine what they might, hypothetically, imagine while alone? On the basis of this imagined 
agreement Hobbes establishes what will later become government by contract, using the fear of 
the unknown, an unknown filled with the misfiring imaginations of solitary individuals, to argue 
for a strong centralized government. In this rhetorical setup, to refuse to imagine like Hobbes is 
also an act of self-incrimination, in which a person risks confinement within the very solitude he 




 We find in the figure of Milton’s Satan many of the horrors Hobbes ascribes to those in a 
state of solitude. Satan’s arguably most famous speech announces his belief in a solipsistic 
world, consisting of a “mind [that] is its own place, and in itself, / Can make a heaven of hell, a 
hell of heaven” (1.255-256). A.B. Chambers directly links Satan’s thinking at this important 
moment with the philosophy of Hobbes, arguing that “[w]hile […] Satan declares himself 
unaffected by time and place,” a predicament that resembles “those phantasms of the mind, as 
Hobbes calls them,” nevertheless, “he cannot escape […] the ultimate placing of himself by 
God” (101). From Chambers’s perspective, Satan’s parochialism prevents him from realizing 
that his own mind’s emplacement is always relative to, and contained by, the “placeless place” of 
God, a narrow-mindedness that resembles the kind of megalomania afflicting humans in 
Hobbes’s state of nature. Much the same way that Hobbes’s nature lacks a sovereign, Milton’s 
hell is a place in which “men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,” leaving 
their minds to solitary wandering (3: 113). Chambers reads Satan’s soliloquy as the example par 
excellence of the crazed egoism found in Hobbes’s solitary state of nature. 
 Chambers thus reveals an unexpected affinity between Hobbes and Milton, albeit in the 
hell of Paradise Lost. His analysis suggests that Hobbes would likely find in Milton’s metaphor 
for hell an especially convincing description of what happens in solitude, absent a sovereign 
power.8 The infighting of the fallen angels, the tribalism, their questioning of God’s 
omnipotence, as well as their decision to revenge their condition by sabotaging Eden—what 
Milton calls Pandemonium, Hobbes would likely call the solitudinous war of all against all, in 
which no common power exists to bind the wills of humans. Nor should the parliamentary 
speeches of the fallen angels convince otherwise, since, as Hobbes proposes, the state of nature 
“consisteth not in actual fighting,” but instead the very sort of posturing that occurs in Milton’s 
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hell, in which the “will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” (3: 113). It does not matter, 
according to Hobbes, whether war is really waged or not; what matters is the posturing for war, 
which is as harmful as actual war, constituting an imminent threat to the security of all, 
including, in the case of Milton, the safety of Eden. True as it might be that Milton’s hell is in no 
way analogous to Hobbes’s hell, because, as Christopher Scott McClure suggests, “Milton 
wavered between presenting hell as a state of mind and as another realm, while Hobbes is 
adamant that hell will be on earth,” nevertheless, it is possible to read Hobbes’s state of nature as 
analogous to Milton’s hell, a connection McClure almost makes when writing that in Hobbes’s 
theology the “damned will live much as those do in the present world who live under bad and 
[…] non-Hobbesian government” (8, 6).9  
 In reading Milton’s hell as a simulacrum of the state of nature, a Hobbesian would likely 
criticize it, taking issue with the remarks of Beelzebub, who claims that “war hath determined 
us,” as well as his questioning “what peace will be given / To us enslaved” (2.330, 332-33). The 
Hobbesian would disagree with Beelzebub’s conclusion, and the general consent, to wage war 
against “Some easier enterprise” in Eden by “force or subtlety” (2.345, 358). The way out of this 
hellish solitude, Hobbes would intimate, is not through more war and wiles, whether with 
heaven, as Moloch first proposes, or with Eden, as Beelzebub last suggests, but rather through 
seeking peace by submission to a common power in God. Even Belial, who opines that God “in 
time may much remit / His anger,” does not seek permanent peace through natural law, as a true 
Hobbesian would insist, but opts instead for “peaceful sloth,” suggesting he remains agreeable to 
the idea of future war, should it be necessary (2.210, 228). In Hobbesian terms, then, the fallen 
angels’ logic derives solely from private reason, which dictates actions according to natural right 
instead of natural law. Not one of the demons wishes to reinstate natural law by resubmitting to 
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God as sovereign; all would rather assert their natural rights than acquiesce to a natural law that 
requires them to seek peace through capitulation, having convinced themselves it is far “[b]etter 
to reign in hell, than serve in heaven” (1.263). Intractable logic of this sort recalls the Hobbesian 
fool, who reasons it acceptable to contravene natural law when the outcome holds the possibility 
of some benefit. While the desire to rebel against natural law is not wrong in and of itself, 
according to Hobbes, a belief to which Milton himself accedes through Adam’s character in 
Book 5, actual rebellion always violates reason, making the angels veritable fools in Hobbes’s 
book.10 Despite the angels’ own claims to self-fashioning (“self-begot, self-raised”), their 
solitudes render them delusional (5.860).11  
 While the dilemma is Hobbesian, the solution is distinctly Miltonic. Rather than complete 
conformity, Hobbes’s fix to the problem, Milton advocates unity through difference. As Abdiel 
states, God plans “to exalt / Our happy state under one head more near / United,” a claim 
strongly reminiscent of Raphael’s claim, some three hundred lines earlier, that spirits are “nearer 
to [God] placed or nearer tending” (5.829-831; 476, my italics). The point is not complete 
unification, and thus a total loss of identity, but instead a “nearness” to God both physically and 
intellectually, which still allows for individual difference.12 Milton hesitates to rid heaven of all 
signs of solitude, claiming in Christian Doctrine that even the “good angels stand by their own 
strength, no less than man did before his fall” (344-345). In refusing to “serve in heaven,” then, 
Satan rejects the wrong solution to the problem, namely, the Hobbesian solution. In this way, 
Satan and Hobbes can be said to represent two sides of the same debate, and that debate, 
according to Milton, is not one that either of them should be engaging. Just as Hobbes would 
refuse Satan’s bellicose posturing, Satan refuses Hobbes’s commonwealth of absolute obedience, 
questioning how anyone “can in reason then or right assume / Monarchy over such as live by 
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right / His equals” (5.794-796). Yet, neither Satan nor Hobbes seems able to escape the binary 
logic underwriting their disagreement with each other. Many a Miltonist has found in Satan’s 
lines some of Milton’s strongest repudiations of monarchy. Before we accept William Blake’s 
assertion that Milton “was of the devil’s party,” however, it is important to remember that Milton 
believed a person could be a “heretick in the truth,” believing an idea, but for the wrong reason, 
and that Satan’s repudiating the right idea for the wrong reason therefore makes him no more 
virtuous than if he completely and unquestioningly accepted monarchy, as Hobbes would insist 
he do (YP 2, 543). 
Between Satan and Hobbes stands Abdiel, whose “constant mind / Though single” 
exemplifies the proper balance of unity and difference. Without this singleness of mind and 
body, Abdiel would lack agency, and thus the ability to reason for himself the best response to 
Satan’s impending rebellion. Upon his return from the cabal’s secret meeting, Abdiel is 
described as “one / Returned not lost,” at which point God addresses him directly: “Servant of 
God, well done, well has thou fought / The better fight, who single hast maintained / Against 
revolted multitudes the cause / Of truth, in word mightier than they in arms” (6.24-32). The 
language here parallels Milton’s description of his own polemical activities in the Second 
Defense. There, he discusses his verbal trouncing of Salmasius, the very same Salmasius that 
(alongside Milton) Hobbes also maligns in Behemoth. Portraying himself as a man “with greater 
strength of mind than of body,” Milton sees himself as someone who “exchanged the toils of war 
[…] for those labors which I better understood,” namely the labors of “defending the very 
defenders” in print against the accusations of those like Salmasius (YP 4, 553-554). “When he 
with insults was attacking us and our battle array,” writes Milton, “and our leaders looked first of 
all to me, I met him in single combat and plunged into his reviling throat this pen, the weapon of 
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his own choice. And […] I bore off the spoils of honor” (324). The emphasis on the singleness of 
his act and the fact that he was “in word mightier than they in arms” suggests that Milton locates 
in himself an image of Abdiel. Meanwhile, Milton relegates Salmasius to the “revolted 
multitude” that includes those, like Satan, that outright reject monarchy in any form, as well as 
those, like Hobbes, who insist on monarchy as the only feasible form of government. Equidistant 
between the solipsism of Satan and the conformity of Hobbes, Milton positions himself as a 
person dually committed to unity and difference, society and solitude, a commitment that he is 
willing to defend, even if he must defend it, like Abdiel, while completely alone.  
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Placing Blame: Otium and Shade in Paradise Lost  
 
The issue of belatedness occupies Milton’s thought in his personal letters, his sonnets, as 
well as during several autobiographical moments in his polemical tracts. Worried that his “late 
spring no bud or blossom shew’th,” he routinely bemoans his own lack of productivity, even as 
he defends this literary dearth against claims of procrastination, assuring readers the “ease and 
leisure [that] was given [him] for [his] retired thoughts” was not obtained “out of the sweat of 
other men” (“Sonnet 7,” 3-4; YP 1, 804). Rather than laziness, Milton cites insufficient learning 
for his poetic delay; he simply needs to know more before he can write more. Eventually, of 
course, Milton does get around to writing his great epic. Yet, his concerns over procrastination 
never entirely subside. Instead, Milton reroutes his anxieties concerning belatedness by locating 
them in the discourse of his female protagonist, Eve. Her fears over the production of literal 
fruits (as opposed to Milton’s literary fruits) culminate in a similar quest for more knowledge, as 
she takes the advice of Satan and eats the forbidden food. That Milton locates his own anxieties 
concerning work and belatedness in a female character befits the person nicknamed the “Lady” 
of Christ’s College, though the implications of his literary projection extend far beyond that 
name. In displacing his personal concern for time management onto his female character, Milton 
unconsciously redirects the culpability for the fall back onto himself as a writer whose self-
perceived idleness results in the poem’s delayed composition. Those who would label Milton a 
misogynist—and this list is not short—at the very least must acknowledge that a Milton who 
loathes Eve is a self-loathing Milton, since whatever blame regarding work might be assigned to 
Eve as a literary character could also be assigned to Milton as her literary creator.1 Through the 
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character of Eve, then, Milton realizes his greatest fear, in which labor turns to leisure, bringing 
fruitful productions to a halt. 
As though to avoid appearing too much like his protagonist, though, Milton also 
downplays their resemblance by emphasizing the differences between his fallen desire for 
knowledge and Eve’s prefallen and fructose-based attempt at auto-didacticism. Poeticizing the 
prelapsarian world as one in which time and space are strictly regulated, Milton supplies Eve 
with an orderliness obviously lacking in the seventeenth-century England in which he writes. 
Here, I refer to the division of Eden into light and dark spaces, which correspond with the vita 
activa and vita contemplativa, the life of the body and the life of the mind. Throughout the poem, 
moments of otium, a concept associated with leisure and often used disparagingly of poets and 
philosophers, occur in shade-designated areas, a coincidence few Milton scholars mention, 
probably because this motif appears in literature dating back to Greek times, and thus seems 
nothing new to the early modern poet, whose solitary study eventually “led [him] to the shady 
spaces of philosophy” (YP 1, 891).2 Though related to solitude, otium differs from it insofar as 
Miltonic solitude signifies an ongoing human mode, in sunlight or in shade, whereas otium 
concerns a temporary retreat for the purposes of self-cultivation. Such a division of dark and 
light regions creates a chiaroscuro topography that aids Eden’s inhabitants in deciding when and 
where to think and grow as humans and when and where to work, while also helping readers 
make sense of the poem’s alternating pastoral and georgic modes. As a solitary act of 
contemplation that occurs under the noonday sun, then, Eve’s decision to eat the forbidden fruit 
violates an Edenic geography designed specifically to resist trespasses of this sort. This chapter 
investigates the way in which Eve’s error (from the Latin errare, to stray) connects her unfallen 
confusion of literal place to fallen confusions of language and poetic mode. For Milton, I argue, 
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the postlapsarian development of metaphor, theorized among Latin rhetoricians as a verbal shift 
from one place (i.e., locus) to another, finds its origin as much in Eden’s geography as Eve’s 
appetite. A violation of sacred geography, Eve’s decision turns the blissful otium of prefallen 
Eden into what Milton describes in Tetrachordon as “intense thought and labor” after the fall 
(YP 2, 596). This is the labor of writing poetry, but also interpreting it, which, like Scriptural 
exegesis, now requires us to move “From shadowy types to truth, from flesh to spirit” (12.303).  
 Divided into regions light and dark, “Both where the morning sun first warmly smote / The 
open field, and where the unpierced shade / Enbrowned the noontide bowers,” Eden is 
deliberately zoned into areas meant for activities of the mind (including, for Milton, sex) and 
bodily activities such as fieldwork (4.244-46). Adam and Eve’s personal bower, described as 
“shadier” than any other in literary history, serves as a locus amoenus for leisure time and 
intellectual conversation, as observed during Raphael’s visit (4.705). This collocation of otium 
and umbra discovers its source in the original otium of God, who “retire[s]” during the creation 
of the cosmos, appointing his active and illuminated Son/Sun to divide the heavens and earth 
(7.170). Milton’s contemplative God thereafter remains “Throned inaccessible,” except when he 
“shad’st / The full blaze of [his] beams,” suggesting we can only know him in and through a 
mantle of darkness (3.377-378). Complicating matters, then, is Eve’s decision to leave Adam’s 
“faithful side” that “still shades” her, a shade that connects her through Adam (“He for God only, 
she for God in him”) to the vita contemplativa, thus allowing her to partake in “Food of the 
mind” while laboring in the field (9.265-266; 9.238; 4.299). When Adam retires to contemplate 
himself in Book 8, he does so in a “green shady bank profuse of flowers” (8.286). Similarly, his 
contemplation of the cosmos finds him conversing with Raphael under the “inwoven shade” of 
the bower, a conversation that Eve overhears from the “shady nook [she] stood behind” (4.693; 
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9.277). Upon retiring from Adam’s obnubilating side, however, Eve breaks the placial tie 
between otium and umbra, assuming male prerogative when asking to Adam to “divide our 
labors,” much the same way God divided himself from the Son, who then divided the heavens 
from the earth (9.214).  
 Lest we place all the blame on Eve, I relate her anxiety over production back to Milton’s 
own concerns about poetic output and time well spent. I begin with a brief history of otium in the 
Western literary tradition, including Milton’s autobiographical remarks concerning retired life. 
Next, I turn to Paradise Lost, and, in particular, those passages connecting shade with the vita 
contemplativa. Eve’s reason for leaving Adam’s side, thereby disrupting the umbra/otium 
connection, can be traced back to Satan’s infiltration of her dream and subsequent hypnopedia, 
the subject of my third section.3 Under Satan’s tutelage, Eve confuses places real and imagined. 
“Assaying by his devilish art to reach / The organs of her fancy,” the narrator relates, Satan 
enters Eve’s dream as a second-rate poet, who then equips her with a new hermeneutic by which 
to misunderstand the shady place of otium (4.801-02).4 Powered by Satan, fancy produces the 
“Wild work” of metaphor and equivocation (5.112). In identifying metaphor as the cause of 
Eve’s otium in the sun, I extend the allegorical approach of Judith Anderson, who claims that 
“Satan’s sin changes everything” (292). The spontaneous appearance of Sin “overwrite[s] Edenic 
monism,” a monism that resists doubleness, substituting for it “metaphorical tension, which, 
when continued, becomes openly allegorical” (292-93). Eve’s sunlit otium marks the moment 
this metaphorical tension is first realized in Eden. Whereas monistic Eden is a “mystical or 
metonymic” place that initially “denies the translative (i.e. metaphoric) and constructive function 
of language,” to quote Anderson again, Eve’s dream confuses her notion of place by introducing 
her to metaphor, and the idea that what should be shaded (for instance, her dream) might not be 
 87 
(292). I do not believe, as some do, that Eve’s dream indicates her already fallen status, but I am 
of the opinion that the dream instructs her in allegoresis, a method of interpretation that enables 
her to see allegory in a world as yet without it.5 
 
I. 
 The opposite of negotium, or business life, otium implies a life of leisure, a turning away 
from the vita activa to cultivate one’s mental or spiritual faculties, seen as preparation for a 
return to public life. This passive state is depicted from ancient literature onward as occurring in 
shade. Writing of Roman culture, for instance, Brian Vickers claims that otium was often 
disparaged among authors of the period, except for poets like Virgil, who “flaunted” it by 
depicting unrequited lovers reclining in the shade of trees (24).6 If not lovers, then the 
collocation of umbra and otium would conjure images of off-duty and out-of-work soldiers, 
whose unemployment would be seen as a potential risk to society. Sloth was viewed then much 
the same way it is now, as a defect of one’s character. Understanding this more negative 
connotation of otium is necessary to understanding the work of Cicero, a writer whose praise of 
otium is often taken at face value. Forced into exile, Cicero made sure to distinguish between his 
own involuntary solitude and the leisurely solitude of his more indolent Roman counterparts. 
Were he to describe his own exile, he would use the phrase otium cum dignitate, a dignified 
leisure, one that contributes to society from outside of it. His is decidedly not the otium of which 
the poets speak when describing unrequited lovers bemoaning their situations in the shade of 
some tree, but instead a leisure that is actually not very leisurely at all. In a telling passage from 
On Duties, Cicero defends his otium cum dignitate, first by fulsomely praising the idle otium of 
Publius Scipio Africanus, who famously claimed that he was never less alone than when alone, 
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and then by contrasting Africanus’s idle otium with his own productive otium. Cicero mockingly 
attributes Africanus’s lack of literary production while alone to his overactive imagination. 
Surely, Cicero suggests, with an air of sarcasm, the unproductiveness of Africanus must have 
been the result of his too-active mind and not any passivity on his part. In contrast to Africanus’s 
literary dearth, Cicero touts his own productivity, claiming he does “not have enough strength to 
withdraw myself from loneliness by silent reflection; I have directed all my devotion and 
concern towards this type of literary work,” referring to his current undertaking (102). Similarly 
committed to solitary production, Seneca writes of contemplative man, “wherever the secret 
location of his leisure hours, he should make it his aim to benefit individual men and the world at 
large by means of his intellect, his voice, his advice” (119).  
 The same denunciation of idle otium can be found in Saint Augustine’s City of God, this 
time from a Christian perspective, one that emphasizes self-knowledge as a means of benefitting 
society. “For,” Augustine writes in City of God, “no one ought to live a life of leisure in such a 
way that he takes no thought in that leisure for the welfare of his neighbor” (948). He continues, 
arguing “the delight offered by the life of leisure ought to consist not in idle inactivity, but in the 
opportunity to seek and find the truth, so that everyone may progress in this regard, and not 
jealously withhold his discoveries from others” (948). Centuries later, Petrarch will return to 
Augustine’s discussion in Secretum, a didactic text, written as a conversation between Franciscus 
(Petrarch) and Augustinus (Augustine). This text is perhaps most notable for its ambiguous 
ending, in which, after hundreds of pages of Franciscus acquiescing to Augustinus’s rebukes, he 
turns to go, saying “I cannot restrain my desire for the world,” effectively denying all the 
previous discussion (148). The fictional Augustine wishes Petrarch to use his leisure time to 
contemplate death and the afterlife, whereas Petrarch’s fictional stand-in seems unable to 
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separate himself from the sensuous world around him. 
 As the conclusion of Secretum attests, conversation surrounding otium drastically changes 
beginning with Petrarch, who views the vita contemplativa as a personal choice that need not 
serve any higher purpose than the participant’s own enjoyment of it. A life in shade could be the 
wrong choice—and for many people it certainly is—yet it is a choice that an individual of 
estimable birth should have the right to make, as indicated in another work of his, De vita 
solitaria. Julia Conaway Bondanella likewise concludes that Petrarch changes the debate 
surrounding otium, asserting that he “creates a model of leisure for an educated elite” made 
possible by his “modestly pos[ing] as a man who offers no general rules beyond his observation 
that individual experience and one’s own nature must serve as a guide to living” (17-18).7 To be 
sure, Petrarch’s De vita solitaria is not a repudiation of the Aristotelian belief, a mainstay of 
Greco-Roman thought, that man is an inherently social animal, since his own otium willingly 
admits of friends. Yet, his argument in favor of otium is unique in that it privileges the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual over conformity to the group. He advocates a secularized otium 
in which the individual removes him or herself from society for the pleasure that such 
withdrawal might bring. If this vita contemplativa incidentally benefits society, then all the 
better. The primary objective, however, remains knowledge of the self and the world, which 
requires that the individual withdraw from the noise of an urban environment and retire to a 
shaded countryside.  
 The Petrarchan emphasis on solitude for the purpose of self-cultivation, a variant of Saint 
Augustine’s, most appeals to poets such as Milton, especially during the tumult of the English 
Civil War. As Janette Dillon points out, solitude of the seventeenth century attained a sense of 
moral respectability largely absent from sixteenth-century England, when solitude was often 
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condemned as selfish and a sign of villainry, much as it had been centuries before in Rome (24). 
Many writers of the Protestant persuasion championed otium as consistent with the doctrine of 
sola fide, which affirmed one’s personal relationship with God, even if such a relationship 
involved a partial or total renunciation of the world of negotium. In a section of The Divine Life 
entitled “Of Conversing with God in Solitude,” Puritan theologian Richard Baxter succinctly 
expresses this sentiment, claiming “I have more to do with God, than with all the world: Yea 
more and greater business with in one day, than with all the world in all my life” (358). He 
continues, writing that  
If I be idle, or seem to want employment, when I am to contemplate all the Attributes, 
relations, mercies, works, and revealed perfections of the Lord, its sure for want of eyes 
to see, or a Heart enclined to my business: if God be not enough to employ my soul, then 
all the persons and things on earth are not enough. (361)  
In addition to these overtly religious justifications of solitude, Milton also had the backing of 
other poets, including Virgil, who had extolled the virtues of otium and umbra throughout his 
writings. Virgil’s influence on Milton’s understanding of solitude can be seen most readily in the 
speaker of Lycidas, who, like Virgil’s unrequited lover, begins the poem in mourning underneath 
the shade of trees, except where Virgil’s lover bemoans a female counterpart, Milton’s speaker 
bemoans the loss of a male friend. The Virgilian influence also appears in the person of Milton’s 
Adam, whose desire for a mate finds him in conversation with God while retired to a sylvan 
shade.  
 Given the increasing acceptance of otium in English culture as a result of early humanists 
such as Petrarch, as well as the literary precedent set by Virgil, Ovid, and many others, it seems 
obvious that Milton would unconditionally commend it as a worthwhile endeavor, since his 
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Protestant affiliation already inclined him toward a personal relationship with God. To a certain 
extent, he does advocate for otium. In the first elegy to Charles Diodati, for instance, Milton 
openly praises his temporary retreat from Cambridge, complaining that the “barren fields” of 
“Cam” “lack any gentle shade” and therefore “are not a proper place / for those of us who follow 
the great Phoebus / and set for ourselves the edifying task of producing / poetry” (lines 12-16).8 
“If this rustication of mine is supposed to be an exile,” he continues, referring to his forced 
retirement, “the punishment is this carefree leisure and ease,” wherein “I may spend my time 
with the tranquil Muses and books,” or at the theater, where (here referencing the Latin 
connotation of otium) he might witness “the lover or the sly off-duty soldier” (19-30). 
Commenting on this epistolary elegy, Mandy Green argues that Milton contrasts his own leisured 
exile from Cambridge to the harsh exile from Rome that Ovid experienced. “Unlike Ovid,” she 
writes, “who was without free and easy recourse to books, Milton is enjoying the freedom to read 
what he wants when he wants and then, when he desires a change, he can turn to the theatre or 
take a stroll outside to refresh himself with scenes of natural beauty—a shady grove or a group 
of pretty girls out walking” (92). The same sentiment appears again in Prolusion VII, in which he 
praises a shaded otium that, according to Barbara Lewalski, “he had come increasingly to value 
as the proper milieu for both scholarship and poetry” (45).  
 No doubt, then, Milton valued otium as indispensable to his vocation as a poet, which led 
to five years of self-directed study after receiving his master’s degree. Yet, it is obvious from 
various documents, the 1633 letter first among them, that Milton also struggled with the idea of 
otium, fearing his own might lead to an idleness of the sort condemned by the authors he most 
respected. In the letter, he chastises the sender for thinking he has “given up my selfe to dreame 
away my Yeares in the armes of studious retirement like Endymion wth the Moone as the tale of 
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Latmus of [sic] goes” (YP 1, 319). Milton criticizes “this affected solitarinesse” as averse to his 
interest as an aspiring writer, later assuring his interlocutor that he delays not because of some 
“endlesse delight of speculation” but rather out of “a sacred reverence & religious advisement 
how best to undergoe” the task of writing his great works. He ends, however, with an 
observation on a “certain belatednesse in me” (YP 1, 319-320). Nor is the oft-cited 1633 letter 
the only instance of Milton’s anxiety. In outlining his ideal curriculum in Of Education, he 
condemns indolence as a contributing factor of “that which casts our proficiency therein so much 
behind,” citing the “time lost partly in too oft idle vacancies,” in which children leave off from 
learning for a period but with nothing else to occupy them (YP 2, 371). This fear at the 
possibility of an idle and unproductive otium also helps explain passages like this one from 
Tetrachordon, in which Milton defends marriage as a necessary release from the arduous task of 
the vita contemplativa: 
No mortall nature can endure, either in the actions of Religion, or study of wisdome, 
without somtime slackning the cords of intense thought and labour[.] […] We cannot 
therefore alwayes be contemplative, or pragmaticall abroad, but have need of some 
delightful intermissions, wherin the enlarg’d soul may leav off a while her severe 
schooling; and like a glad youth in wandring vacancy, may keep her hollidaies to joy and 
harmles pastime: which as she cannot well doe without company, so in no company so 
well as where the different sexe in most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike 
resemblance cannot but please best and be pleas’d in the aptitude of that variety (YP 2, 
596-597). 
Qualities normally imputed to otium, including those “delightful intermissions,” in which the 
unencumbered soul is “like a glad youth in wandring vacancy,” Milton instead assigns to 
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marriage, which mollifies the strain of mental work. Meanwhile, he characterizes his actual 
otium as “intense thought and labour.” As if to preempt any accusations of an idle otium, Milton 
syntactically joins “thought and labour,” modifying this single idea with the adjective “intense.”  
 In general, Milton throughout his writing career appears especially preoccupied with 
kairos, that is, the right time to perform such “intense thought and labor,” often referring self-
deprecatingly to his own belatedness. For instance, the speaker of “Sonnet 7” worries that his 
“hasting days fly on with full career,” while his “late spring no bud or blossom shew’th” (3-4). A 
similar concern for time well spent appears in Ad Patrem, too, in the form of shame at his present 
inability to repay his father’s contributions through acclaimed verse. If in these works Milton 
defends against a career begun too late, in The Reason of Church Government he defends against 
a literary career begun too early, as his conscience forced him to “write thus out of mine own 
season, when I have neither yet compleated to my minde the full circle of my private studies” 
(YP 1, 807). In all cases, Milton’s self-portrayal is consistently that of a man out of synch and 
anxious about those who might accuse the “ease and leisure [that] was given thee for thy retired 
thoughts” as having been obtained “out of the sweat of other men” (YP 1, 804).9  
 As much as Milton agonizes over his use of otium, Eve remains completely unconcerned 
by hers. Committed to her work, she sees herself as an industrious worker, even finding a way to 
maximize productivity, directing Adam, “Let us divide our labors” (9.214). Yet, this increase in 
production never occurs, and instead Eve succumbs to an inopportune otium, gazing longingly at 
the forbidden tree, an image of idolatry, but also idleness. In Eve, then, we catch a glimpse of 
anxious Milton, whose commitment to the principle “that he who would not be frustrate of his 
hope to write well hereafter in laudable things, ought him selfe to bee a true Poem, that is, a 
composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest things” we find tested in the first woman 
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(YP 1, 890). Writing his own worst fear into the actions of his female lead, Milton both 
sublimates those feelings by locating them externally, during the first instance of sin, while 
simultaneously redirecting blame back to himself, insofar as the poem in which that sin appears 
is itself belated, the effect of perhaps too much waiting. As if to avoid blame for that waiting, 
Milton supplies prelapsarian Eden with topographical features unavailable to him, thus 
extenuating his own perceived misallocation of otium. Unlike the fallen world, where one must 
decide how best to use otium, Eve’s world is highly regulated between light and dark areas, 
which correspond to the vita activa and vita contemplativa. To be sure, the landscape still invites 
choice from its occupants, but the choice is made easier by the presence of such features, which 
no longer exist in the postlapsarian world. Despite this easy partitioning, however, Eve still 
manages to convince Adam to let her leave, which, as the film tagline goes, finds her in the 
wrong place at the wrong time.  
 
II. 
 The privacy of paradise is evident from the earliest descriptions of the place. Upon 
approaching paradise, Satan describes it as “an enclosure green,” whose “verdurous wall” allows 
Adam a panorama of the “nether empire neighboring round” (4.133-145). Milton’s paradise is 
literally a gated community (“One gate there was, and that looked east”), whose membership is 
determined by the amount of virtue one has, not material wealth (4.178). One almost expects the 
gate to contain a sign that reads: Elysian Estates, Keep Out. Not that such a sign would prevent 
Satan, an outsider, from entering, who like a “prowling wolf,”  
Whom hunger drives to seek new haunt for prey, 
Watching where shepherds pen their flocks at eve 
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In hurdled cotes amid the field secure, 
Leaps o’er the fence with ease into the fold: 
Or as a thief bent to unheard the cash 
Of some rich burgher, whose substantial doors, 
Cross-barred and bolted fast, fear no assault, 
In at the window climbs, or o’er the tiles. (4.183-191) 
Milton describes paradise using pastoral and city imagery alike, comparing Satan’s unlawful 
entrance both to a wolf in a pasture and a thief in the house of “some rich burgher.” Regardless 
which metaphor one chooses, Milton makes clear that this outdoor setting, unlike the 
wildernesses of Comus and Paradise Regained, is designed to fit the needs of its occupants. Its 
accommodating qualities bolster the reading of John Gillies, who surmises that “Miltonic 
environment responds ontologically to the spiritual character of its guest species,” helping to 
explain why the “intimacy of this placial tie is broken” after their fall from grace (40). Practically 
speaking, Milton’s division of Eden into light and dark, work and thinking, enables him to 
distinguish between pastoral and georgic at a time when, as Paul Alpers notes, the two modes 
“merge in various ways, largely because in Christian thought ideas of humility are connected 
with the curse of labor” (28).10 
 Despite the fact that all of paradise is private, where, according to God, “unrivalled love” 
might find “blissful solitude,” some locations are clearly meant to be more private than others, 
especially the bower, “a place / Chosen by the sovereign planter,” whose exceptional privacy is 
indicated by its shaded seclusion (4.692-93; 3.65-69). Determined to make his bower literally the 
coolest of them all, Milton assures his readers that never before has a “shadier bower / More 
sacred and sequestered” existed, contrasting his sacred shade to the “feigned” shade found in the 
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literature of Pan, Silvanus, and Faunus, alluding to his Greek and Roman models (4.705-708). 
Though allusive, his is a shade that remains non-allegorical. This is decidedly not the shade of 
Spenser’s Bower of Bliss, whose umbra, writes Mattison, mediates between the real and 
artificial, “creating an allegorical structure in which the real is read through the Bower’s 
unreality and the Bower’s unreality is read through its relationship to the real” (90). Nor is it 
Spenser’s Garden of Adonis, an “allegory of mind,” according to Kenneth Gross, in which “the 
poet overheard himself thinking” (360, 361). As such, Adam and Eve’s morning aubade, though 
replete with light and dark imagery that verges on symbolic, should not be read allegorically, but 
as the “Unmeditated” and divinely inspired verse of daily ritual (5.149). If ever the shade of 
unfallen Eden seems metaphorical, it is perhaps because “We enter Eden with Satan and never 
see it without an awareness of his predatory, allegorical presence,” as Anderson states, a 
“presence [that] brings doubleness and perceived dualism with it” (294).11 From the perspectives 
of unfallen Adam and Eve, however, the meaning of shade remains sacred, as Adam 
acknowledges when explaining to Raphael that “by sovereign gift” they “possess” this “spacious 
ground,” referring to “yonder shady bower,” in which he requests they “sit and taste” until the 
“sun more cool decline” (5.366-70). 
 Throughout the poem, the noun “bower” is modified by the adjective “shady” or “shaded” 
more often than it is not. For Raphael, its shade actually seems more important than the bower 
itself, instructing Adam to “lead on then where thy bower / O’ershades” (5.375-76). Once inside, 
and after a cornucopia of choicest fruits had been consumed, “sudden mind arose / In Adam,” 
who presses Raphael on matters cosmological (5.452-53). Not unlike Plato’s Symposium or 
Erasmus’s Religious Feast, texts that depict the life of otium as occurring among men 
philosophizing in the shade of a house, Milton’s Paradise Lost conceives of the bower as a place 
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of scholarly contemplation for Adam and Raphael, while dining on fruits provided by Eve. In 
addition to the passages cited above, wherein the narrator describes the bower as “shadier” than 
its “feigned” counterparts, and whose roof is made of “inwoven shade,” he also contrasts Eden’s 
bowers (indeed, there is more than one) to the sunlit field. At the start of Book 4, he provides 
perhaps the most definitive example of the difference between the sun of the field and the shade 
of the bowers when describing 
Both where the morning sun first warmly smote  
The open field, and where the unpierced shade 
Enbrowned the noontide bowers: thus was this place, 
A happy rural seat of various view. (4.244-46) 
This “various view” unambiguously divides paradise between the “open field” and the “noontide 
bowers.” Not long after this description, the narrator recounts how Adam and Eve use the 
entrance to their bower as a place of prayer. After they “at their shady lodge arrive,” the narrator 
describes how “both stood[,]” 
Both turned, and under open sky adored 
The God that made both sky, air, earth and heaven 
Which they beheld, the moon’s resplendent globe 
And starry pole[.] (4.720-24) 
Again referring to the darkness of the “shady lodge,” the narrator here describes a moment of 
prayer that occurs in the liminal space of the doorway of the bower, as the couple contemplates 
God’s creation before retiring for the evening. One can imagine the shadow cast by the bower as 
the couple stands in the threshold, openly praising God’s handiwork in the gloaming.  
 Like the outdoor privacy of garden, woods, and bower, and elsewhere described by Mary 
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Thomas Crane, the shady bowers of Eden function as natural enclaves within the larger paradise 
that specifically serve the otium of its occupants.12 Similar to the outdoor privacy found in 
Montagu’s The Shepherd’s Paradise and many other early modern texts, the blissful bower is 
described in strictly domestic terms, rendering it more of a house than the natural place it 
proclaims to be. Normally, domesticity would not mean leisure, particularly for women, whose 
role in early modern oikos was housework. In the utopian setting of Eden, however, her 
femininity does not prevent Eve from enjoying leisure too. This is especially true of her nursery, 
annexed to their central bower. Sitting “retired in sight” while Adam and Raphael converse, Eve 
then “went forth among her fruits and flowers, / To visit how they prospered, bud and bloom, / 
Her nursery” (8.41-46). The most obvious meaning of “nursery” is a place for the care of young 
plants awaiting transplantation. While Milton intends this definition primarily, he likely has other 
meanings in mind, including Randle Cotgrave’s 1611 dictionary entry, quoted in the OED, which 
defines the word “nursery” simply as a “priuat roome onely for women” (OED, I.1.b). He 
probably also intends “nursery” to mean a place of contemplation, as when the Elder Brother of 
Comus describes contemplation as “nurse” to the “retired solitude” of “Wisdom’s self” (375-
377). Combining these definitions, then, one might say Eve uses the nursery as a place of 
feminine otium, not for manual labor, so much as to “visit” (from videre, “to see”) how the plants 
“prospered” by their own accord. It is a room of her own, to quote Virginia Woolf, a place to 
which Eve will refer in Book 9 when requesting leave from Adam, arguing that she knows of 
Satan, having “from the parting angel overheard / As in a shady nook I stood behind” (9.277-76). 
The “shady nook” provides Eve a place not only to be alone (and eavesdrop) but also to 
contemplate the evil that Satan represents. On the day of the fall, Eve will refer back to these 
shady contemplations, claiming they have prepared her to be alone in the field. 
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 The bower, then, facilitates the first couple’s otium, serving as a place to talk, pray, 
philosophize, and engage in sex, described in Paradise Lost, as it is throughout Milton’s divorce 
tracts, as an intellectual experience “Founded in reason” (4.755). Adam confirms this spatial 
allocation when educating Eve, explaining to her that  
 […] other creatures all day long 
Rove idle unemployed, and less need rest; 
Man hath his daily work of body or mind 
Appointed, which declares his dignity, 
And the regard of heaven on all his ways[.] (4.616-20) 
By “Appointed,” Adam means that God has assigned the “daily work of mind or body” to a 
specific time and place. “Labour and rest” are “as day and night to men / Successive,” according 
to Adam, but labor is itself subdivided in Eden, such that mental labor occurs in shade and 
physical labor in the sun (4.613-14). Occupying a liminal space between the two extremes, 
darkness/rest and daylight/work, shade denotes a space intended for labors of the mind, the vita 
contemplativa.13 When not physically exerting themselves during the day, then, the first couple 
must return to some shade to engage in mental exertion, lest they be found roaming “idle [and] 
unemployed,” like the animals of the open field. The need to abide by the spatial allocation of 
mind and body in Eden is especially important at noontime, “whence no way round / Shadow 
from body opaque can fall” (3.618-19). God himself indicates as much when he instructs 
Raphael to  
Converse with Adam, in what bower or shade  
Thou find’st him from the heat of noon retired, 
To respite his day-labour with repast, 
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Or with repose[.] (5.230-233) 
Discoursing here with Raphael, God inadvertently responds (in a very literal way) to the question 
Milton poses to him in Sonnet 16, whether he “exact[s] day-labour, light denied” (7). The answer 
in prelapsarian Eden is an emphatic “no.” As a “light denied” area, shade functions as a space in 
which Adam and Eve “respite” their “day-labour with repast,” rather than continue physical 
work. As the Milton of the 1633 letter insists, citing John 9:4 in his defense, “Christ comands all 
to Labour while there is light” (YP 1, 319). That which Christ commands to his disciples, Milton 
commands to his literary characters, who must “labour” physically “while there is light,” but 
then engage in mental activity while in shade.14 
 As much as possible, given the fallen status of language, Milton divides Eden literally 
and unequivocally into shade and sunlight, corresponding to the vita contemplativa and vita 
activa, respectively. A “quintessence pure / Sprung from the deep,” sunlight continues to be 
affiliated with physical acts of creation in Eden, whereas shade designates the place of divine 
contemplation (7.244-45). When Eve contemplates her image at the lake, for instance, it is while 
“Under a shade of flowers” (4.451). Confusing her image for another, God must lead her back to 
where “no shadow stays / Thy coming,” that is, to a sunlit area (4.470-71). Likewise, when 
Adam begins to contemplate his solitude, he too retires to a “green shady bank profuse of 
flowers,” one that Andrew Marvell might have had in mind when poeticizing his “green thought 
in a green shade” (8.286).15 While the pastoral shade of Paradise Lost designates the sacred 
place of otium, including “the rites / Mysterious of connubial love” (4.627-29), the sunlit field 
serves as the place for active employment, where Adam and Eve together tend to “branches 
overgrown, / That mock our scant manuring, and require / More hands than ours to lop their 
wanton growth” (4.742-43). This partitioning of body and mind is not a refutation of Edenic 
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monism—what Raphael terms “one first matter all”—so much as an example of an ontological 
process of rarefaction intrinsic to it, modeled on Aristotle’s theory of souls, in which things 
“more refined, more spirituous, and pure” are “nearer to [God] placed” (5.472; 475-76). In 
shade, Adam and Eve are ontologically closer to God, who is himself described by the narrator 
as “throned inaccessible,” excepting “when thou shad’st / The full blaze of thy beams” and then 
“Dark with excessive bright thy skirts appear” (3.377-80). Poeticizing Aristotle’s theory of three 
souls, Milton divides his Eden into two “active spheres,” which suffice to separate Adam and 
Eve’s “daily activities of body or mind” until “body up to spirit work,” at which point they will 
dispense with physical labor altogether (5.477-78; 8). Whereas Adam explains to Eve that 
humans have been “Appointed” (literally, given a specific, geographic point) to employ either 
“body or mind,” Eve takes leave from him only to find herself alone in a brightly lit grove, 
desiring to “reach, and feed at once both body and mind” (9.779, my italics). Insofar as the 
confusion of otium’s proper place results from her separation from Adam, she resembles the Eve 
of Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder, “On whose weak side,” 
  th’ assault had not been made 
Had she not from her firm protection stray’d; 
But so the Devil then, so leud men now 
Prevail, when women privacies allow[.] (4.171-174) 
Adam retains a belief in the sacred univocality of place, in which the bower is a locus amoenus 
for the mind, the field a topos for physical exertion, but Eve’s dream, as we shall see, acquaints 
her with the possibility of one place being “like” another, a hermeneutic she applies during her 




 A simple but persistent question has perplexed Milton critics for many years. Namely, 
what motivates Eve to seek leave from Adam prior to the fall? Robert Wiznura supplies a 
plausible explanation when claiming her dream “mitigates Eve’s ignorance and forces her to 
contemplate horizons beyond those presented by Adam,” while at the same time introducing her 
to the idea of “multiplication, duplicity, conjugation, and endless permutation” (109, 115). 
Though he never uses the word “metaphor,” Wiznura agrees that the dream first acquaints Eve 
with the prospect of equivocation, arguing that, within the dream, the tree—and no longer 
Adam—“becomes the grounding of the [dream] experience, and, subsequently, a possible object 
of desire” (119). Though he accounts for Eve’s arborescent cathexis once she arrives at the tree 
of forbidden knowledge, Wiznura never entirely explains why Eve desires leave from Adam in 
the first place. To do that, I suggest returning to the dream itself, which Mindele Anne Treip 
accurately describes as “true” in “a prefigurative and allegorical sense” (202). The episode 
begins with the arrival of the angelic brigade. Once at the bower, we see Satan 
Squat like a toad, close at the ear of Eve; 
Assaying by his devilish art to reach 
The organs of her fancy, and with them forge 
Illusions as he list, phantasms and dreams[.] (4.799-803) 
 The simile “Squat like a toad” alerts the reader to Milton’s own struggle as a fallen poet to 
describe the event. His description should not be read as a mimetic replication of the event as it 
actually occurred, but rather a poetic approximation ex post facto, in which the narrator imagines 
Satan appearing “like a toad.” As such, the verse acts as both an example (via simile) and 
explanation (via content) of his inability to recount with verisimilitude exactly what happened. 
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“Assaying by his devilish art to reach / The organs of her fancy,” Satan, as we later learn from 
Adam, reverses the usual order of things, infiltrating Eve’s fancy and forcing it to usurp reason’s 
throne. Normally, reason is “chief,” says Adam, but when reason “retires / Into her private cell” 
at night, then “mimic fancy wakes” and attempts to “imitate” the finer art of its superior (5.102, 
108-111). Like Satan, who awakes in heaven to press his neighbor about the “new laws” 
imposed on the angelic order with the arrival of the Son, Satan-controlled fancy awakes in Eve to 
enact a similar usurpation of divine reason (5. 679). The corruption Satan visits on divine reason 
while in heaven he also visits on human reason while in Eve’s dream.   
 Satan’s infiltration of Eve’s dream works to reaffirm the initial uncertainty she exhibits to 
Adam when asking him why the stars still shine “when sleep hath shut all eyes” (4.658). If Eden 
is a sacred place divided by light and dark, then why do stars glow in the night sky? A perfectly 
reasonable question, if ever there was one. Adam’s response—that stars, “though unbeheld in 
deep of night, / Shine not in vain” because “spiritual creatures walk the earth / Unseen”—
temporarily addresses the issue. But when Satan enters her dream, inviting her to rise because 
“now reigns / Full-orbed the moon, and with more pleasing light / Shadowy sets off the face of 
things; in vain, / If none regard,” his speech directly counters that of Adam, who, moments 
before, told her the stars shine “not in vain,” even though she is not awake to see them (5.41-44). 
In illuminating her dream with the fanciful light of an imagined moon, Satan convinces Eve that 
night is like day, that sleep is like wakefulness, that the shaded bower is like the sunlit field, a 
confusion that is recreated textually through the dichotic enjambment of “light / Shadowy.” In 
brief, Satan prepares the way for Edenic allegory by rendering the shadowy world of the dream 
analogous to the real and light-filled world. “I rose as [though] at thy call,” Eve tells Adam using 
simile, admitting she thought Satan’s voice sounded like that of her husband, her behavior 
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following suit (5.48). Once beside the dream-tree, she observes a figure “shaped and winged like 
one of those from heaven,” again employing simile to describe the imagined angel (5.55, my 
italics). Edenic place loses its reverential/referential status for Eve throughout her dream, which 
convinces her that places can be relative to one another, a defining feature of Miltonic allegory.  
 Despite Adam’s attempt to assuage Eve’s anxiety about the implications of the dream, 
reminding her that “Evil into the mind of god or man / May come and go,” nevertheless, the 
dream, I suggest, alters the interpretive context in which Eve operates (5.117-18). Edenic place 
remains sacred even after the dream, but Eve’s understanding of it changes. As a sacrosanct and 
anti-allegorical locale, Eden relies on the ritualistic observance of its inhabitants. The bower is a 
site of umbra and life of otium; the field is a place of manual work and collaboration. The tree 
stands alone as a monument of God’s divine fiat and “sacred fruit forbidden” (9.904). Through 
the dream, however, Satan convinces Eve that the bower is other than what it seems. In it, Eve is 
transported to the forbidden tree, where, she later tells Adam, “I, methought, / Could not but 
taste” of its fruit (5.85-86). While Eve does not taste, nor does the dream predetermine her 
decision to taste in Book 9, nevertheless, the dream itself contributes to that decision by 
confusing one locus for another, which is the primary definition of metaphor as Latin 
rhetoricians understood it. Though true that “Eve’s unwilled dream” could be used as “an 
opportunity to confirm and strengthen her freely willed obedience by means of a fully informed 
imagination,” as McColley asserts, nevertheless, it seems Eve is not met with success in this new 
enterprise (40).  
 Anxious about the relationship between dreaming and knowing, Eve initially embodies 
many of the same worrisome traits as Milton, who neurotically defends against the idea of 
“giv[ing] up my selfe to dreame away my yeares in the armes of studious retirement like 
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Endymion wth the Moone as the tale of Latmus of [sic] goes” (YP 1, 319). Eve’s oneiric worry 
will eventually subside, but not before other fears take hold, also involving knowledge 
production, and these too have a basis in Milton’s personal life. For instance, the fear Milton 
expressed in The Reason of Church Government that the “ease and leisure [that] was given [him] 
for [his] retired thoughts” was obtained “out of the sweat of other men” is strongly reminiscent 
of the language Eve uses during the separation scene when arguing that she and Adam should 
“divide their labors,” lest the “hour of supper comes unearned” (9.225). Though she is concerned 
about the production of literal fruits, not literary fruits, even that changes during her discussion 
with Adam, who reminds her that “Food of the mind” is not prohibited in the field, so long as it 
occurs by the “faithful side” that “shades” and “protects” her. Worried that she is lazy, and that 
the “hour of supper comes unearned,” Eve devises a plan to increase productivity, much like 
Milton, who expedited his poetic output toward the end of his career, perhaps out of a recurring 
fear that his “hasting days fly on.” Both Milton and Eve, then, respond to their respective 
concerns for belatedness with an attempted increase in production. While Milton’s escalation 
resulted in the production of Paradise Lost, Eve’s produced the main event of that poem, the 
eating of the forbidden fruit.  
 Intentional or not, then, parallels exist between Milton’s belated act of writing and Eve’s 
gluttonous act of eating, which both can be traced back to anxieties concerning otium and good 
time management. For Eve, however, the fault specifically has to do with a misconception over 
Edenic geography.16 Responding to her desire to leave, Adam initially denies that request, 
advising her to “leave not the faithful side / That gave thee being, still shades thee and protects” 
(9.265-66). Unsatisfied with this response, Eve begins to question whether they can be happy at 
all when “In narrow circuit straitened by a foe,” assuming she will “double honour gain” by 
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resisting Satan’s ploys while by herself (9.323, 332). She continues, asking, “what is faith, love, 
virtue unassayed” if not demonstrated “Alone, without exterior help sustained” (9.335-36). 
Unsurprisingly, the very ideas Eve wishes to test heroically while alone (“faith, love, virtue”) all 
belong to the vita contemplativa and thus should be ritually practiced in the shade of home or 
husband. That Eve’s conception of otium’s place has shifted is also readily apparent from her 
asking Adam to 
[…] not then suspect our happy state 
Left so imperfect by the maker wise, 
As not secure to single or combined. 
Frail is our happiness, if this be so, 
And Eden were no Eden thus exposed. (9.337-41) 
The self-referentiality of the idea that “Eden were no Eden” epitomizes her new understanding of 
geography, which treats all of paradise as an undivided unit, ignoring differences of place and 
function. Insert “hell” for “Eden,” and her claim bears an unsettling resemblance to Satan’s claim 
that “Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell” (4.75). In other words, both Satan and Eve believe 
all places are the same to those who bring to them virtue (Eve’s argument) or vice (Satan’s 
argument). Such thinking disregards the strict zoning laws of Eden, which divide between light 
and dark, thinking and doing. In short, her desire to “divide [their] labors” has the opposite effect 
of bringing together (i.e., “con-fusing”) geographic divisions. Here, Eve is playing God, whose 
original self-division retired him, sending forth the Son to create the heavens and earth. Unlike 
the mighty Son, though, whose role was to divide heavens and earth from chaos, Eve’s own 
attempt at heroics (“double honour gain”) is based in a geographic merger, not a separation. This 
confusion of place is simultaneously a confusion of function. Leaving Adam to continue the 
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physical labor of the field, she will instead find herself in the midst of the forbidden tree, 
contemplating mysteries untold.  
 Ultimately, Adam resigns himself to the fact of her leaving, urging her “To be returned by 
noon amid the bower” (9.401). His fault in acquiescing I discuss at length in Chapter 1. At 
around noon, however, just when Eve should be making her way back to the bower, Satan 
instead discovers her wandering in a “flowery plat,” described as her “sweet recess” (9.456). It is 
not long before Satan convinces her to follow him to the forbidden tree, a journey that “made 
intricate seem straight” (9.632). This confusion on Satan’s part does not seem to upset Eve, 
whose dream distorts her notion of place and time. At this point, Eve is doing the very thing that 
Adam warned against when discussing God’s appointment of “daily work,” “rov[ing] idle 
unemployed,” like the beasts of the field. Not surprisingly, her leader at this moment is a beast of 
the field. Once they arrive at the forbidden tree, and after some serious finagling, Eve decides to 
eat the fruit during the “hour of noon,” a time when, by Edenic code, she should be in the shade 
of the bower (9.739). Dismissing God’s appointment of “body or mind,” Eve decides to “reach, 
and feed at once both body and mind” (9.779, my italics). In this instant, the division between 
the vita contemplativa and the vita activa fails, and, along with it, the sacredness of Edenic 
landscape. Shade and sunlight, a dichotomy that previously regimented their time in Eden 
suddenly no longer applies, for immediately “Earth felt the wound,” a line that immediately 
connects Eve’s gustatory action to Eden’s geographical changes (9.782). Much like Eve’s dream, 
this newly postlapsarian landscape is one of intermixing darkness and light, a chiaroscuro image 
that allows for the development of Miltonic allegory.  
 The word “shade” continues to appear after the fall, but its context has changed, and so too 
its meaning. No longer sacred and literal, shade and shadows now function metaphorically to 
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indicate the couple’s fallen status. Upon their waking from lust-filled sex, the first couple and the 
poet find the meaning of shade is different, along with their minds: 
As from unrest, and each other viewing, 
Soon found their eyes how opened, and their minds 
How darkened; innocence, that as a veil 
Had shadowed them from knowing ill, was gone[.] (9.1052-55) 
Once pure, their minds are now figuratively “darkened.” Gone, too, is the “veil” of “innocence” 
that “Had shadowed them from knowing ill.” Ironically, a literal shadow has been lifted, 
ushering in more darkness. This metaphoric understanding of shade also figures into Adam’s 
apostrophe: 
   O might I here 
In solitude live savage, in some glade 
Obscured, where highest woods impenetrable 
To star or sunlight, spread their umbrage broad 
And brown as evening: cover me ye pines, 
Ye cedars, with innumerable boughs 
Hide me, where I may never see them more. (9.1084-90) 
Comparing the “broad / And brown” shade provided by trees to “evening,” Adam engages in the 
same metaphorizing as the narrator, who next describes the couple searching “thickest wood” for 
the place where “the Indian herdsman shunning heat / Shelters in cool, and tends his pasturing 
herds / At loopholes cut through thickest shade” (9.1108-10). This shade, provided by the fig 
leaves, is both actually and metaphorically sewn together to form clothes “to hide / Their guilt 
and dreaded shame,” which is both external and internal (9.1113-14). Without using the word 
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itself, Mattison also observes Eden’s new double nature when noting that “these hiding-places,” 
referring to the thick woods to which they retire, “go two ways at once” insofar as “they provide 
shelter” while also “represent[ing] a form of disconnection” (122). Though “their shame [is] in 
part / Covered” in shade, nevertheless, the couple remains without “rest or ease of mind” 
(9.1119-20). Before, shade functioned as a direct connection with God; now, it serves to hide 
them from his presence. That which hides them from God also hides God from them, though, 
creating a division between fallen humanity and the divine that can only be transcended via the 
shade that mediates it. Shade now functions as a metaphor, that which “carries across” meaning 
from one side of the divide to the other, and vice versa. A metonym no more, shade transforms 
into a metaphor, which, extended, becomes full-on allegory in Milton’s postlapsarian works.   
 
Conclusion 
 Never again will shade function literally and sacredly. As a postlapsarian figure, shade still 
designates the place of otium, but otium itself has changed, no longer representing ease and 
leisure, but instead “intense thought and labor,” as Milton styles it in Tetrachordon, an intensity 
that results from its involvement with metaphor and verbal ambiguity. In brief, the shadows of 
prelapsarian Eden become in Milton’s postlapsarian world the shadows of Plato’s cave, 
metaphoric shadows that can only ever approximate the truth they adumbrate. We might say, 
then, that the “double-formed” sin of Paradise Lost (2.741) activates the “double-shade” (1.500) 
that will enclose the Son in Paradise Regained, as well as the “double darkness” (593) of 
Samson’s despair. Ultimately, though, these various darknesses attest to Milton’s own shade and 
the “ever-during dark / Surround[ing]” the blind poet (3.45). Emerging out of Adam’s shade, Eve 
ultimately enters into a metaphoric shadow that also encloses us as fallen readers, and Milton as 
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a fallen writer. The parallels between Eve’s leisurely eating and Milton’s belated writing, then, 
should come as no surprise, given that her confusions of place introduce slippages in language 
that make writing anything but the “Unmeditated” verse it was in prelapsarian Eden. Whereas 
Eve once labored to produce fruits, his labor is to produce epic poetry, bringing to fruition 
literary works that “justify the ways of God to men,” and, in this case, the ways of Eve, using 
fallen and therefore less efficient language (1.26). Yet, Milton also seems to displace at least 
some of Eve’s blame onto himself. In attributing the fall to a misuse of otium, Milton expands 
the Genesis myth in ways personally relevant to him, including how best to use one’s leisure 
hours, and when. Her decision gives voice to Milton’s fears concerning time management and 
how to use otium. Behind Adam’s order “To be returned by noon amid the bower,” we can 
almost hear Milton’s third wife, Elizabeth, as she admonishes him for retiring himself from 
friends and family, hoping to achieve the “immortality of fame” he once described in a letter to 







Allegory and Aloneness in Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes 
 
 This chapter continues my analysis of shade and solitude, extending the last chapter’s 
findings concerning Paradise Lost to the companion poems, Paradise Regained and Samson 
Agonistes. In the closing remarks of the previous chapter, I described how the meaning of shade 
shifts with the fall, as the literal and sacred geography of Eden transforms into the metaphorical 
and deconsecrated landscape of the postlapsarian world. In this chapter, I resume that discussion 
of fallen geography as I trace how the metaphorical shade of Paradise Lost develops into full-on 
allegorical thunderstorms in the companion poems, thunderstorms that garner different responses 
from the Son and Samson. Not only do their responses to climate differ, but their solitudes are 
different, as well. Samson believes his solitude results from God’s abandonment, while the Son 
understands his as the result of God’s elevating him for glorious deeds. Despite these differences, 
however, both figures end their poems through singular action, either the vanquishing of Satan in 
Paradise Regained or the destruction of the Temple in Samson Agonistes. The key to 
understanding these actions, I argue, is how each character responds to stormy weather, which 
literally and figuratively forecasts their singularities. Confronted by a storm that is made to 
appear allegorical, the Son immediately affirms its reality, even while tacitly admitting it could 
be read allegorically. For the Son, who chooses not to interpret it allegorically, the storm is 
simply wind and rain, and nothing more than that, despite Satan’s attempts to persuade him 
otherwise. In denying allegory, the Son redeems Eve, who applied an allegoric hermeneutic to 
the sacred geography of Eden. As detailed in the last chapter, Eve learns this hermeneutic from 
Satan in a dream. Likewise, the Son’s storm occurs while he is asleep, suggesting a correlation 
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between the two events. His triumph, then, is redemptive. Elevated himself, he uses his solitude 
to uplift fallen humanity.  
 In Samson Agonistes, we find a very different situation. Whereas the Son’s solitude 
culminates in a moment of uplifting, Samson’s ends in things brought down, in particular the 
Philistine Temple, which falls on himself and his captors. The Son’s upward movement toward 
salvation, rendered mimetic through the actions of the angels, who “upbore” him “As on a 
floating couch through the blithe air,” is met with Samson’s downward movement toward death 
and destruction, which creates problems for the reader not found in Paradise Regained (4.584-
585). Unlike the messiah, whose solitude is the natural extension of his unquestioned 
exemplarity, Samson clearly struggles with his aloneness, which manifests as a deep melancholy 
following his failed marriages and subsequent enslavement. If the Son knows God has singled 
him out for success, whose “matchless deeds express [his] matchless sire,” Samson initially 
believes God has singled him out for failure (1.233). I say “initially” because Samson eventually 
overcomes his dejection, and he does so upon hearing the brontide of an approaching storm that 
signals not only Harapha’s approach, but also, as I argue, his own final act. Manoa alerts Samson 
to the storm’s approach in a non sequitur following his vitriolic conversation with Dalila. At 
first, he, too, refuses to assign much meaning to the storm, claiming his “riddling days are past” 
(1064). Ultimately, though, he reads within the meteorological event an allegory of his own 
violent end, slaughtering the Philistines “As with the force of winds and waters pent” (1646).  
 Or so it seems, anyway. In fact, it is the Messenger who encodes the violent act within 
this stormy conceit, not Samson. As readers, then, we are left to wonder whether Samson read 
the storm aright, or, indeed, if he read it at all. Whereas critics such as Michael Bryson argue that 
“Samson’s violence can be seen for what it truly is,” namely, “a failure of understanding, of 
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intelligence, and of faith,” I contend that Samson’s violence is entirely unseen—and I mean that 
literally (33). Not only does Milton prevent us from witnessing Samson’s destruction firsthand, 
he also casts a veil over the Israelite’s final act, encoding it within the Messenger’s stormy story. 
Opposite the Son, then, who instantly refuses the allegorical import of his storm, Samson’s 
response to his storm is not immediate, in the sense of “lacking mediation.” Instead, his response 
is mediated through the Messenger’s mini-allegory, placing the onus on the reader, who must 
now confront the storm, whose meaning is connected with his act of destruction. As confirmed 
by the plethora of critical responses to that act, however, there is no consensus over that 
meaning, nor is it likely there will ever be one. Rather than a fluke, however, I argue this is 
precisely Milton’s point. He intentionally encodes Samson’s violent act in an impenetrable 
allegory, which serves to demonstrate that 
1) we are not the Son, whose immediate response to his storm proves him far superior to the 
fallen reader, 
2) that we are not Milton, whose poetic mastery enables him to execute such a difficult 
allegory, 
3) and, finally, that we are not each other, whose various responses to the poem confirm our 
differences from one another, as well as our readerly solitudes.    
I will return to each of these strands at various points throughout the chapter, especially the 
second and third, which comprise my conclusion. Taken together, they extend my discussion of 
the dissertation’s Introduction, which concerns Miltonic solitude and its postlapsarian function. 
Adamantly against conformity in both church and state, Milton believes the ideal society is one 
in which everyone is different, and he sees solitude as both a sign and surety of that difference. 
In Samson, he transfers his desire for politico-religious difference to the domain of aesthetics by 
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encouraging our critical dissimilitude. Through us, Milton continues to make a difference in the 
world by inviting different responses to his most enigmatic poem, thereby securing critical 
nonconformity, which, for Milton, is a guarantor of our solitude. Decrying “alphabetical 
servility” among the English, the last thing Milton wants from his critics is a hegemonic reading 
of the text that forecloses interpretive possibility, and Samson Agonistes is his most powerful 
statement in that regard (YP 2, 280). Though Samson claims his “riddling days are past,” Milton 
ensures us that ours as critics are far from over.  
 I use the word “allegory” throughout this chapter somewhat loosely, which, according to 
Mindele Anne Treip, is also how an early modern reader might have used it, as well. In her view, 
the word “shade” often functioned as a general synonym for Renaissance allegory, whose 
purpose was to veil or “shadow” meaning. Noting how the “related words ‘type’ and ‘shadow’ 
occur a number of times” in Paradise Lost, Treip claims that “[b]oth words, but especially 
‘shadow’, are of course common Renaissance terms for any kind of allegorical figure” (181). 
Aware of the correlation between shadow and allegory, Milton redoubles his use of shade in the 
companion poems, whose darknesses are both literal and figurative. While my primary focus is 
the darkness of the storms appearing in each poem, it is clear that Milton overtly obnubilates the 
poems to heighten their overall allegorical feel. He also plays with the meaning of “step,” which 
can signify the motion of actual feet, as well as metrical feet, whose movement is not simply 
across the page, but also up and down the semiotic ladder between literal and figurative 
meanings. Thus, the “wandering steps” (12.648) of Adam and Eve out of Eden become the “step 
by step” of the Son in a “pathless desert” (1.189; 296), as well as the “dark steps” of Samson 
(line 3), whose blindness brings him to a place that is both literally and figuratively darkened. 
Occurring within the first two hundred lines of the companion poems, this emphasis on shade 
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and shaded footsteps attunes the reader to their allegorical potential, which is dispelled by the 
Son, and proliferated by Samson.1   
  
I. 
 That which prompts the Son to deny allegory in Paradise Regained also prompts him to 
refuse the scriptural terms offered by Satan, and so it is with some general claims about the Son’s 
tactics of resistance that I begin. It is obvious that Scripture in the poem functions differently for 
Satan and the Son. For Satan, Scripture acts as a historical precedent that foretells what the Son 
ought to do at any given temporal juncture. Many of Satan’s queries render scriptural history as a 
teleology which the Son fulfills. For instance, Satan tells the Son that  
  thy kingdom though foretold 
By prophet or by angel, unless thou 
Endeavor, as thy father David did, 
Thou never shalt obtain; prediction still 
In all things, and all men, supposes means, 
Without means used, what it predicts revokes. (3.351-356) 
Here, Satan figures the Son as the primary agent of historical change, who must obsequiously 
obey scriptural edict so as to bring about the kingdom of God. Should it be the case that he will 
one day fulfill scriptural prophecy, and it remains unclear from his response that such an 
outcome is inevitable, nevertheless, the Son make clears that now is not the time:  
Means I must use thou say’st, prediction else  
Will unpredict and fail me of the throne:  
My time I told thee (and that time for thee  
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Were better farthest off) is not yet come. (394-397) 
While Satan views scriptural history as inevitable, the Son maintains a more dynamic view of his 
place in time by promoting an ethics that emphasizes not the end result, but rather what happens 
in the interim. Whereas Satan understands Christian history, in which the end has been 
teleologically forecasted in the beginning, the Son, by contrast, comprehends each passing 
moment as equally important and relies, as he indicates, on the notion of kairos, or “My time.” 
 This sort of back and forth continues until the poem’s final scene. Satan telekinetically 
lifts the Son atop a pinnacle and gives him two options. Either the Son can “There stand, if thou 
wilt stand; to stand upright / Will ask thee skill” or else he can  
Cast thyself down; safely if the Son of God:  
For it is written, He will give command  
Concerning thee to his angels, in their hands  
They shall uplift thee. (4.551-558)  
As before, Satan tries to use biblical history to coerce the Son into action by claiming that 
Scripture prophesizes that angels will “uplift” him should he decide to fall. Through his jesting, 
Satan acknowledges that the excerpt from the Bible describing the Son’s ascension with the help 
of angels transcends all contexts and therefore must be regarded as having authority in and of 
itself. Which is to say, Satan views Scripture as unconditional, as something akin to the Kantian 
categorical imperative, to which the Son should necessarily submit as a rational being. Contrary 
to Satan, who continuously alludes to scriptural truth as self-evident and mandatory, the Son 
employs biblical history strategically to subdue Satan’s logic by quoting Deuteronomy 6:16: 
“Also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy God, he said and stood” (4.560-561, my italics). In 
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counteracting Satan’s appeal with his own equally valid biblical allusion, the Son effectively 
decenters Satan’s imperative, thereby shifting the terms of the debate.  
 By setting one Bible quote against another, the Son has shown how there is no utterance 
that transcends all others, but rather that all utterances are firmly embedded in an ever-shifting 
context. The way to the correct understanding of history, biblical or otherwise, is not through an 
obsequious submission to the words on the page, as Satan exhibits, but instead the ability to 
disengage those quotations from their original context and reinterpret them strategically to fit the 
present circumstances. In this way, he represents the ideal Renaissance reader, whose use of 
quotations is context-specific. Milton employs a similar hermeneutic to argue that the New 
Testament prohibition of divorce applied only to the Pharisees to whom Jesus was speaking at 
the time, and should not be taken as a universal prohibition of divorce. My point is not that the 
Son (and, through him, Milton) promotes a relativist mode of interpretation that reduces biblical 
truth to a rhetorical exercise in marshaling one quote after another in never-ending repartee. That 
truth is contextual in Milton’s thinking does not make him a relativist; truth still requires proofs, 
and the Son’s rebuttal to Satan simply shows the archfiend (as well as the reader) that one 
biblical quote cannot perforce make a universal law, nor does the search for truth always yield to 
unity, a fact examined in detail in the first chapter, while discussing Adam and Eve’s debate in 
Book 9 of Paradise Lost. This exegetical thinking on the part of Milton explains why the Son 
modifies his statement with the adverb “also,” which indicates that he has added another 
citational layer to the ongoing textual matrix, and not just uttered an ultimatum, as Satan has 
done, who “smitten with amazement fell” immediately after the Son responds (4.562). The Son’s 
“also” suggests that meaning making is no longer (nor ever was) a self-evidential phenomenon; 
instead, meaning is only determinable by establishing spatiotemporal context. That one context is 
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more propitious than another for evoking biblical history requires a kairotic sensibility—namely, 
the feeling that this particular moment is better suited than any other to invoke what has been 
written, which the Son effectively demonstrates.2 
 This same refusal to think in categorical terms also informs the Son’s denial of allegory. 
To be clear, the poem is undoubtedly an allegorical one; I am merely saying the Son must act as 
though it is not. “[T]he magic has gone” from Paradise Regained, to adopt David Quint’s 
succinct phrasing, and in its place, I argue, we are left with allegory (183).3 The narrator alludes 
to the allegorical doubleness subtending the poem in his earliest description of the Son, who 
One day forth walked alone, the spirit leading, 
And his deep thoughts, the better to converse 
With solitude, till far from track of men, 
Thought following thought, and step by step led on, 
He entered now the bordering desert wild, 
And with dark shades and rocks environed round, 
His holy meditations thus pursued. (1.189-195) 
To the Son’s physical quest into the “desert wild” corresponds a spiritual/conceptual quest, one 
that cancels out the “Real or allegoric” opposition later proffered by Satan, substituting for it a 
narrative that is at once real and allegoric, as noted by Judith Anderson, among others (4.390).4 
This same negation of binaristic opposites, I contend, is also apparent in Milton’s juxtaposition 
of “dark shades” and “rocks environed round,” the mimetic certainty of the rocks rendered 
uncertain by the metaphoric darkness that obfuscates them. Unlike the sacred shade of unfallen 
Eden, then, this is a shade whose reconfiguration threatens the poem’s very meaning, which now 
vacillates dangerously between its real and allegoric registers.  
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 The “Real or allegoric” binary that Satan extends to the Son at 4.390 comes after another 
binary that appears exactly twenty lines before it, in which Satan pronounces the Son unfit for 
either a “life contemplative, / Or active” (4.370-71). Like the “real or allegoric” binary, this one 
too is false—the Son lives a life both contemplative and active. The certitude of a life divided 
between “real or allegoric” and “contemplative or active” modes no longer exists in the 
postlapsarian world. Yet—and this is a very important “yet”—the Son must act as though such 
certitude does still exist, even if it does not. His solitude is such that he must contemplate one 
thing and act another. To redeem Eve’s metaphorical understanding of otium’s place, the Son 
insists on the univocality of his own contemplative setting, despite the narrator (and Satan too) 
suggesting the shade that encloses him is a “double-shade,” that is, an allegorical shade (500). 
Whereas Satan falsely assumes the continued bifurcation of action/contemplation and 
real/allegory, the Son must recognize that he lives in a world in which such binaries do not exist, 
while still acting as if they do. Satan assumes the world is “Real or allegoric,” inviting the Son, 
like Eve, to comprehend his surroundings within the latter category as metaphorical. The Son 
acknowledges the world is real and allegoric, but resolves to see it as only real, in contrast to 
Eve, who saw it as only allegoric. He stoically reduces the allegorical to the real, as opposed to 
Eve, whose mistake was to turn a real and sacred place into an allegorical one.  
 After deploying the active/contemplative and real/allegoric binaries, Satan returns the Son 
to the wilderness in which he found him, at which point the narrator describes how 
   Darkness now rose, 
As daylight sunk, and brought in louring night, 
Her shadowy offspring unsubstantial both, 
Privation mere of light and absent day. (4.397-400) 
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A seemingly forthright description, the narrator describes how daylight fell, but not before it 
gave birth to (“brought in”) night, which, along with “darkness,” constitute daylight’s “shadowy 
offspring.” In what turns out to be a multivalent allusion to Paradise Lost, the narrator recalls the 
moment Lucifer (whose name means “light”) fell from grace, begetting sin, and through his 
incestuous relationship with sin, brought death into the world. That the narrator describes 
darkness and night using the adjective “shadowy” evokes the narrative description in Paradise 
Lost of the shapeless forms of Sin and Death, who “shadow seemed / For each seemed either” 
(2.669-70). The modifier “unsubstantial” likewise agrees in meaning with Satan’s description in 
Paradise Lost of “unessential night,” whose “void profound” he must cross before he can enter 
into Eden (2.438-39). The “daylight” of line 398 bifurcates and becomes the conjunction of line 
400 (“light and absent day”). Whereas the “daylight” of line 398 refers to Satan, by line 400 the 
metaphorical referent could also be God, whose “Privation” is actually what renders the 
shapeless forms of darkness and night “unsubstantial.” By intertextually comparing the darkness 
that encloses the Son of Paradise Regained to the darkness found in the hell of Paradise Lost, 
and simultaneously transfiguring the meaning of daylight midverse from Lucifer to the “light and 
absent day” of God, the narrator invites us to read the passage as metaphorically overdetermined, 
creating a sense of narrative urgency by confusing the metaphorical referents and forcing the 
reader to act quickly so as to solve the riddle. In short, the narrator wants us to view the scene 
allegorically, which, as we shall soon find out, is the same way Satan wants the Son to view it 
too.  
 A complicated allegorical interplay, indeed, the foregoing scene is immediately subverted 
once the narrator relates how 
Our saviour meek and with untroubled mind 
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After his airy jaunt, though hurried sore, 
Hungry and cold betook him to his rest, 
Wherever, under some concourse of shades 
Whose branching arms thick intertwined might shield 
From dews and damps of night his sheltered head[.] (4.401-06) 
Whereas the reader was emplaced by the narrator within a complex intertextual allegory in the 
previous passage, whose allusions were many and obscure, the Son finds himself in this passage 
“with untroubled mind,” located “Wherever, under some concourse of shades.” The locational 
ambiguity of “Wherever” undermines the analogical specificity of the preceding lines, while the 
imprecision of “some” downplays the significance of the place in which he “might shield” 
himself from the literal “dews and damps of night.” Momentous and metaphorical becomes 
mundane and mimetic, as the solivagant Son shows no regard for any hidden meaning in his dark 
surroundings. His stoical response (“with untroubled mind”) deemphasizes the allegorical 
implications of his natural setting, which matter far less than the real dark that encloses him 
while he attempts to sleep. This same stoical response the Son must bring to the dream sequence 
that occurs next. Not unlike his infiltration of Eve’s dream, Satan reenters the wilderness at this 
moment to disturb the Son’s sleep with “ugly dreams” that “tempt the Son of God with terrors 
dire” (4.408, 431). Through his dream, however, the Son demonstrates his awareness of Eve’s 
oneiric mistake, maintaining the division that she could not by unrelentingly holding on to the 
real amidst the appearance of allegory.  
 Despite the narrator’s allegorically intense description, the Son responds indifferently to 
his dark surroundings, the same response he must also maintain with Satan, who promptly 
returns and “soon with ugly dreams / Disturbed his sleep” and “rain with lightning mixed, water 
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and fire,” while also sending winds “From the four hinges of the world” that shook the trees, 
who “Bowed their stiff necks, loaden with stormy blasts” (4.408-18). Satan picks up where the 
narrator left off, sending a storm whose allegorical import the Son must likewise resist. Referring 
to this storm, David Quint notes that “Storms are normally sent in classical epic by an angry 
deity, but in this reformed Christian poem a storm may just be a storm,” adding that “Jesus 
acknowledges the natural storm—he has gotten drenched—but not any metaphysical content in 
its violence” (191-92). True to form, the Son denies the storm’s allegorical content, despite 
Satan’s attempts to convince him such storms “oft fore-signify and threaten ill” (4.464). 
According to Satan, the storm functioned as a symbol of the “dangers, and adversities and pains” 
that will precede his gaining “Israel’s sceptre,” encouraging the Son to project metaphorically 
such hardships back onto the tempest (4.479-83).  
 The Son, meanwhile, adamantly refuses to impute to the storm any allegorical meaning 
whatsoever, his absolute recalcitrance approaching the absolutism with which God refuses blame 
for the fall in Book 3 of Paradise Lost:   
Me worse than wet thou find’st not; other harm 
Those terrors which thou speak’st of, did me none; 
I never feared they could, though noising loud 
And threat’ning nigh; what they can do as signs 
Betokening, or ill boding, I contemn 
As false portents, not sent from God, but thee; 
Who knowing I shall reign past thy preventing, 
Obtrud’st thy offered aid, that I accepting 
At least might seem to hold all power of thee, 
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Ambitious spirit, and would’st be thought my God, 
And storm’st refused, thinking to terrify 
Me to thy will; desist, thou art discerned 
And toil’st in vain, nor me in vain molest. (4.486-98) 
The Son never denies that wind and rain “can do as signs,” suggesting it is possible for him to 
read the storm allegorically, should he choose to do so, only that he “contemn[s] [them] / As 
false portents” when he the “storm’st refused.” The storm, he discreetly admits, is real and 
allegoric, natural and artificial, yet his present task requires him to refute its allegoric potential 
and hold fast to the real. In doing so, he redeems Eve, whose mistake in Book 9 was to read the 
world through the allegorical hermeneutic provided by Satan in her dream. Whereas the content 
of Eve’s dream supplied her with a new interpretive context with which to understand her world, 
an argument I made in the previous chapter, the Son outright denounces the dream content, 
dispelling the idea, adopted by Eve, that the dream could supply an allegorical read of his 
surroundings. The Son even disavows the dream using some of the same phrases found in the 
passage describing Eve’s dream in Paradise Lost, twice referring to his Satanic project as “vain.” 
The Son refuses all things superficial, a denunciation Eve found herself incapable of performing 
when bringing her dream-infused and metaphorical understanding of the world to the forbidden 
tree in Book 9. 
 
II. 
 Turning to Samson Agonistes, we discover quite another situation, though one that still 
involves a storm and a partial dismissal. While Samson initially dismisses reading his storm 
allegorically, claiming his “riddling days are past,” nevertheless, the Messenger reinscribes his 
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violent end using watery conceit, leaving open the possibility that Samson actually did read his 
future destruction in the storm’s brontide (1064). Corroborating this version of events are 
Samson’s “rousing motions,” which occur between his first hearing the storm and his stormy 
finish as described by the Messenger (1382).5 The following section examines the events leading 
up to those “rousing motions,” as well as the Messenger’s encoding the act in allegory. I 
conclude with a section discussing the implications for the reader of this tripartite tempest, where 
the brontide of a distant storm becomes Samson’s unseen stormy act, which, finally, becomes the 
stormy conceit of the Messenger’s mini-allegory. Be it far from me, however, to imply that I am 
the first or only person to read Samson Agonistes allegorically. Joseph Wittreich argues that the 
play is not simply a “political allegory but also an allegory of readings,” in which “any notion of 
a representative Samson attached to this or that scriptural text is menacing to Milton’s own 
representation” (279-80). He regards the triple simile occurring at the end of the poem, wherein 
Samson is compared to a dragon, eagle, and phoenix—symbolic figures of regeneration and 
degeneration, the Son and Satan, the God-sanctioned success of Cromwell and his hubris—as 
“an active complication of reading, a challenge to interpretation” (267). Similarly, Victoria Kahn 
argues in Wayward Contracts that Samson Agonistes is “Milton’s allegory of 
antifoundationalism, of the creative fiat of interpretation in the absence of any more secure or 
more legible foundation” (253-54). Writing in the context of seventeenth-century contract 
theory, Kahn insists that the poem “renders the political and theological problem of interpreting 
the covenant as a poetic problem of interpreting the contract of genre” (270). In this regard, 
Milton “anticipates modern theories of aesthetics as critique, theories that make the alienation 
effect of representation itself the condition of ethical and political action” (276). Like Wittreich, 
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Kahn believes this act of alienation produces a “surplus of possible meanings,” in which the only 
action still available to the reader is the all-important act of interpretation itself (277). 
 Both Wittreich and Kahn, then, read Samson Agonistes as a political and/or theological 
allegory that responds to the historical conditions in which it was written, while also resisting 
any easy interpretation of those conditions. A “challenge to interpretation,” a “surplus of possible 
meanings,” their understanding of the poem’s inscrutability stems from the respective historical 
frameworks in which they situate the poem, early modern typology for Wittreich, seventeenth-
century contract theory for Kahn. Nor are they alone in finding the poem a difficult text to 
interpret, as proven by even the most cursory survey of Samson criticism. Difficult, indeed, but is 
the reading of the poem itself a tragedy? For many, including Wittreich and Kahn, this answer is 
also a resounding “yes.” In answering in the affirmative, however, they assume a parallel 
between the action in the poem and the action of reading it. Samson’s tragedy is our tragedy; his 
decision becomes our indecision; his resolution, our irresolution. Whereas they view this 
situation as a tragic one, I regard the interpretive multiplicity that results from the poem’s 
indecipherability as consistent with Milton’s understanding of solitude, and therefore a positive 
outcome. Like Samson, who starts the play assuming God has singled him out, yet ends it in 
singular fashion, we are made more alone by the poem, and more singular through our different 
interpretations, and, for Milton, this is desirable. Contrary to Kahn, then, who claims Manoa 
“misreads the genre Samson has brought to conclusion” by inscribing on his monument a lyric 
song, I suggest that lyric befits the play, which celebrates our differences from one another, 
including our interpretive differences over the play’s meaning (275).  
 Though it ends in celebration, the play opens with the dejection of Samson’s “dark steps,” 
which take him to a solitary place of either “sun or shade” (2-3). This “unfrequented place,” he 
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says, allows him “Ease to the body some, none to the mind” (17-18). As it turns out, the option 
of “sun or shade” is really a false option. He is always in a vexed shade who cannot escape his 
own tormenting thoughts. Whereas the Son simply knows the “contemplative or active” binary 
that Satan offers is false, Samson lives that falsity, since little “Ease” comes to his ever-active 
“body” and “none to” his always contemplating “mind.” It matters not, therefore, where he goes; 
all places are the same to those who bring to them despair in the form of tormenting thoughts, 
that “deadly swarm / Of hornets” (19-20). Here, we see Satan’s the-mind-is-its-own-place 
reasoning at work. Samson’s logic at the beginning of the play is thus similar to Eve’s in Book 9 
of Paradise Lost. Both Samson and Eve believe that place is unimportant because all places are 
homogeneous to the virtuous (Eve’s argument) or the despairing (Samson’s argument). Eve 
employs this logic when departing from Adam, a departure that facilitates the fall; Samson 
reproduces Eve’s logic at the start of the play, but substitutes his despair for her virtue. Unlike 
Eve, however, Samson is right in making this claim; he is right precisely because Eve was 
wrong, and in being wrong brought about the fall of man. To the fallen, all places really are the 
same, a fact Satan of Paradise Lost knows all too well, but also the Son, who brings virtue to the 
scraggly woods, as well as the Lady of Comus, whose chastity saves her amidst a similarly 
tenebrous setting. 
 Samson attributes his despairing thoughts to his blindness and the experience of “dark 
[while] in light” (75). At the outset, this ironic darkness remains literal for him (“O dark, dark, 
dark, amid the blaze of noon”), while doubly ironic for the reader, who is aware of both its literal 
and figurative dimensions (80). Samson apostrophizes his condition in literal terms, as a loss of 
physical light: 
O first-created beam, and thou great word, 
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Let there be light, and light was over all; 
Why am I thus bereaved thy prime decree? 
The sun to me is dark 
And silent as the moon, 
When she deserts the night 
Hid in her vacant interlunar cave. (83-89) 
The assiduous reader will of course detect the figurative dimensions of Samson’s darkness, the 
“first-created beam” referring not only to God’s “prime decree,” but also his Son, the word made 
flesh, whose light beam, itself prefiguring the typological wooden beam upon which he will be 
sacrificed, Samson literally/figuratively cannot see. Samson also seems unaware of the figurative 
irony of the statement “The sun to me is dark,” questioning moments later “why […] the sight / 
To such a tender ball as the eye confined” (93-94). In the opening lines of the play, then, the 
irony of his darkness remains literal/physical, even as he unwittingly compares the absence of 
the Sun/Son to the silence of the moon.  
 So despairing is Samson that he begins to contemplate suicide, explaining to Manoa, who 
maintains hope that light will return to his son’s eyes, that he will soon “yield to double darkness 
nigh at hand” (590-98). If light throughout Milton’s texts is affiliated with the laboring body in 
general, and with the crucified body of Christ in Samson in particular, then Samson’s use of the 
phrase “double darkness” signifies the damned body’s morbid stasis, its absolute inactivity. The 
emphasis Samson places on the corporeal (he later compares his blindness to open wounds that, 
“finding no redress,” “Rankle, and fester, and gangrene, / To black mortification”) prevents him 
from realizing his physical blindness is also a metaphoric blindness, and the light denied him is 
as much or more spiritual as it is material (619-22). At his most despairing, Samson assumes the 
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“double darkness” of suicide will soon enclose him. While Samson is right about his own 
impending doom, the play seems to suggest that his darkness will not encreate more darkness. 
Instead, his physical and spiritual darkness will bring about an internal change, and, “With 
inward eyes illuminated,” he will bring down the Temple of Dagon (1689). 
 Altogether, solitary Samson uses some variation on the word “dark” fourteen times in the 
play’s first six hundred lines and then never again after that, an omission that intimates Samson’s 
regeneration from a character himself caught in the shadow of allegory to a self-aware allegorical 
figure who “sees” the shadow around him. He can now read metaphorical figures aright, most 
importantly the riddle of a storm, its unexpected approach at the end of the play functioning like 
a deus ex machina intervention. This deus ex machina designation gains even more credibility 
after we learn from the Messenger that Samson himself decimated the Philistines like a storm, as 
though suddenly transformed into self-aware allegorical figure, he played God to his own 
machinations. Responding to the Chorus’s apparent non-sequitur (“But had we best retire, I see a 
storm?”), Samson claims that “Fair days have oft contracted wind and rain,” to which the Chorus 
responds, “But this another kind of tempest brings” (1062-63). Samson then bids the Chorus to 
“Be less abstruse, my riddling days are past” (1064). Before marrying the woman of Timnah, 
Samson had sundered a lion, in whose carcass bees then nested, producing honey. The “riddling 
days” refer back to this event, encoded to the Philistines within the expression, “Out of the eater 
came meat, out of the strong came sweetness” (Judges 14: 14). Referring to this riddle, Samson, 
like the Son of Paradise Regained, initially refuses to interpret the impending storm 
prophetically. Enough with riddling, he tells the Chorus, and in telling the Chorus this seems to 
deny allegory too. As noted by Treip, “the concept of allegory as enigmatic secondary discourse 
or actual riddle had always formed an important element in medieval and earlier Renaissance 
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views of allegory,” adding later that, “allegory is closer than the other [tropes] to enigma, or 
perhaps to riddle, in that it is consciously misleading” (23, 133).  
 The stormy riddle Samson seems to deny the Chorus is therefore more than just a riddle; 
unwittingly, it is a self-referential allegory. Samson is the impending storm—to solve the riddle 
is therefore to solve himself, to know his own role as deus ex machina, who will bring about the 
play’s final action. The storm that Samson initially rejects will become the very storm he 
unleashes on the Philistines. Though he claims his riddling days are past, it is precisely in 
realizing the metaphorical import of the storm, effectively solving the riddle, that Samson 
surmounts his despair and triumphs over his captors. It is only after he learns of the approaching 
storm from the Messenger that he begins to feel those oft-cited “rousing motions,” and it is my 
contention that such tempestuous movements are his own realization that the storm of line 1063 
is a prefiguration of his own violent act. While certainly possible to read Samson’s “rousing 
motions” as pertaining to spiritual changes, the foregoing discussion between the Chorus and 
Samson regarding the impending thunderstorm suggests the “motions” that Samson feels are also 
a sign of his allegorical transformation into the storm unleashed on the Philistines inside the 
Temple. In short, these “motions” are as much meteorological as they are spiritual, indicating 
changes to the weather outside and the weather within. 
 Though he initially dismisses hearing the storm, in effect denying himself, by the end of 
the play it is clear the storm prefigured his own violent end. Out of sight, readers of the play are 
made aware of Samson’s action through the narrative of a Messenger, who returns from the 
Temple describing a “cloudless thunder” that “bolted on their heads,” referring to his violent act 
on the Philistines (1696). “[S]training all his nerves,” the Messenger describes how Samson 
“bowed,” 
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As with the force of winds and waters pent, 
When mountains tremble, those two massy pillars 
With horrible convulsion to and fro, 
He tugged, he shook, till down they came and drew 
The whole roof after them, with burst of thunder 
Upon the heads of all who sat beneath[.] (1646-1652) 
The “As” of the simile “As with the force of winds and waters pent” both contains and mitigates 
the violence of Samson’s act, turning a potentially unnatural, even perverse, event into a 
mundane and natural one by reducing it to a common meteorological occurrence. Samson’s act is 
no more violent, unnatural, or unusual than a thunderstorm, according to the Messenger’s 
account of things, albeit a thunderstorm that terrifies. By placing Samson’s act within the 
Messenger’s mini-allegory, Milton both distances himself from it (the most immediate author 
now the Messenger himself), while also forcing readers to come to terms with its violence as 
something as common as a thunderstorm. As allegory, then, we, the readers, are forced to ask a 
different set of questions, to work within a different logical framework, as it were. The question 
is no longer, nor ever really was, whether or not Samson’s violence is justified, but rather 
whether thunderstorms can be read as good or bad omens, indeed, whether Samson has read his 
own thunderstorm correctly. That storms can be read as both good and bad omens renders 
Samson’s awful (in the traditional sense of that word) act utterly ambiguous in meaning. 
Exacerbating the issue is Manoa’s confounding simile at play’s end that “Samson hath quit 
himself / like Samson,” a self-reflexive comparison that would not be much of a problem if the 
Samsonic “self” that is here being reflected were not already rendered allegorical through the 
Messenger’s previous epic simile (1709-10).6 A self-referential simile that refers back to a simile 
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that itself refers back to prophesied thunderstorm, Manoa’s line works to complicate an already 
overdetermined play, which quickly becomes about the act of readings signs, both verbal and 
phenomenal.  
 Samson not only shatters the Temple, then; he also shatters any attempt at a universal 
meaning for the play. For centuries now, critics have played the part of archaeologists, 
examining the fragments of Samson’s destruction, trying to piece together what happened and 
why. Out of these fragments come various interpretations, some which defend his violence, 
either on historical or modern grounds, others that outright condemn it, whether through recourse 
to some transhistorical categorical imperative, or through a close analysis of Milton’s own 
biography, and what motivated him to write the play, and still others that neither defend nor 
condemn his action, attempting to understand it on its own terms, especially through the question 
of genre. This proliferation of possible meanings has led some scholars to claim Samson’s 
tragedy is really our own as readers of the play. Ultimately, they claim, we cannot escape this 
impulse to interpret. As Victoria Kahn writes, “the reader is provoked to a sublime activity of 
interpretation,” consisting of a “strange and fragmentary ostentation that provokes a surplus of 
interpretation” (276). For Kahn, however, as well as many others, this process is decidedly a 
tragic one. According to her, Samson’s tragedy has become the tragedy of interpretation. But this 
understanding of the play requires that the reader disavow, among other things, the poem’s 
conclusion and the countervailing firmness of Manoa’s resolution to build a monument 
commemorating Samson’s act. Why is Manoa most decided at a time when readers should be 
most undecided? Whereas Kahn claims Manoa “misreads the genre Samson has brought to 
conclusion” through his inscription of Samson’s deeds in lyric song, I offer a different take on 
the play’s conclusion (275). As a commemoration, Manoa’s lyric encomium is not a celebration 
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of Samson’s action—which no one, not even Manoa, sees—but the Messenger’s “eye-witness” 
report of his final act (1594). Moreover, the monument itself is intended to “inflame” the breasts 
of “valiant youth,” inspiring others through his lyric retelling of the Messenger’s retelling of 
Samson’s reading of a thunderstorm (1738-1739). In other words, Manoa’s song celebrates the 
act of interpretation itself—the things we tell about the things we have heard, whether an eye-
witness testimony, or thunder in the distance. Insofar as everyone has their own story, and thus 
their own story to tell, Manoa’s monument is a testament to our interpretative differences, and 
the solitudes that attend them. It is to these differences—and these solitudes—that I turn now.  
 
III.  
 To understand fully the various arguments for and against the possible justice inherent in 
Samson’s violent act, one must also consider what Milton writes in Christian Doctrine, which, 
though written before Samson was published, still makes for an insightful comparative. For 
every statement of love and worldly charity that would seem to categorically preclude Samson’s 
act there is found in Milton’s tract a statement equal and opposite in its tenor that advocates 
religious violence and even hatred of God’s enemies. For instance, shortly after defining charity 
as loving our neighbor as ourselves, claiming “Our enemies are not to be excluded from our 
charity,” he nevertheless goes on to say that “There is some hatred, however, which is a religious 
duty, as when we hate the enemies of God or the church. […] or as when we hate even those who 
are in other respects our nearest and dearest, if they hinder or deter us from the love of God and 
from our reverence for the true religion” (YP 6, 742-43). It is difficult to read these views on 
hating God’s enemies and not think of Samson, who certainly hated the Philistines, and in 
particular that one Philistine woman, one of his “nearest and dearest,” whom he felt had 
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“hinder[ed] or deter[red]” him “from the love of God and from [his] reverence for the true 
religion,” to reapply Milton’s expression. “As for war,” which might be said to include the 
violence Samson performs, Milton writes that “we are instructed, in the first place, that it is to be 
undertaken only after extremely careful consideration,” but adds that “a cruel enemy should not 
be spared,” and this right before Milton writes that “we should not trust in the strength of our 
forces, but in God alone” (YP 6, 801-02).7  
 I bring these passages up (and more could be cited) not to justify or condemn Samson’s 
action outright, but instead to show that, when it comes to Milton’s own beliefs concerning 
religious charity and violence, he seems quite divided, much as critics have been since the play’s 
earliest reception. Samuel Johnson and Richard Cumberland describe the catastrophe, 
respectively, as “just and regular” (102) and of “unparalleled majesty and terrour” (115), while 
F.M. Krouse in 1949 claims Samson represents a “champion of God” (104). The Romantic 
William Hazlitt, connecting Samson’s character to Milton’s own politics, wrote that within the 
hero existed all the “high moral and religious prejudices of [Milton’s] maturer years” (29), a 
feeling that Kenneth Burke will echo years later when he writes that the play’s violence was the 
product of a “cantankerous old fighter-priest” (5). This desire—the desire to read Samson as a 
response to the failed Revolution—continues throughout the twentieth century in the work of 
scholars like Jackie DiSalvo, Christopher Hill, Laura Lunger Knoppers, David Loewenstein, and 
David Norbrook, among others. Yet, scholars who prefer a less homicidal Milton are quick to 
separate the violent end of the play from the author’s own politics. Of this critical camp the most 
famous figure is John Carey, who in 1969 insisted that Samson was a “barbaric foil” to the Christ 
of Paradise Regained, and not a hero to be admired, an opinion he reiterated in the wake of 9/11. 
Stephen Fallon, meanwhile, returns to the work of Hazlitt and Burke when finding “in this 
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Samson’s late heroism a self-portrait of Milton,” noting that “a Samson ‘elect above the rest’ 
who has achieved his end and a Samson profoundly fallen and flawed are equally 
autobiographical and equally implicated in Milton’s lifelong project of self-representation” 
(270). Other scholars, such as Feisal Mohamed and David Lowenstein, seek to rationalize 
Samson’s actions from within the framework of the text and time period. Taking a historical 
approach, Lowenstein asks us “to consider Milton’s poem in relation to the culture of religious 
terror in the early modern period” (208), ultimately arguing that even though the poem “gives the 
experience of religious terror a troubling representation,” Samson’s actions “do not concern 
terrorist activity” as we currently conceive of it (227). Mohamed, too, regards the poem as “very 
much a part of the discourse of the revolution in which Milton was engaged” (333). Lingering in 
the background of many of these more recent assessments is Stanley Fish, who in 2001 made the 
categorical claim that “the only value we can put on Samson’s action is the value he gives in 
context. Within the situation, it is an expression, however, provisional, of his reading of the 
divine will; and insofar as it represents his desire to conform to that will, it is a virtuous action. 
No other standard for evaluating it exists” (426).  
 Ever the lawyer, Fish abides by the same logic that informs modern-day constitutionalists 
in America, who believe the only way to read that historic document is how the forefathers 
intended it. To read this way, however, risks reducing a literary text to a legal document 
completely devoid of aesthetics, whose only purpose is to establish a doomed contract between 
writer/reader that the reader will inevitably fail because of his or her fallenness. Such a reading 
practice ignores the many allusions, both intra- and extratextual, that Milton makes throughout 
his poetry, as John Rumrich also notes when dismissing Fish’s determinist methodology. 
Referring to Milton’s characters, Rumrich in Milton Unbound criticizes Fish’s oversimplifying 
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approach, writing that “If only the fact of choice matters, [then] the process leading up to it can 
be distorted without consequence” (13). More to the point, though, Fish’s legalistic approach 
denies readerly solitude. According to him, we are always already bound by a contractual poetics 
of Milton’s design, which depends on the sameness of writer/reader, insofar as the reader must 
be able to think the same way as the poet in order to anticipate his intentions. As discussed in my 
Introduction, though, Milton is a poet of dissent, not contract, and his poetry intends to showcase 
our readerly differences, not our ability (whether real or potential) to read the same way. Milton 
first acknowledges this difference in Paradise Lost by setting himself as poet apart from us:  
More safe I sing with mortal voice, unchanged 
To hoarse or mute, though fallen on evil days, 
On evil days though fallen, and evil tongues; 
In darkness, and with dangers compassed round, 
And solitude[.] (7.23-28) 
His most famous use of solitude, this passage marks the insuperable distance occurring between 
the enshrouded poet, who “as the wakeful bird / Sings darkling, and in the shadiest covert hid / 
Tunes her nocturnal note,” and the reader, whose darkened solitude results from a missed 
connection with a poet who refuses to be seen (3.38-40). Acknowledging the “ever-during dark / 
Surround[ing] me,” Milton registers the difference between the singularly shaded place from 
which he writes, that fanciful “flight / Through utter and middle darkness borne,” and the many 
shadowy places about which he writes, including the shadowy thunderstorm of Samson 
Agonistes (3.45-46). Rather than a contractual poetics, then, which assumes an implicit sameness 
between writer and reader, Milton asserts his difference from us through a poetics of solitude. In 
a way, then, the monument Manoa builds for Samson, enclosed within the “shade / Of laurel ever 
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green, and branching palm,” is also a monument for Milton, who similarly locates himself in the 
shadows of his own work (1734-1735). 
 Emphasizing his own solitude, Milton does not—and cannot—know his audience. Not 
knowing them, he can only place faith in their fitness, a faith he tests to the extreme in Samson 
Agonistes. An isolated writer, writing to an isolated audience, Milton’s estranging poetics of 
solitude situates readers of Samson in a present to which they do not belong, awaiting a poet who 
will not arrive. In a version of predestination, Milton asks us to read Samson as though we 
already know ourselves members of his poetic approbate, the certainty of our membership 
corroborated through the freely willed act of reading, which inevitably results in interpretive 
difference. We affirm ourselves as part of his poetic elect by not affirming it, that is, by allowing 
that we might not be members, a permanent state of readerly suspension that invites us to revisit 
the poem, searching for new meaning—new to ourselves and to each other. While it is Milton 
who must “stand and wait” for his God in Sonnet 18, nevertheless, it is we who must “stand and 
wait” for Milton, a deferral that I call “teleiopoetic.” Invented by Derrida in reference to 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, teleiopoesis designates writing whose intended audience comprises 
“friends of solitude, […] inaccessible friends, friends who are alone because they are 
incomparable and without a common measure, reciprocity or equality,” who will receive his 
message within “the darkness of a friendship which is not yet” (35, 42-43). As the narrator of 
Paradise Lost states explicitly, and the writer of Samson Agonistes encodes allegorically, Milton 
expects us to be these very sorts of solitary friends, whose friendship is always of the future, and 
therefore remains a friendship of hope, of expectancy, of things to come.  As “friends” of and 
through Miltonic solitude, we must accept that the poet will always be enshrouded by a shaded 
solitude, placing him and ourselves beyond the “horizon of recognition,” a good thing, too, since 
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this distance is precisely what allows us to read the poems anew. In other words, Milton’s shaded 
solitude, his singularity as a poet capable of managing fallen language, is what builds our literary 
community, or, more aptly, our literary disunity. Our scholarship, as varied as it is, remains a 
testament to Milton’s late arrival, an ever-incomplete documentation of an event that has not 
happened yet and probably never will. A source of anxiety throughout his poetic career, Milton 
turns his authorial belatedness and the solitude that results into the source of his inspiration, and 




Authorizing Solitude: Lucy Hutchinson and John Milton, Dalila and Samson 
 
 In the previous chapter, I mentioned the idea that the laurel and palm that shade Samson’s 
monument might also shade Milton, whose poetic achievement in allegorizing Samson’s final act 
parallels Samson’s own achievement in bringing down the Temple. The present chapter expands 
on that observation to show that Milton was not the only republican writer locating himself in a 
poet’s shade after the death of a fictionalized hero. At about the same time Milton was busying 
himself with Samson Agonistes, Lucy Hutchinson was writing the Memoirs of the Life of Colonel 
Hutchinson, a work that finds her occupying an equally tenebrous condition following the death 
of her husband and fellow republican, John Hutchinson. Here, I refer to the famous and oft-cited 
passage in the Memoirs, in which Hutchinson compares herself to a mirror, claiming her husband 
“was the author of that virtue he doted on, while she only reflected his glories upon him; all that 
she was, was him while he was here, and all that she is now is at best but his pale shade” (26). 
Having written John Hutchinson as a hero of the republican cause, often comparing him to 
Samson in both the Memoirs and the Elegies, Lucy Hutchinson repeatedly describes herself as 
existing in her own “pale shade” after his death. This is first and foremost a funereal shade, a 
shade of mourning, though, as we shall see, it is ultimately a hero’s shade not unlike Milton’s, a 
possibility registered in Robert Walker’s portrait of the writer, featuring her holding a wreath of 
laurel. If John Hutchinson resembles Samson both in look and demeanor, as Lucy Hutchinson 
suggests throughout the Memoirs and Elegies, then by documenting those virtues, she assumes 
the position of author/poet, whose shadowy presence indicates both her personal grief and her 
poetic achievement, proving, as Penelope Anderson states, that she “is not merely a shadow of 
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her husband, but also that shadows are not mere at all: they are the locus of memory and 
monument” (215).  
 Unlike Milton, however, Hutchinson adamantly refuses this poet’s shade, insisting the 
solitude in which she writes in fact belongs to a widow, not a writer, and furthermore that 
widowhood precludes her poetic abilities. According to her, solitude actually prevents her from 
accurately narrating her husband’s virtues, which “will, through my apprehension and 
expression, shine as under a very thick cloud, which will obscure much of their luster” (16). “His 
virtues come very much sullied out of my hands,” she later writes, “and, indeed, he that would 
commemorate his heroic glory should have a soul equally great to conceive and express that 
which my dejected and inferior spirit cannot perform” (29). As these and other lines attest, 
however, she never entirely abandons the language of allegory, in this case, of Plato’s cave, 
believing her husband to be the original, his wife a shadowy copy, “reflecting truly, though but 
dimly, his own glories upon him,” and her representation of him in the Memoirs an even more 
shadowy copy of that copy (52). Though she claims her poetic shortcomings are the result of her 
“dejected and inferior spirit,” invoking a modesty topos that will appear throughout the Memoirs 
and Elegies, I will argue that her self-abnegation forms the basis of a rhetorical strategy that 
channels the grief and solitude of widowhood into an allegorical reworking of her and her 
husband’s life together. While the immediate source of the “very thick cloud” may in fact be her 
widow’s solitude, that cloud also functions to obscure the truth of her husband’s life under a 
shadow that, as Mindele Anne Treip notes, “was often a synonym for literary allegory” during 
the early modern period (249). Hutchinson creates allegory from allegoresis, turning a mode of 
reading Old Testament typologies (allegoresis) into extended metaphors within her own texts 
(allegory), even referring to this process of textual production by name in the Memoirs when 
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excusing her comparison between Moses and the Colonel (“if we may allegorize the eminent 
place of suffering into which God called him up at last”) (56). In this way, she is still very much 
like Milton, who, according to Treip, “continually prob[es] that mysterious barrier, sometimes so 
delicately slight, sometimes so opaque, which separates ‘shadow’ from concrete reality, image or 
reflection from original, metaphor or similitude from object of comparison, ‘representation’ from 
‘truth,’” making it especially difficult to discern the “real” version of her husband, John, from the 
allegorical “copy” (201).  
 Blurring the line between biography and typology through frequent invocation of Old 
Testament figures when describing her husband, and in particular Samson, whose coif she 
compares to the Colonel’s own “very fine thickset head of hair,” Hutchinson exploits her role as 
a defective mirror in order to distort the image of their marriage through allegory, turning that 
self-described defect into a source of poetic license (Memoirs, 87). While most scholars focus on 
her insubordination in forging the recantation letter for her husband while he was still alive, I 
argue the more radical subversion occurs after his death, when she uses the solitude provided by 
a shadow that lingers in his absence to reconstruct their marriage using the story of Samson and 
Dalila. Seen this way, we must also reconsider her claims of solitude in the Memoirs and her 
elegiac verse. Though she laments solitude throughout her writing, it is precisely what allows the 
transformation from obscure wife to obscuring author to happen. The shade that covers her 
following her husband’s death also acts as a public screen, the author and wife disappearing 
behind the widow’s weeds, while her husband triumphantly emerges within the narrative as a 
double of a high-minded though ineffectual Samson, and she a conspiring but ultimately 
sympathetic Dalila figure. Whereas Milton’s Eve wanders away from Adam’s “faithful side” that 
“still shades […] and protects” her, Lucy Hutchinson opts to remain within the posthumous 
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shadow of her husband, using that tenebrous condition as a site of transformation from private 
wife to public author (9.265-66). While agreeing with N.H. Keeble that there are “two Lucy 
Hutchinsons in the Memoirs,” I nevertheless take issue with his aligning “the obedient wife” 
with “her husband’s shadow,” while differentiating that shadowy and obedient figure from “the 
creatively independent, defiant and opinionated narrator who speaks for the former” (254). “For 
Lucy Hutchinson to write at all,” Keeble argues elsewhere, “was thus to emerge from the shadow 
of John Hutchinson by laying implicit claim to the prerogatives of the masculine gender” (250).1 
Rather than emerge out of that shadow as the narrator, Hutchinson remains decidedly within it, 
exploiting the ambiguity it provides in order to alter her husband’s image, thereby coming closer 
to the description of Jonathan Goldberg, who labels her the Colonel’s “shadow writer” (372).  
 In what follows, I evaluate Hutchinson’s frequent use of typology in the Memoirs, 
particularly the recurring Samson imagery, that we might better understand why Hutchinson 
prefers to be seen as a mournful Dalila figure, the betrayer of Samson, and not an aspiring writer 
like Milton, who documents Samson’s heroic deeds. In making herself into a Dalila that betrays 
her husband in order to save him, Hutchinson actually redeems that figure from the more 
common (and more negative) portrayal we find in Milton’s Samson Agonistes, offering yet 
another way in which Hutchinson “break[s] with Milton” over gender, as Shannon Miller puts it 
(116). Discussing Order and Disorder, the first epic written in English by a woman, Miller 
argues that Hutchinson parts way with Milton by “expand[ing] the power of the mother within 
the context of marriage, combining a significant rewriting of Genesis with a gesture toward 
revisions within contemporary marriage laws” (116). Similarly, I argue that Hutchinson in the 
Memoirs and the Elegies rethinks the Samson narrative, expanding Dalila’s power, and in doing 
so empowering herself as an author, a process made easier by the solitude she experiences upon 
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her husband’s death. While her husband might be read as “Milton’s Samson,” a connection made 
by Keeble in the introduction to the Everyman edition of the Memoirs, nevertheless, she is 
decidedly not Milton’s Dalila (xxiii). In some ways, then, this chapter constitutes an extension of 
Pamela Hammons’s claim that, at least in her Elegies, Hutchinson demonstrates an “awareness 
of her vulnerability to negative stereotyping as a newly widowed woman and use[s] complex 
poetic strategies in an effort to foreclose her possible association with that caricature” (433). 
Unlike Hammons, though, I believe Hutchinson’s writing is significantly more radical than her 
more conservative analysis would seem to permit. Hutchinson is not simply performing damage 
control in the elegies, attempting to salvage her own reputation from the unbecoming 
“caricature” of a widow. Falsely rendering John Hutchinson when he was still alive, Lucy 
Hutchinson takes even more creative license after his death, using the distance she gains as a 
solitary widow to allegorize him and herself into a new marital relation. The solitude of 
widowhood is thus both authorizing and authorized in Lucy Hutchinson’s writing, and especially 
in her elegies, serving as the shaded site in which her authority develops, but also the primary 
subject of her authorship once it is established. If Miltonic solitude coincides with moments of 
creation, as discussed at length in my Introduction, then Hutchinson’s solitary revisionism proves 
her of kindred spirit. For Hutchinson, as for Milton, solitude invites nonconformity, and while 
they would certainly dispute their very different representations of Dalila, nevertheless, their 
disagreement is not itself an issue. In fact, it is a sign of their shared commitment to the project 




 Hutchinson’s rhetorical strategy—her using a widow’s solitude as a reason to write as 
well as an excuse for the purportedly bad writing she produces—is all the more striking given 
her general stance toward the life alone as conveyed throughout her other works. In Order and 
Disorder, for instance, Hutchinson abides by a fairly conventional reading of the Genesis 
narrative concerning Adam’s creation and desire for a mate. Whereas Milton glosses Genesis 
2:28 in Paradise Lost in a somewhat perfunctory manner, Hutchinson both glosses the passage 
and substantially adds to it, claiming that  
tis not particularly good   
For man to waste his life in solitude,  
Whose nature, for society designed,  
Can no full joy without a second find 
To whom he may communicate his heart, 
And pay back all the pleasures they impart; 
For all the joys that we enjoy alone, 
And all our unseen lustre, is as none. (3.333-340) 
If Adam’s solitude is negative, as Hutchinson here suggests, then even worse is the solitude of 
those “Who into caves and deserts run away, / Seeking perfection in that state wherein / A good 
was wanting when man had no sin” (3.322-324). Building on Aristotle’s political philosophy, 
and the idea that humans were “for society designed,” Hutchinson uses this moment in the poem 
to censure anchorites, who seek sanctuary in secluded settings like a cave or desert. Here, she 
implies that anchorites and other kinds of recluses seek a state of perfection that Adam himself 
was unable to attain, and thus their project is ideologically bankrupt. “A good was wanting,” she 
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writes, even in that ideal condition into which Adam was born; how much more, then, is that 
good wanting during the fallen times in which she writes.  
 This stance against solitude turns up again in the Memoirs and Elegies, during her 
discussion of the Colonel’s imprisonment. In both texts, Hutchinson condemns what she calls her 
husband’s wrongful incarceration, lamenting his solitude, while also championing his paramount 
virtues in the face of an undeserved punishment. Imprisoned in the dank and rundown Sandown 
Castle, his primary “business” at this time, according to Lucy Hutchinson,  
and continual study was the Scripture, which the more he conversed in, the more it 
delighted him; insomuch that his wife having brought down some books to entertain him 
in his solitude, he thanked her, and told her that if he should continue as long as he lived 
in prison, he would read nothing there but his Bible. (321) 
Even as she denounces the forced solitude her husband experiences, Hutchinson with equal and 
opposite vigor upraises him for his perfect endurance of it. Hutchinson describes, in a paean to 
her husband’s martyrdom, how his “study of the Scriptures did infinitely ravish his soul and 
refine it and take it off from all lower exercise, and he continued it in his sickness even to the 
last, desiring his brother, when he was in bed and could not read himself, to read to him” (328). 
A moving description, this portrait of the Colonel extends her declared purpose in writing, which 
is to demonstrate to all future generations, and especially her children, the nonpareil virtue of the 
husband after his death. However, she also admits an inability to create an accurate portrait of 
her husband, whose virtues exceed her capacity to write them down. So, is this, then, the 
besmirched portrait, indeed, the only portrait she claims she is capable of writing? Furthermore, 
if solitude provides the Colonel the opportunity to study the Scripture, how does it differ from 
those anchorites she derides in Order and Disorder, “Who into caves and deserts run away, / 
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Seeking perfection”? It seems the Colonel is engaged in the very same action she elsewhere 
denigrates.  
The answers to these questions require an understanding of how solitude and gender 
interrelate throughout Hutchinson’s works. Initially, her view of solitude would seem to bolster 
an argument supporting feminine weakness. I say “seem” because, as I plan to suggest, the very 
fact that she writes at all, an activity that necessarily involves time spent alone, contradicts 
whatever negative claims she makes about female solitude. Yet, make those claims she does. 
When documenting the fall from grace, for instance, the narrator of Order and Disorder writes 
that Eve gave Satan “opportunity” by “coming there alone / So to be first and easier 
overthrown,” and, moreover, that 
th’ assault had not been made 
Had she not from her firm protection stray’d; 
But so the Devil then, so leud men now 
Prevail, when women privacies allow. (4-169-174) 
At first glance, these lines seem unequivocally to support a position of female subordination, 
even suggesting that the fall itself would not have occurred at all, had not Eve from her “firm 
protection stray’d.” If, however, we look not just to the words themselves, but also the context in 
which they were written, a different image emerges, one of a female writer, who, writing alone, 
and many years after the Colonel, her own “firm protection,” had died, denounces female 
privacy. In other words, we must read within these gendered lines some level of irony, an irony 
that simply could not be lost on someone as intellectually gifted as the woman who wrote them. I 
see Hutchinson using the possibility of feminine weakness, and the idea that, while alone, 
women are more susceptible than their male counterparts to the workings of the devil, as an 
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implicit justification for her supposedly distorted image of the Colonel. In choosing to write 
alone, Hutchinson intentionally opens herself to the very caricature of females that she depicts in 
Order and Disorder, exploiting the image of female inferiority to justify whatever so-called 
“flubs” appear in her writing. Much the same way she uses the Colonel’s involuntary 
imprisonment as an opportunity to showcase his Christian piety, and, with more subtly, his 
perseverance in the Good Old Cause, Lucy Hutchinson uses her involuntary solitude to 
emphasize certain traits about her own person. However, the traits she chooses to emphasize are 
not, as they are for her husband, those of Christian piety, but rather feminine weakness. If we are 
skeptical of her aggrandized portrait of the Colonel, as, I think, we should be, then all the more 
skeptical we should be regarding her claims to feminine inferiority, especially since the only 
basis for those claims is the writing in which those claims appear. Through an interesting (and, I 
would argue, intentional) rhetorical setup, the better she writes, the better she will convey in 
prose and poetry her own feminine inferiority; yet, the better she writes, the less likely we are to 
believe the very inferiority her words intend to convey. To put it simply, the more we believe her 
writing, the less we (can or should) believe her.  
Through the hyperbolic language she uses when discussing her husband’s heavenly 
transformation during his enforced solitude in prison, Hutchinson directs readers’ attention away 
from a transformation that she herself catalyzes as a writer working within the confines of a 
widow’s solitude. In the Elegies, for instance, she positions herself as a writer simultaneously 
public and private. As Sharon Achinstein remarks, referring to Hutchinson’s second elegy, in 
which the speaker chastises the Sun for attempting to creep into her window and witness her 
mourning, “There is no place for the sun in her inner world of grief, a world that remains, finally, 
private even though that which it mourns is a ‘Publick funerall’” (71). “Hutchinson herself feels 
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too visible,” Achinstein continues, and thus “she wishes to remain in darkness,” turning this 
desire to “remain in the shadows” into a “political challenge” against the restoration of Charles II 
(71-72). I would only add to Achinstein’s reading that the “our” of the poem’s penultimate line 
(“Which from our Eies in Secrett fall”) complicates any clear sense of a private/public divide; in 
royal form, the pronoun “our” closes off Hutchinson from the public’s prying eye, while, in the 
inclusive form, it invites her readers to mourn along with her in a public display of sorrow.2  
By reframing her solitude as an imagined space of public mourning, Hutchinson prepares 
readers for a similar authorial move that finds her obscured by the shadow of allegory, as she 
reworks public narratives such as the Samson story to fit her own conception of her marriage to 
the Colonel. The tendency to identify life events as the fulfillment of biblical precedent is 
common in the period, though, I would argue, Hutchinson’s self-identification with Dalila is 
rather unique for a woman writer, and thus invites a prolonged study. Shadow is not merely 
funereal in her works; it functions, much as it does in Milton’s poetry, as a space of concealment 
that turns apparent grief to literary ends. Her wish not to be seen, and the feminine apologetics 
that recur throughout her works, do not correspond with a genuine belief in her own inferiority, 
but instead act as a ploy to keep us from focusing on her marital revisionism. If Hutchinson is in 
fact a Dalila figure, it is not in the way she describes. Her deception of her husband through the 
supposed forgery of the letter pales in comparison to the many acts of deception that occur 
throughout her writing, deceptions that seek to focus our attention on her mourning, and how that 
mourning supposedly tarnishes her writing, enabling her to present herself as a widow who 
idealizes her husband while debasing herself.  
Few scholars comment on the fact that Lucy Hutchinson compares her husband to 
Samson (among other biblical figures), and those who do tend to follow David Norbrook in 
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describing Hutchinson’s allusions as just that—allusions. Writing of “Elegy 6,” for instance, 
Norbrook claims the “poem’s climax appropriately evokes Samson’s iconoclasm as an image for 
[John] Hutchinson’s fall and exaltation,” but neglects to move beyond this arguable (is Samson 
really a smasher of images?) and tangential remark (384). One exception to this scholarly trend is 
Penelope Anderson, who ventures a cogent explanation of how Hutchinson’s typologies are 
inextricably implicated in a larger strategy of self-presentation involving companionate marriage. 
Reading her recantation letter alongside Richard Brathwaite’s The English Gentlemen (1630), 
Anderson argues that Hutchinson arrogates to herself the Samson and Dalilah narrative originally 
found in Brathwaite’s work, “present[ing] herself as the negative other of friendship, the wife 
who is the false counselor, in order to sacrifice herself for her friend, like the republican friends 
who rebel against the tyrant” (202). But Anderson’s reading is also complicated by the fact that 
Lucy Hutchinson was not a friend—neither false nor true—when she wrote the sections of the 
Memoirs dealing with her sorrowful and shadowed existence.3 Rather, her status at that time was 
solitary widow, and it is in her capacity as widow that we must read the Samson and Dalila 
narrative, for it is her “dejected and inferior spirit” that, in my reading, authorizes her to 
allegorize the account in the first place. The Samson/Dalila undercurrent throughout the Memoirs 
is as much an attempt on Hutchinson’s part to rethink her marital role as it is to assert herself as 
the author of that marriage, using the solitude in which she finds herself after her husband’s 
death as a pretext for her “cloudy” vision of their lives together.  
 It would behoove us, then, to reconsider her typologies, that is, her locating Old 
Testament figures in contemporary Puritan life, as the result of a self-actualizing and solitary 
author rather than a self-abnegating friend or wife. To do that, we must revisit the allegorical 
doubles appearing in her work, so as to trace them back to the singular author that wrote them. 
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This doubleness especially appears in her early descriptions of her husband. The Colonel’s 
upbringing and moment of divine revelation, for instance, Hutchinson compares to that of 
Moses, asserting 
God took this time to instruct [Mr Hutchinson], when he had given him rest from the 
passions which commonly distract young people and sequestered him into a private life 
before he had yet many domestic concernments to divert his mind. If small things may be 
compared with great, it seems to me not unlike the preparation of Moses in the wilderness 
with his father-in-law, where it is thought he writ the book of Genesis, and some believe 
that of Job (54). 
Using a double negative (“not unlike”) to render her husband’s private study the typological 
fulfillment of Moses’ sojourn in the wilderness, Hutchinson locates in Moses a prefiguration of 
her husband’s future actions, while also providing readers a new context with which to 
understand her previous declarations concerning writerly inadequacies. That which appears as a 
modesty topos in the opening pages of the Memoirs (her husband will “shine as under a very 
thick cloud, which will obscure much of their luster”) can now be read as an understated 
testament to her writerly ability. Her description does, in fact, “shine” in the narrative, all the 
more so because it is under the “thick cloud” of allegory. If her husband appears obscured, it is 
not only (or ever) because Lucy Hutchinson cannot produce an accurate portrait of her husband, 
but instead because she actively seeks to show John Hutchinson as other than he actually is or 
was, transforming him into the fulfillment of various biblical identities, including, but not limited 
to, Moses.4  
 Indeed, Hutchinson obliquely admits to this project later in the same paragraph, while 
discussing her husband’s imprisonment following the Restoration, on what was likely trumped 
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up charges of conspiracy to overthrow once again the government. Recalling his time in prison, 
Hutchinson writes that  
Mr Hutchinson again might often take up the parallel of the great Hebrew Prince 
[Moses]; and if we may allegorize the eminent place of suffering into which God called 
him up at last, there it was in the bleak mountains of affliction that the Lord instructed 
him in his law, and showed him a pattern of his glorious tabernacle, and gave him a fuller 
discovery of his person (56). 
Of course, the appearance of the word “allegorize” does not an allegory make. Yet, alongside her 
other “parallel” to Moses, as well as the opening claims to obfuscation, we begin to discern the 
full extent of Lucy Hutchinson’s project in the Memoirs. She does not just provide us with the 
facts about her husband’s life, but also the meta-narrative through which to read and assign 
moral value to them. As Derek Hirst makes mention, “Mrs Hutchinson declared her resolve to 
leave a portrait of her husband to their children, and, partisan and idealist as she was, she 
coloured that portrait and rewrote the history of 1660 to rescue his memory” (269). More than 
just coloring that portrait, however, Lucy Hutchinson has readers color it for her, providing them 
the allegorical metatext that will then guide their moral interpretation. In doing so, she proves 
herself a competent and well-read writer, a person more in agreement with the bookish Lucy 
Hutchinson to whom John Hutchinson was first attracted, and which she describes at the outset 
of the Memoirs. There, she describes herself in paradoxical terms, both as a gifted scholar and an 
unrefined lady, the very same persona she once again adopts after her husband’s passing, using 
the pretext of an uncultured lady to divert attention away from the aesthetic merits of the work.   
 Her penchant for Old Testament allegorizing finds Hutchinson among many 
nonconformist writers in the seventeenth century, nearly all of them male, who routinely invoke 
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Moses, Abraham, and Samson as archetypal models for their own progress as Christians. “To the 
Puritan and nonconformist mind,” remarks Keeble in The Literary Culture of Nonconformity, 
“both personal history and national English history were comprehensible only in terms of Israel’s 
history, and, since the latter was as vividly present to their imagination as the former, it offered 
not only an interpretive key but a narrative model” (264). Keeble continues, suggesting the 
“mode of nonconformist story […] is at once realistic, allegorical in the old medieval sense, 
picturing forth theological abstractions, and symbolic in the manner of modern subjectivism, 
investing particular experiences with figurative significance” (264). By repeatedly alluding to 
Moses and his prefigurative likeness to her husband, Lucy Hutchinson situates her Memoirs 
within a highly recognizable narratological structure, one that has special resonance for 
nonconformists living in Restoration England, while simultaneously identifying herself as a 
capable female author working within an almost exclusively male literary tradition. As a 
submissive wife, she desires to be seen as living in the shadows of this tradition, yet her formal 
use of shadow and shading in the Memoirs ironically proves her knowledgeable of its most 
defining literary convention, as evidenced in such works as Thomas Taylor’s 1635 Christ 
Revealed: or the Types and Shadows of Our Savior in the Old Testament. Beyond the title, which 
directly connects the use of shadow and typology, Taylor dedicates a fair amount of time to 
proving the homology between Moses and Christ, much as Hutchinson will after him, reading in 
Moses a similar prefiguration of her savior-husband.  
 While Moses is the most obvious Old Testament prefiguration of John Hutchinson, the 
most important is Samson, a superlative that holds true for other seventeenth-century texts as 
well. In addition to Lucy Hutchinson’s Memoirs, the Samson narrative appears in the tracts of 
many other writers of the period, both royalist and republican alike. Of all these renderings, 
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Milton’s treatment of the narrative in Samson Agonistes, which recruits the Nazarite for the 
republican cause, either as a model of virtue or else a cautionary tale, remains the best-known 
appropriation of the story, though it is not the first time he avails himself of the Book of Judges. I 
am referring to Milton’s polemical rejoinder to King Charles’s propaganda piece, Eikon Basilike. 
In that piece, the king arrogates to himself the Samson story when claiming the willful 
resignation of his royal power would be “as if Sampson should have consented, not only to bind 
his owne hands, and cut off his hair, but to put out his own eyes, that the Philistins might with 
the more safety mock, and abuse him; which they chose rather to doe, then quite to destroy him, 
when he was become so tame an object, & fit occasion for their sport and scorne” (69). Milton 
counters in Eikonoklastes, belittling the king’s comparison when claiming that “The words of a 
King, as they are full of power, in the autority and strength of Law, so like Sampson, without the 
strength of that Nazarites lock,” which, through the parallelism, refers to the Parliament-created 
English law, “they have no more power in them than the words of another man” (YP 3, 545-546). 
Redeeming Samson for the republican cause, Milton takes care to show how the Nazarite’s 
strength resides metonymically in his hair, described in The Reason of Church-Government as 
“those his illustrious and sunny locks the laws waving and curling about his god like shoulders” 
(YP 1, 859).5  
 Though not referring to Samson by name, Lucy Hutchinson also alludes to his narrative 
several times in the Memoirs, and again in the Elegies, as Norbrook and others have pointed out, 
and in so doing hails him (and by proxy, her husband) a champion of the republican cause. 
Often, her Samson references specifically concern the Colonel’s hair. “Though his zeal for truth 
and virtue caused the wicked, with the sharp razors of their malicious tongues, to attempt to 
shave off the glories from his head,” she triumphantly states in the Memoirs, “yet his honour 
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springing from the fast root of virtue did but grow the thicker and more beautiful for all their 
endeavors to cut it off” (28). Like Samson, whose strength resided in his hair, John Hutchinson 
refused to be metaphorically shorn of his greatest attributes, his “zeal for truth and virtue,” 
choosing to remain acersecomic. Hutchinson’s emphasis on the Colonel’s unshaven coif picks up 
again later, when she describes how his eccentric cut excluded him from the designation 
“Roundhead,” applied to Puritans at the time. As before, his locks represent more than a fashion 
statement, actually unlocking, as it were, ideological commitments: 
Two or three years after, any stranger that had seen [the Roundheads], would have 
enquired the reason of that name, which was very ill applied to Mr Hutchinson, who 
having a very fine thickset head of hair, kept it clean and handsome without any 
affectation, so that it was a great ornament to him, although the godly of those days, 
when he embraced their party, would not allow him to be religious because his hair was 
not in their cut nor his words in their phrase, nor such little formalities altogether fitted to 
their humour; who, were, many of them, so weak as to esteem rather for such 
insignificant circumstances than for solid wisdom, piety, and courage, which brought real 
aid and honour to their party (87). 
Again aligning ideal appearance (“a very fine thickset head of hair”) with the appearance of 
ideals (“wisdom, piety, and courage”), Hutchinson narrowly avoids idolatry by Puritan standards 
when boasting of her husband’s “great ornament,” which he kept “clean and handsome without 
any affectation.” While the Colonel’s hair might be a physical manifestation of probity, Lucy 
Hutchinson’s doting on that fact renders her vulnerable to accusations of idol-worship.  
This trend continues in the Elegies, especially numbers six, nine, and eighteen. The first 
of these—“Elegy 6”—offers the most sustained comparison, ending with the couplet “And like 
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great Sampson dying Threw downe more / Then he had vanquisht all his life before,” though the 
other elegies—nine and eighteen—repeatedly return to the Samson narrative, with passing 
references to the Colonel’s hair, chains, deceitful women, champions, and pillars (67-68). 
Alongside the aforementioned allusions to Samson in the Memoirs, these references in the 
elegies form a theme across time and genres, in which Hutchinson repeatedly compares her 
husband to the Nazarite hero. The story of a virtuous husband and an admiring and ambitious 
wife, the Samson narrative undergoes a significant revision by Lucy Hutchinson to accommodate 
her own personal experiences during the Restoration. In claiming her husband “despised nothing 
of the female sex but their follies and vanities; wise and virtuous women he loved, and delighted 
in all pure, holy and unblamable conversation with them, but so as never to excite scandal or 
temptation,” Lucy Hutchinson prepares readers for her own folly in deceiving him by forging a 
recantation letter in his name, effectively preventing the Colonel from becoming the Samsonic 
martyr he desired to be (30).  
 Rather than make him a martyr by revealing the source of his secret strength, as Dalilah 
does in the Book of Judges, Hutchinson betrays her husband by preventing his martyrdom, 
thereby reversing the more traditional Samson narrative found in Milton, where martyrdom is 
figured in some ways as a reputation-saver after the Nazarite’s uxorious dealings with foreign 
women. This reversal in effect renders the Colonel a passive figure, a Samson who passively 
retires to a countryside prison, while his wife emerges the true heroine, disobeying her husband 
to save him from a damning act of self-incrimination. “Even though she massively idealizes her 
husband,” observes David Norbrook, “he consistently emerges from her narrative as a kind of 
anti-hero, waiting on events, subject to others’ agendas, his actions acquiring a providential 
luster only with hindsight” (245). What might otherwise seem a contradiction, this portrayal of 
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an ineffectual husband makes sense when viewed as an intentional reworking of the Samson 
narrative, in which the Dalilah figure appears honorable for having betrayed her husband. This, I 
would argue, is part and parcel of her larger authorial strategy to sublimate the gloom she 
experiences following his death into a revisionist tale in which she betrays her husband in order 
to save him from the martyrdom he so desperately desires. In reversing the Samson narrative, 
Lucy Hutchinson emerges the story’s true hero, and also the person who must write about it, 
even as her husband went on to encounter not a glorious or heroic death, but rather a slow 
decline in a drafty prison.  
 The rewriting of the Samson narrative inevitably brings Dalilean undertones to 
Hutchinson’s description of the forged letter. Writing of herself in the third-person, she claims 
that  
Mrs Hutchinson, whom to keep quiet her husband had hitherto persuaded that no man 
would lose or suffer by this change, at this beginning was awakened, and saw that he was 
ambitious of being a public sacrifice, and therefore, herein only in her whole life, 
resolved to disobey him, and to improve all the affection he had to her for his safety, and 
prevailed with him to retire; for she said she would not live to see him a prisoner. (280) 
From a woman in the early modern period, this description carries with it strong connotations of 
feminine chicanery, reminding us once again what Penelope Anderson says about Hutchinson 
playing the role of a “false counselor.” In the context of allegory, however, these lines place 
Hutchinson in the more specific role of a new Dalilah, who deceives her husband by 
“prevail[ing] with him to retire” to the countryside, which provided her the opportunity to forge 
the recantation letter, an act that deprives the Colonel of “wisdom, courage, and piety” in the 
public eye, virtues symbolically attached to his Samsonic hair. Insofar as “she would not live to 
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see him a prisoner,” Hutchinson metaphorically shores the very locks of virtue she elsewhere 
works to grow in the reader’s mind. Choosing her own death before her husband’s imprisonment, 
Hutchinson elevates herself to the status of heroine, who preempts the Colonel’s would-be 
martyrdom by actively and knowingly betraying him. If Lucy Hutchinson represents herself as a 
“pale shade” of her husband following his imprisonment and subsequent death, it is not just 
because she mourns for him, but also because she metaphorically died when failing to secure his 
freedom. Because, according to her own script (and, in this case, Scripture), she “would not live 
to see him a prisoner,” she therefore must die after he becomes one, her own heroic plot having 
been foiled by the powers that be. The pale shade she occupies has as much to do with her own 
tragic story of a failed redemption as it does with the Colonel’s demise. I will return to this idea 
in the third section, which deals with the Elegies. 
Deception appears a few pages later, when Hutchinson describes the specifics of her 
forgery. After convincing him not to surrender himself, Hutchinson then  
devised a way to try the House, and writ a letter in his name to the Speaker, to urge what 
might be in his favour, and to let him know that by reason of some inconvenience it 
might be to him, he desired not to come under custody, and yet should be ready to appear 
at their call; and if they intended any mercy to him, he begged they would begin it in 
permitting him his liberty upon his parole till they should finally determine him. Which 
letter she conceived would try the temper of the House; if they granted this, she had her 
end, for he was still free; if they denied it, she might be satisfied in keeping him from 
surrendering himself. (281)    
The actual contents of the letter, of course, tell a much different story, wherein the Colonel 
appears an especially remorseful character, who openly regrets his service to the republican 
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forces. Whether Lucy Hutchinson actually forged this letter or just claimed to have forged it, the 
fact remains that her account of it in the Memoirs “must call into question her obtrusive self-
characterization as the epitome of wifely duty and dependence,” as Derek Hirst so succinctly 
puts it (690). Read in the context of the Samson narrative, Hutchinson would seem to rationalize 
her disobedience through recourse to the archetypal disobedient wife, Dalilah, while also subtly 
redeeming that biblical character from centuries of misogynistic vitriol. “[H]ad not his wife 
persuaded him, [he] had offered himself a voluntary sacrifice,” she writes a little later, which, 
extracted from its immediate context in the Memoirs, reveals a striking reversal to the Book of 
Judges, wherein Samson becomes a “sacrifice” (though not voluntarily, of course) precisely 
because he was previously duped (or “persuaded”) by his conniving wife (286). We may better 
understand that reversal by comparing Hutchinson’s rendering of Dalila with contemporary 
representations, including Milton’s in Samson Agonistes.  
II. 
Negative portrayals of Dalilah abound in early modern England, the biblical story often 
used as a warning for women about how not to behave. The epigrammatist John Owen sums up 
the opinions of “many men” in 1619 when he writes that 
Samsons deceitfull Dalilah,  
His Strength in’s Haire destroyed·  
In these dayes, by such Dalilahs  
Are many-men annoyed. (“Epigram 12”) 
Owen claims to represent a real-life masculine majority, for whom Dalila symbolizes the 
waywardness of numerous English wives, demonstrating the story’s use in perpetuating English 
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stereotypes about the fickleness of women. This misogyny even finds its way into the writing of 
early modern women, too, in particular the prophetic discourse of Lady Eleanor Davies, whose 
petition to the House in 1643, entitled “Samsons Legacie,” warns that King Charles I and his 
wife, the Spanish Henrietta Maria, are unknowingly acting out the Samson story. In her account, 
a tract written in the confusing prose of prophecy, the seven locks of hair on Samson’s hand, 
metaphorically shaved off by his wife, have been replaced by the “false hair,” by which she 
means the wigs worn by royalists: 
Fastend this also on our Effeminate time, his seven Locks, Left to this last hundred yeare: 
shewing what weaving and curlling we have of FALSEHAIRE, by that going away of 
His, with the Webbe fastend to the Beame; whose locks therein woven by her: who said; 
Thou sayest false, (or) hast mocked mee, &c. Expressing how men forbidden expresly 
long Haire, yet the sonnes of God will weare it: some of them looking thereby more like 
the sonns of Divels. (92-93) 
Referring to “our Effeminate time,” Lady Davies greatly expands the purview of Dalila’s 
deception, which is no longer limited to a few wayward women, but now appears interwoven 
into the temporal fabric of the seventeenth century itself, rendering gender obsolete by 
effeminizing men both morally and physically. How ironic that a woman who condemns the 
effeminacy of the times should herself attempt to convince an all-male Parliament of that fact by 
recourse to the Samson narrative, a story that blatantly cautions against listening to women. A 
religious fanatic and general termagant, who was personally despised by King Charles and many 
others in government, confined to Bedlam in 1636 for destruction of church property at Lichfield 
and later imprisoned in the Tower, Lady Davies was probably not in the best position to advocate 
for the Samson story, appearing too much like the untrustworthy woman she condemns 
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throughout the tract. If Hutchinson succeeds in using the Samson narrative where Lady Davies 
failed, it is in part because she takes the exact opposite approach, appearing so unlike Dalila in 
her personal life that her use of that figure in the Memoirs and Elegies is that much more salient. 
Hers is a widow’s solitude, and thus she gains authority through mourning, whereas Lady 
Davies’s solitude is that of a supposed madwoman, whose writing cannot be trusted. 
 Milton’s Dalila certainly shares many of the same negative attributes as other 
seventeenth-century versions, yet she fares the worst not in the play itself, but among the play’s 
future critics, who want her to be many things, but rarely a redeemable figure.6 To redeem Dalila 
from some of her harshest critics we need not look further than the play itself, and her claim that 
“to the public good / Private respects must yield,” which sounds uncannily similar to Milton’s 
immediate rationale for writing Eikonoklastes. As Secretary of Foreign Tongues, the official title 
granted to Milton during the Interregnum, he writes in the preface to Eikonoklates that “I take it 
on me as a work assign’d rather, then by me chos’n or affected,” considering it his public duty to 
expose, point by point, the supposedly false portrait of the deceased king in Eikon Basilike (YP 3, 
339). Lest this comparison seem overhasty, it might be objected that Dalila also desires fame, 
whereas Milton does not. For instance, she claims that  
Fame if not double-faced is double-mouthed, 
And with contrary blast proclaims most deeds, 
On both his wings, one black, the other white, 
Bears greatest names in his wild aery flight. 
My name perhaps among the circumcised 
In Dan, in Judah, and the bordering tribes, 
To all posterity may stand defamed, 
 160 
With malediction mentioned, and the blot 
Of falsehood most unconjugal traduced. 
But in my country where I most desire, 
In Ecron, Gaza, Asdod, and in Gath 
I shall be named among the famousest 
Of women, sung at solemn festivals, 
Living and dead recorded, who to save 
Her country form a fierce destroyer, chose 
Above the faith of wedlock-bands my tomb 
With odours visited and annual flowers. (971-987) 
Yet, Milton also makes the case for fame. Though he seems to declare it against his purpose to 
achieve fame in this political tract (“I never was so thirsty after Fame, nor so destitute of other 
hopes and means, better and more certaine to attaine it”), he nevertheless allows for “other hopes 
and means” to achieve it, namely, his poetry (YP 3, 337). In fact, Milton states explicitly his 
desire for poetic fame in a 1637 letter to his friend, Charles Diodati.7 Such claims to fame and 
service to the public, which are by no means exclusive practices, even if Milton tries to separate 
them in the preface to Eikonoklastes, render him even more like his Dalila, whose final 
monologue has her once again defending her actions by similar means. Choosing “to save her 
country form a fierce destroyer,” and in doing so neglect the “wedlock-bands,” Dalila is an 
amalgam of the republican Milton, his deserting wife, Mary Powell, as well as Samson himself, 
who likewise saves his country from a “fierce destroyer,” finding his own name inscribed on 
monuments and song, proving, as Catherine Gimelli Martin states, that Milton “overturns the 
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conventional system in which intrinsically inferior women are innately subject to men” by 
making them “negotiating partners” at this moment of pseudo-divorce (60). 
 For all her redeeming qualities, however, Dalila still suffers in Milton’s account, with the 
Chorus and Samson getting the final word, the former labeling her a “manifest serpent by her 
sting / Discovered in the end, till now concealed,” after which Samson says that “God sent her to 
debase me” (997-999). Though Milton elsewhere shows himself almost endlessly capable of 
revamping biblical narrative in creative and unorthodox ways, most famously in Paradise Lost, 
an epic elaboration on just a few short passages from Genesis, here he falls back on the original 
script, seemingly unable to move beyond its misogyny. While Dalila might have Milton’s 
sympathy, since both are people whose religious principles led them to traitorous behavior, he is 
not about to exonerate her completely, nor even let her remain in his narrative without also 
inserting strong invectives against her through the mouths of his other characters. It is against 
this unforgiving portrait of Dalila that Lucy Hutchinson’s version appears quite radical for its 
time. Hutchinson does what Milton would not, creatively revising the Samson narrative in a way 
that more formally exculpates her wrongdoing.  
While Hutchinson does not attempt to remove from Dalila her notoriety as a deceiver, she 
does redeem her by turning an inherent fault—a feminine inclination toward deception—into an 
extreme but necessary measure taken to save her husband. In her retelling, Colonel Hutchinson 
is, in fact, too manly, and would sacrifice himself were it not for her wiles, that is, the letter she 
claims to forge in his name, which saves him from appearing before the House. She thus makes 
feminine trickery a necessary counterbalance to the extreme masculinity of her husband, almost 
as if her husband’s manliness forced her to commit such a drastic act. If anything, she seems to 
suggest, her husband’s rash behavior, his desire to make himself into a public spectacle, requires 
 162 
that she, in turn, deceive him through her epistolary scheming. Using a real-life role reversal—
the Colonel finding himself retired to the private life of the countryside, while his wife enters the 
public sphere via letter in an attempt to save him—Lucy Hutchinson is able to rewrite the 
Samson story in such a way that Dalila emerges the narrative’s fallen heroine, an identity that 
she happened upon by accident, but which she intentionally exploits when writing the Memoirs. 
If Milton’s Dalila is shown in a potentially seductive act of supplication, attempting to reunite 
and “touch” the “hand” of Samson, who violently resists her, then Hutchinson’s Dalila is a 
widow whose solitude forecloses the possibility of that reunion, while simultaneously 
authorizing her to tell his story (SA, 951-53). Unlike the supplicating hand of Milton’s Dalila, 
then, Hutchinson’s is the “unskillful hand” that “will injure [the Colonel]” by writing and 
rewriting his narrative (Memoirs, 18).  
 This is not to say that Lucy Hutchinson is an apologist for all of womankind; in fact, far 
from it. When discussing the royalist court, she follows Lady Davies in linking the king’s woes 
to his uxoriousness, having doted too much on his foreign wife. Of interest here, however, is the 
fact that Hutchinson specifically avoids the Samson imagery she so liberally uses in other parts 
of the narrative. Whereas Lady Davies goes to great lengths to prove the allegorical link between 
Charles/Henrietta and Samson/Dalila, Hutchinson, who elsewhere refers to Samson by name and 
often by metonym through reference to his hair, conspicuously avoids such imagery when 
discussing how the “power [the queen’s] haughty spirit kept over her husband, who was enslaved 
in his affection only to her, though she had no more passion for him than what served to promote 
her designs” (70). Though she describes Charles as “enslaved in his affection,” Hutchinson 
resists labeling the dynamic between them Samsonic because doing so would interfere with her 
own use of that narrative. Instead, she diverts attention away from the would-be Samsonic 
 163 
element of the Carolinean court by comparing it to the Elizabethan court. “If any one object the 
fresh example of Queen Elizabeth,” she writes, “let them remember that the felicity of her reign 
was the effect of her submission to her masculine and wise counselors; but wherever male 
princes are so effeminate as to suffer women of foreign birth and different religions to 
intermeddle with the affairs of state, it is always found to produce sad desolations; and it hath 
been observed that a French queen never brought any happiness to England” (70).  
 By no means mounting a universal defense of women, then, even going so far as to claim 
Queen Elizabeth’s success was the result of “her submission to her masculine and wise 
counselors,” Hutchinson still finds a way to resist the negative portrayal of the seventeenth 
century’s most despised woman, turning a moment of betrayal into one of necessary deception. If 
not for the fact that “his wife persuaded him, [he] had offered himself a voluntary sacrifice,” 
according to Hutchinson, whose characterization of her own virtuous actions concerning the 
letter-writing incident, while still turning her into a Dalila figure, nevertheless, offers a stark 
contrast to her disparaging of Queen Henrietta, who comes to function as a scapegoat for 
Hutchinson’s own emasculating activities. Hutchinson thus claims Dalila for the republican side, 
just as Milton had redeemed Samson from the king’s usage of him in Eikon Basilike. Ironically, 
though, Hutchinson reclaims Dalila from Milton, whose negative depiction might otherwise have 
remained the standard reading of Puritan republicans in seventeenth-century England.  
 This process of reclaiming Hutchinson continues throughout the Elegies, appended to the 
manuscript version of the Memoirs, though her narrative strategy shifts slightly to fit the new 
genre. Whereas the Memoirs attempt some level of facticity in its presentation of events 
surrounding her betrayal, the elegies, mourning the loss of her husband, introduce a degree of 
emotion and self-criticism not seen in the biography, and it is these poems I now wish to 
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consider. Critically speaking, not much has been said about the Elegies, with the exception of 
Pamela Hammons’s account, previously discussed. In addition to Hammons, Elizabeth Scott-
Baumann writes that “Lucy Hutchinson’s self-reproach for the impact of her intervention on her 
husband pervades the elegies, th[r]ough the language of guilt and infidelity” (456). Focusing on 
this pervasive tendency for self-reproach, I understand the “language of guilt and infidelity” as a 
continuation of a project begun in the Memoirs, which both establishes her as a Dalila figure, 
while also serving as a pretext for her need to write. Of utmost importance, then, is Derek Hirst’s 
claim that “If the misrepresentation Lucy Hutchinson perpetrated in the Memoirs seems a 
deliberate effort to remodel the Colonel for posterity, the claim in the Elegies that her pride had 
killed him complicates such an assumption” (271). Here, Hirst has in mind a passage in the 
second elegy, which reads 
if I on thee a private glance reflect 
confusion does my shamefull eyes deject 
Seeing ye man I Love by me betrayd, 
by me who for his mutual help was made. 
Who to preserve thy life ought to haue dyed, 
& I haue killd’ thee by my foolish pride. (33-38) 
According to Hirst, we can “resolve the tensions” of this passage “in one of two ways” (271). 
Either the passage functions as an extension of the fantasy life created by Hutchinson in the 
Memoirs, or else this elegy acts as a tacit admission of her own guilt in attempting to shift her 
husband’s image in that biography. Her “pride” either refers to the act of writing the recantation 
letter, or, alternatively, to her pretending to write the letter, so as to cover up the fact that her 
husband had authored it. Hirst seems more inclined to believe the second of these scenarios, 
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asking whether her characterization is not actually part of a “complex of emotions that included 
guilt born of concealment and untruth, and real resentments” for her husband’s cowardly 
behavior, which she attempted to cover up by taking credit for the letter (271). Hirst bases his 
belief on the idea that the elegies are “surely in an important sense more private” than the 
memoir, and, for that reason, can be taken as the more truthful or candid version of her feelings 
(270). 
For Hirst, then, elegy 2 offers commentary on the Memoirs, but does not continue the 
fictional narrative found there. Instead, I would suggest that all the elegies function to extend the 
allegorical project begun in the Memoirs, and that her “pride” follows from her attempt to 
intervene in her husband’s affairs by forging the letter. In some instances, this narrative 
continuation is explicit, as when she writes in elegy 6, “On the Picture of ye Prisoner,” that the 
Colonel, “like the great Sampson dying Threw downe more / Then he had vanquisht all his life 
before” (67-68). As elegy 18 asserts, he “liued a Champion,” but “a Victime died,” never 
achieving the sort of fame that the Samson of Judges experiences upon his death (6). Instead of 
pulling down the pillars of a temple on his enemies, Hutchinson claims that her husband was 
“Him selfe cheife Pillar of his house,” and that “They all / He [had] taken vp, did vnsupported 
fall” when he finally perished in prison (11-12). Elsewhere, Hutchinson alludes to the Samson 
narrative and her own role as Dalila in a more subtle way, for instance, her use of the phrase 
“foolish pride” in the passage Hirst discusses. If her “foolish pride” “killd’” her husband, if she 
feels as though she “betrayd” her “Love,” it is because the Lucy Hutchinson of the Elegies still 
views herself as a sympathetic Dalila figure, who forged a letter on behalf of her husband in 
order to save him from decapitation. As much is evident from elegy 9, which describes how 
His Thick bright hare flowed in loose Curle 
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And each lock bound a Captiue Girle 
But he markt not Those Victories 
Who onely Sought & kept one prize 
 
Whome while he stroue to catch he found 
That he himselfe his one Armes bound 
And a maids chane tyde him vp then 
From giuen liberty to men[.] (33-40) 
Unlike the women whom he “bound” with his “Thick bright hare,” only John Hutchinson’s wife 
“bound” him with her “maids chane,” thus depriving him of the “giuen liberty to men.” This 
passage could be read as commenting on marriage in general, and the “giuen liberty” the 
freedom of the bachelor to roam. Yet, given the many other references to the Samson narrative, 
the passage allows for another reading, as well, wherein the tying of the “maids chane” occurs 
after matrimony, and the freedom lost is the freedom to pursue the “one prize” of a martyr’s 
death. In other words, Hutchinson conflates in the space of one stanza two separate events: the 
loss of a bachelor’s liberty following their marriage, as well as the liberty John Hutchinson lost 
after his wife betrayed him. While she never identifies herself as Dalila here, the reference to the 
Colonel’s “Thick bright hare,” as well as her mentioning the ability to divest him of his “liberty,” 
suggests the Samson myth is never far from her thoughts. From there, Hutchinson goes on to 
describe how “his mind” continued to shine even through this “passions veyle” (41). The self-
described “prize” of her husband, Hutchinson portrays herself as better than all the other women 




With that in mind, we must also reconsider the solitude found in the Elegies. While 
Hutchinson would have us believe her solitude belongs to that of a forlorn widow, and certainly 
there is some truth to that statement, it becomes increasingly clear that this solitude is also what 
allows her the space to write and rewrite her life with John Hutchinson. Not only does her status 
as solitary widow give her the chance to write about the events of her and her husband’s life, it 
also acts as the pretext for her embellishing those events. If she served as his mirror while he was 
alive, “reflect[ing] his glories upon him,” then it only makes sense that upon his death that mirror 
would malfunction, becoming a “pale Empty shade” that casts an allegorical shadow that distorts 
her husband’s image into one that just so happens to fit her own narrative agenda. Which is to 
say, the mirror metaphor only works so long as John Hutchinson is alive to fill it. Its ability to 
reflect his life accurately depends on his living presence, which both supplies the image and the 
light. His death brings emptiness, indeed, but a promising emptiness that allows Hutchinson the 
freedom to replace the image that previously appeared on that mirror with a new, allegorically-
laden one. What initially looks like a modesty topos—the idea that her husband’s virtues “will, 
through my apprehension and expression, shine as under a very thick cloud, which will obscure 
much of their luster”—now becomes a subtle justification for her narrative reworking. John 
Hutchinson’s deeds “shine as under a very thick cloud” because that is how Lucy Hutchinson 
wrote them, using the metaphor of a defective and darkened mirror to reconcile why her husband 
appears as an ineffectual Samson figure, whose Dalilean wife must betray him in order to spare 
his life. Because she “was nothing before his inspection gave her a fair figure,” which, “when he 
was removed, was only filled with a dark mist,” she can now fashion his life out of that same 
“dark mist,” a mystical mist, a mist from which arises her allegorical doubles (51).  
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 Whereas Hutchinson uses her widow’s solitude as pretense for her writing, excusing the 
supposedly poor quality of her writing by reminding readers of her “dejected and inferior spirit,” 
other seventeenth-century women writers more openly link solitude and writing, claiming the 
former as prerequisite for the latter. First among them is Margaret Cavendish. Cavendish 
uncompromisingly asserts her right to solitude, since, as she says, it serves as the precondition 
for imaginative thinking. Nor is Cavendish willing to settle for the solitude afforded an anchorite, 
since the solitary minds of women “must be as free from all bond, as their mindes must be from 
all wandering desires,” the bonds to which she refers including not just religion, but also 
“Parents or wedlock,” as well as “Superiours” (27). Hutchinson seems to share Cavendish’s 
distaste for anchorites, arguing in Order and Disorder that, while Adam’s originary solitude was 
“not his will” and those “Opposing his creator’s end, as they / Who into caves and deserts run 
away” should be condemned (3.320-322). But Hutchinson also disagrees with Cavendish’s more 
liberal philosophy regarding female solitude, arguing elsewhere in Order and Disorder that 
“privacie” contributed to Eve’s downfall, claiming “th’ assault had not been made / Had she not 
from her firm protection stray’d” (4.171-174). Against Cavendish’s more unabashed assertion of 
solitude, then, I argue that Hutchinson’s solitude is more subdued but also more tactful by 
comparison. Her Puritan status would seem to restrict her worldly movements, all but 
eliminating her chances as an aspiring writer, and in many ways this is in fact the case, as even a 
cursory reading of the many submissive remarks in the Memoirs will reveal. Yet, Hutchinson 
proves herself highly attuned to the conventions not only of allegory, but also elegy, turning her 
sorrow into a systematic rewriting of her life with John Hutchinson, one that renders him the 
anti-hero of a story in which she appears a calculating but effective political participant. That 
these qualities are subsumed within a modesty topos that positions her the despondent and 
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incapable writer of her dead husband’s life thus seems fitting; that this image of her persists in 
the criticism attests to how effective she was at concealing her own intentions under the guise of 
a submissive and solitary wife.  
Finally, while Hutchinson is not the Dalila found in Samson Agonistes, she shares with 
Milton an interest in allegory that places her in the shadows of her own works. Both authors, too, 
provide real-life correlatives for their own obscurantism, in the case of Milton, his blindness, and 
for Hutchinson, her widowhood. Like Milton, who frequently mentions his blindness throughout 
his poems, Hutchinson similarly claims, following the death of her husband, “My substance into 
ye darke vault was laide / And now I am my owne pale Empty Shade” (first elegy, 7-8). Yet, 
their mutual affinity for allegory’s shadow goes beyond the transformative force of life events, 
albeit events of chance, uniting them through a literary tradition to which Milton calls attention 
in Ad Patrem when describing “what my dreams have brought to me from the caves / of sleep, 
and what the laurel groves of the sacred wood / in the shade of Mount Parnassus have seen fit to 
bestow” (15-16). Alluding to his Greek and Roman models, Milton’s many references to shadow 
and shade place him in the dark alongside such figures as Homer and Virgil, as well as his 
Christian God, who in Paradise Lost is described as “Throned inaccessible, but when thou 
shad’st / The full blaze of thy beams” (3.377-378). By also placing herself in that darkness, using 
the pretense of mourning in order to do so, Hutchinson joins her male Miltonic counterparts, 
both real and fictionalized, who occupy the shadows, entirely alone, except for the muses. 
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Notes to Introduction 
1 Citations of Milton’s poetry can be found in the Longman editions of Fowler and Carey. All 
references to Milton’s prose sourced from the Yale Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 
unless otherwise noted. I give volume first, followed by page number.  
2 See especially R.V. Young’s “Milton and Solitude.” In his article, Young argues that by the 
time Milton writes Paradise Lost “solitude has become the essential condition of man and devil,” 
adding that Milton understands his own “situation” as one of a “survivor living in a kind of 
internal exile among the triumphant partisans of what he regarded as a licentious, idolatrous 
culture” (98; 104). Young’s article is especially helpful as an index of the various kinds of 
solitude found in Milton’s texts, but its brevity prevents the author from engaging Miltonic 
solitude with due diligence.   
3 See also Joan Bennett’s Reviving Liberty: Radical Christian Humanism in Milton’s Great 
Poems. Speaking of Milton’s antinomianism, she similarly observes that, “Released from all 
positive laws, the Christian must build his or her moral judgment, inner authority, through the 
discernment of the valid hierarchy of natural laws that apply in particular ethical situations. The 
more difficult the situation, the more effective the exercise gained. For this reason, Milton gives 
us the dynamic, challenging moral situations of Satan, Eve, and Adam; the Chorus, Dalila, and 
Samson; and the Christ of Paradise Regained” (108).  
4 See especially John D. Schaeffer, 89-90, and David Ainsworth, 79. Schaeffer significantly 
downplays the role of dissension and dispute. He compares Milton’s understanding of truth to 
Jeremy Taylor’s understanding of the Eucharist, asserting that “To find the common ground of a 
shared truth is what Taylor thinks is the purpose of the Eucharist, and it is what Milton thinks is 
the purpose of unlicensed printing: to unite Christians into one body.” Reading becomes eating 
in Schaeffer’s account, as the dismembered body of truth is redistributed among Milton’s 
readers-turned-communicants. “Milton conceptualizes a potential unity, a future consensus,” 
concludes Schaeffer, “in the face of the religious and political dissension all around him.” David 
Ainsworth, meanwhile, revises Schaeffer’s account in important ways that reintroduces 
contrariety into the phrase “triall is by what is contrary.” Whereas Schaeffer rejects the 
possibility of “consensus emerging from dispute,” Ainsworth argues that truth surfaces in 
precisely this way, as a “coming together of many individual faiths, communicating, debating in 
a charitable way, and developing consensus.” In his view, however, truth is recovered, not 
created, and so disputation should be kept to an absolute minimum, the very least needed to 
perform the act of recovery. 
5 See also Victoria Kahn, 222. Her comparison between Thomas Hobbes and Milton finds that 
“Hobbes’s eloquence was almost always in the service of absolute obedience,” while “Milton’s 
imaginative energies were far more often engaged by breach of contract and dissent.”  
6 See also Paradise Lost, 11.42-44, where the Son requests from the Father that “All my 
redeemed may dwell in joy and bliss, / Made one with me as I with thee am one,” itself a 
poeticized version of John 17:11, 21-23. However, Milton explains in Christian Doctrine that, 
regarding the Son, just because “the Father dwells in him […] does not mean that their essence is 
one, only that their communion is extremely close” (YP 6, 220).  
7 For an insightful discussion of the connection between Eve’s logic and Milton’s Areopagitica, 
see Diane McColley, Milton’s Eve, especially pages 172-181. 
8 On this score, see especially Karen Edwards, Milton and the Natural World. Edward’s 
intervention occurs within a critical trend that erroneously views Milton as scientifically 
171 
unsophisticated. Against this view Edwards claims that Milton “is on this side of modernity,” 
meaning that the poet was not only aware of the scientific empiricism of figures like Boyle, 
Brown, and Bacon, he also actively and interestingly incorporated the new science within his 
poetry (3). Edwards begins her discussion by noting an etymological distinction, just beginning 
to take shape in the mid-seventeenth century, between the terms “experience” and “experiment.” 
While experiment would come to signify that which the new scientists did, namely testing 
evidence and drawing conclusions inductively, experience was associated with an idiosyncratic 
happening or event, much as it is today. Edwards then uses this distinction to reread the scene of 
the Fall in Book 9. According to her, Eve’s fall occurs because she relies on experience (and not 
even her own, but that of the serpent’s) when choosing to eat of the forbidden fruit. “[H]ad she 
‘made experiment’ of the serpent’s claims,” writes Edwards, “she would not only have avoided 
the Fall; she would have discovered in the created world further evidence of the Creator’s glory, 
power, and wisdom” (39). In general, Edwards claims that Milton consistently identifies Satan 
and his minions with the old science, based on lore, while in prelapsarian paradise the new 
science prevails. I complicate Edwards’ analysis by focusing on another word closely linked with 
scientific empiricism—namely, “trial”—a word that, for Milton, means something quite different 
than it does for his seventeenth-century scientific counterparts. 
9 See also Elizabeth Mazzola and Corinne S. Abate’s introduction to the critical anthology 
Privacy, Domesticity and Women in Early Modern England. They make the claim that “Only 
rarely was privacy understood or possible as a state of solitude, and in these infrequent cases it 
was typically condemned as something dangerous” (5). Discussing the link between privacy and 
secrecy, Mary E. Trull similarly notes how “this early modern sense of ‘privacy’ indicates the 
shared freedom of familiarity rather than the freedom of isolation” (8). The semantic divide these 
scholars claim to identify between privacy and solitude ceases to exist by the middle of the 
seventeenth century, a time when plays like Walter Montagu’s The Shepherds’ Paradise (1632) 
begin to use the words interchangeably to indicate both the place and experience of aloneness. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1 Robert Burton advances a similarly Aristotelian notion of solitude in Anatomy of Melancholy, 
the most extensive and widely read examination of loneliness in the seventeenth century. While 
most “voluntary solitude” results in paroxysms of the soul, Burton admits that he “may not deny 
that there is some … kinde of solitariness to be embraced” and that this version of solitude can 
make “a Paradise, an Heaven on earth, if it be used aright” (243-244, my italics). He goes on to 
cite Plato, who describes in de Amore how a solitary Socrates spent an entire day standing in 
meditation, which would be “pernitious to an other man,” then concludes with his own rendition 
of the Aristotelian injunction: “man alone is either a Saint or a Divell” (245). See also Francis 
Bacon’s essay, “Of Friendship,” where he writes that “Savage” is the “man,” who maintains an 
arbitrary “aversation towards society,” but noble is the mortal, who leaves society “out of a love 
and desire to sequester a man's self for a higher conversation,” as well as George Mackenzie’s 
essay “Preferring Solitude,” which likewise includes a reference to Aristotle’s beast/god 
formulation (183).  
2 Excluding Luxon, Harrison, and Long, not many other scholars have devoted prolonged 
attention to Adam’s solitude, except to mention it in passing, and those who mention it at all 
often do so in somewhat disparaging terms. Of those scholars, Mary Nyquist designates Adam’s 
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solitude a “psychological defect inherent in his being the first and only man” (118). Victoria 
Kahn, too, suggests Adam manifests a real “sense of lack,” while naming his subsequent 
enamoring of Eve an instance of “voluntary servitude” to his own likeness (211). Wendy 
Olmsted, who agrees that positive figurations of solitariness exist elsewhere in Milton’s writing, 
nevertheless claims that he “does not entertain” solitude as a viable alternative to companionate 
marriage in the epic (181). Mary Beth Long similarly argues that Eve “is the solution to 
[Adam’s] problem of loneliness,” claiming that Adam’s solitude is a “purely negative, 
involuntary state” (103, 104). 
3 See especially Mary Nyquist’s “The Genesis of Gendered Subjectivity in Divorce Tracts and in 
Paradise Lost,” which argues for a latent misogyny in Milton’s choice of the “J” or “Jahwist” 
text. For a more optimistic reading of Milton’s understanding of women, and of divorce in 
particular, see Catherine Gimelli Martin’s “Dalila, misogyny, and Milton’s Christian liberty of 
divorce.” Martin argues that “[a]lthough like virtually everyone else in his era, Milton grounds 
his doctrine in the conventional Pauline teaching of ‘natural’ masculine priority, his critics have 
also generally overlooked his striking modifications of this teaching” (60). According to her, 
Milton ostensibly “overturns the conventional system in which intrinsically inferior women are 
innately subject to men” by making them “negotiating partners” (60).  
4 See also William Poole’s chapter on Adam and Eve’s creation and education, especially pages 
171-173. 
5 See also Ronald Levao, “‘Among Unequals What Society’: Paradise Lost and the Forms of 
Intimacy,” especially 90, where he argues that “Twoness never merely replicates oneness, and 
the play of likeness and difference can be unpredictable, the divergence frustrating pure 
understanding at one moment and grounding another kind of likeness the next.” 
6 My reading of solitude in Books 8 and 9 thus contributes to a strand of scholarship that includes 
notable thinkers such as Thomas Luxon, whose work, in particular, offers an important 
alternative to my own. “Aristotle, when he comes to write his discourse on friendship,” Luxon 
says, “will take his cue form Aristophanes and develop a whole theory of friendship based on 
likeness. Milton will come to regard much the same principle as fundamental to creation and 
metaphysics, as well as friendship” (16). In Luxon’s reading, Milton attempts to apply this model 
of friendship-based-on-likeness to seventeenth-century marriage, but with little success, since he 
refuses to grant “equality and thus full humanity to women” (120). In the end, he asserts, Adam 
remains alone, unable to find an equal in Eve. See also Luxon’s more recent piece, “How Life 
Began,” which appears in the anthology Sex Before Sex, edited by James M. Bromley and Will 
Stockton. There, Luxon acknowledges the importance of difference in Milton’s ontogeny, though 
he still subordinates that difference to likeness, writing that “When Adam first expresses desire 
for a mate, the difference on which he focuses, the difference that gives rise to his desire, is of a 
kind far less remarkable than sexual difference—it is numerical difference. What is more, it 
appears to be a numerical difference grounded in the likeness of one individual to another” (267). 
7 See also Joan Bennett, who likewise insists that “Adam’s axiomatic reasoning shows his 
quicker logical ability, closer to that of the angels” (111). 
8 See also Linda Gregerson, who argues that Eve must “be trained to construe likeness as a 
hierarchical principle” (160). 
9 In addition to Luxon and Harrison’s takes on Adam’s formation, see also Jonathan Sawday’s 
piece in Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present. Like Luxon, Sawday 
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also encourages us to read Adam as awaking “fully embodied,” a person who must then attend to 
“the more pressing problem of the relationship between the body and the self” (46). 
10 Luxon describes this moment using Lacanian terminology as the moment God “by a discursive 
process becomes sufficiently alien to be recognized (and misrecognized) as an other” (115).  
11 See also Bruce Boehrer’s understanding of Miltonic divorce in “Animal Love in Milton: The 
Case of ‘Epitaphium Damonis.’” Reading the epitaph as Milton’s earliest attempt to introduce 
same-sex terminology into a discourse of companionate marriage, Boehrer claims the shepherd 
Thyrsis, speaker of the elegy, contrasts his human longing for an ideal partner (in this case, a 
male friend) with the natural converse of animals. Like the divorce tracts that succeed it, the 
poem’s beastly world provides Milton “a model not of mere sensual gratification but rather of 
harmonious union, a union to be improved upon by the rational society of human wedlock, but 
one which nonetheless prefigures the rational ends of wedlock through its own transcendence of 
carnal promiscuity” (798). By the time of the divorce tracts, Boehrer continues, the animal world 
will even more prominently represent both a “marker of difference, by employing it as the 
ground against which the rational and spiritual qualities of human fellowship differentiate 
themselves” and “a paradigm of contentment and harmonious integration with the surrounding 
order of things” (805). I  
12 All references to Erasmus’s colloquies appear in Volume 39 of his Collected Works, translated 
by Craig R. Thompson. 
13 Despite my obvious indebtedness to Bennett here and elsewhere, I find her emphasis on 
knowledge-gaining as a process of phronesis, that is, a collective activity that intends to “keep 
the dialogue open” and “unit[e] the reasoners,” too quickly overrides Milton’s own interest in 
trial as a solitary activity (114). The very fact that Adam and Eve’s debate concerns solitude, not 
God or some other doctrinal quibble, the examples that Bennett uses when discussing the use of 
phronesis as an humanistic antinomian activity in Milton’s work, suggests more is at stake the 
collective bargaining tactics implied by her definition.  
14 See also Robert E. Bourdette, Jr., who similarly remarks in “‘To Milton Lending Sense’: 
Richard Bentley and Paradise Lost.” There, Bourdette writes the optimism of Bentley’s sermon 
“requires [his] explicit emphasis in the final lines of Paradise Lost and man’s naturally social 
state” (46).  
Notes to Chapter 2 
1 Originally, Philosophical Rudiments had been written in Latin under the title De Cive, wherein 
Hobbes states, “Verum quidem esse homini per naturam, sive quatenus est homo, id est, statim 
atque est natus, solitudinem perpetuam molestam esse.” In the Edmund Waller entry of Brief 
Lives, John Aubrey insists Hobbes translated the first English edition of De Cive himself, 
expressing the Latin “molestam” as “enemy.” While most recent editions of De Cive still cite 
Hobbes as translator, and thus retain the English wording of the original, some scholars, such as 
Noel Malcolm, convincingly argue that Charles Cotton translated the first edition. No matter 
who actually translated De Cive, however, the fact remains that Hobbes would have been aware 
of this particular translation, which, all faults aside, is consistent with how Hobbes elsewhere 
describes solitude, namely, using disparaging terms such as “enemy.” For more on this debate, 
see Noel Malcolm, “Charles Cotton, Translator of ‘De cive.’” Except for references to De Cive 
and De Homine, which are sourced from Man and Citizen, edited by Bernard Gert, all other 
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citations can be found in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. I indicate volume first, then 
page number. 
2 I later contrast Fish’s rather optimistic view of Hobbes, which certainly has its merits, with 
Victoria Kahn’s more realistic view that Hobbes’s philosophical endeavors go beyond merely 
trying to save his country, enacting a gendered program that forces readers into a subordinate and 
feminized position. 
3 Zagorin argues that “his definition of the natural law as theorems of reason in contrast to the 
definition of law as a command […] brings Hobbes’s legal positivism clearly into view as a new 
development in legal and political philosophy” (49-50). 
4 As Zagorin suggests, “Hobbes called natural law eternal and immutable, which means that it 
must antedate Scripture and the incarnation of Christ,” going on to say that Hobbes “based his 
argument on reason, although he also sought analogies and support for his conclusions in the 
Bible, because he was addressing Christian readers” (51). 
5 I read Hobbes’s phrase “without care of anything” as an indictment of sloth. Like Reformation 
theology of the early modern period, which assumes idle hands are the devil’s workshop, 
Hobbes’s own philosophy posits action as the natural end of a rationally self-interested 
individual. A person “without care of anything,” who does not contemplate action, but instead 
themselves, cannot, by Hobbes’s account, be acting rationally.  
6 Both Rossello and I share an affinity for the work of Erica Fudge, who argues for a pre-
Cartesian understanding of animality that does not render it, a priori, the categorical antithesis to 
human. “If rationality has a relative status” in the early modern period, writes Erica Fudge, 
“opposed always to irrationality,” then “it would be impossible to make a judgment about the 
possession of reason without invoking the potential for its lack,” namely, the animal (36). The 
same is true of Hobbes’s political philosophy, a fact Rossello compellingly demonstrates in his 
essay. 
7 Robert Burton notes this paradox too, writing that “too much solitarinesse […] [is] Cause and 
Symptome both” of melancholy (115). Much of Hobbes’s description of the imagination’s 
malfunctioning can also be found in Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, a seminal work in early 
modern psychiatry.  
8 Hobbes himself claims hell only exists metaphorically, writing “that which is thus said 
concerning hell fire is spoken metaphorically” and intended to “design metaphorically a grief 
and discontent of mind” (3: 448). McClure calls Hobbes’s treatment of hell, in which he 
vacillates between calling it a metaphor and a real place, an “intentional ambiguity” (6) intended 
to deter readers from asking “questions about the afterlife” (27). McClure claims such questions 
will “recede into the background in a more or less unconscious effort to avoid asking them 
altogether” once readers realize Hobbes himself seems unable to answer them (27). I agree with 
McClure that Hobbes manufactures anxiety concerning hell, though it is unclear why Hobbes’s 
readers would shy away from questions of the afterlife simply because of Hobbes’s ambiguity.  
9 For a very different reading of Milton’s hell, see Anthony Low’s Aspects of Subjectivity. Low 
argues that Milton’s hell constitutes “an exaggerated picture of the Hobbesian state, exhibiting 
the perfectly disciplined unity of perfectly self-centered individuals” (178). As such, Low reads 
Milton’s hell as analogous to the Hobbesian state after the sovereign has been installed, whereas 
I see his version of hell as closer to Hobbes’s state of nature, given the lack of a clear authority, 
the infighting of the angels, and the bold resolution to wage war. See also John Rogers, who 
claims that “the chaotic life of man in the Hobbesian state of nature is redeemed through the 
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direct and ongoing intervention of a powerful sovereign, [whereas] the Miltonic chaos is 
transformed by Creation into an autonomous universe through a single, nonrepeatable act of 
divine infusion” (132). See also Barbara Lewalski, who insists that “for Milton, in contrast to 
Hobbes and the Levellers, repudiation of the political contract does not abrogate the social 
contract and return men to the state of nature,” but it seems that this same statement does not 
apply when the law in violation is divine rather than overtly political (233). 
10 Adam tells Eve that “Evil into the mind of god or man / May come and go, so unapproved, and 
leave / No spot or blame behind” (5.117-119). 
11 Nor does Satan recognize his own deformation. He struggles to understand how he has 
changed, declaring to his fallen comrades, “We know no time when we were not as now” 
(5.859). Similarly, Satan scorns Zephon, who does not initially recognize him. Upon learning of 
Satan’s identity, Zephon instructs him to “Think not […] thy shape the same” as it was prior to 
the fall (4.835). This same inability to comprehend his own difference occurs again when Satan 
confronts Sin.  
12 Jessica Beckman remarks that Satan has a conscience but cannot adequately respond to it, 
demonstrating the limits of the conscience as a force of persuasion. As she points out, the success 
of Adam and Eve’s repentance depends on “the social work of shared conscience and faith” (59). 
For them, as for all fallen individuals in Milton’s poetry, conscience is a communal project 
involving the affective capacity to feel like and for another, whereas Satan’s solitude prevents 
him from escaping his own “sinful self-generated internal torment” (59). However, Beckman 
never fully elaborates on what this “social work of shared conscience” entails, except to say that 
it involves commiseration. Responding to her claim, I would qualify it by saying that 
commiseration is not conformation, whether on earth or in heaven. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1 For a discussion of medieval and Renaissance accounts negatively linking Eve with idleness 
and feminine vanity, see Diane McColley, Milton’s Eve, especially 151.   
2 In 1958, B.A Wright counted use of the word “shade” no fewer than sixty times in Milton’s 
poetry, often to mean an outdoor “screen or shelter or retreat,” but without making the direct 
connection to otium (205). Except for a few passing references, I have found very little 
secondary literature examining the connection between otium and shade in Milton’s work. 
3 See also Shannon Miller, who similarly observes that “The poem will even establish frequent 
links between Eve’s tendency toward being solitary and Satan’s frequent description as ‘alone,’” 
adding that the “language in Eve’s dream links her to solitariness as well” (35-36). 
4 This accords with McColley’s reading of the dream in “Eve’s Dream,” in which “Milton shows 
distinctions between the abuses of poetry and its right uses often debated in the Renaissance” 
(39). See also John M. Steadman, who writes that “Phantasy’s proper role, as Milton conceived 
it, is the production of shapes and images, to be submitted to the reason; but as a mimetic power, 
usurping the role of reason, it does not produce a reliable image of ‘external things’; instead it 
fabricates out of dispersed memories grotesque and mismatched forms” (59).  
5 For an account of some scholars who impute sinfulness to Eve’s dream, see Diana Treviño 
Benet’s “Milton’s Toad, or Satan’s dream.” Benet herself argues for a spotless Eve, whose 
dream Milton adopts and revises from contemporary authors Crashaw and Crowley, removing 
from his version the idea that Satan-infected animal spirits predetermine a person’s actions (48). 
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Jeanie Grant Moore also defends Eve through an intertextual comparison with the Lady of 
Comus, whose innocence Milton “recreates” in Eve of Paradise Lost (10). Meanwhile, other 
scholars sense debasement in Milton’s depiction of Eve following her dream. Drawing on 
classical allusion in the morning after Eve’s unsettling dream, Maggie Kilgour notes a striking 
resemblance between Eve and the degraded Flora of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, suggesting that 
perhaps Eve’s fall has already occurred, at least in a prefigurative sense (6).  
6 Ever the poet, Milton depicts otium and umbra positively, in contrast to Andrew Marvell, 
whose fulsome praise of otium in “The Garden,” Vickers points out, “is anything but admirable, 
and stands in sharp contrast to Marvell’s thirty years of public service, as Latin Secretary, MP for 
Hull, representative of the Trinity House and confidential agent for two administrations” (3). 
7 See also Janette Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man. In the introduction, Dillon makes 
the similar claim that “Petrarch revolutionized the terminology of the solitude debate, replacing 
the terminology of right and wrong, morally superior and inferior, more or less pleasing to God 
[…] with a new terminology of personal will, individual nature, and more and less pleasing to 
self […]. Petrarch now secularized that contemplative solitude and offered self-examination not 
as a means to a higher end, but as an alternative, as an end in itself” (18-19). 
8 For Milton’s Latin verse, I am using David R. Slavitt’s interpretation, which maintains the 
verse structure of the original.  
9 A similar concern for kairos appears throughout Milton’s poems, especially Paradise Regained 
and Samson Agonistes. Apropos the former, Laurie Zwicky was one of the first scholars to 
comment on kairos in the poem, writing that Milton “interweaves the theme of kairos throughout 
the poem, mentioning a special kind of time more than twice as often as in Paradise Lost, and 
making it the cornerstone of Christ’s rejections of the temptations. Satan’s constant effort is to 
get Christ to act before his time or kairos, and thus pervert God’s plan (271). She goes on to 
write that Satan displays “no comprehension of the rightness of a moment; he comprehends only 
opportuneness” (276). According to Zwicky, the key to the Son’s success is discerning not only 
an opportune rhetorical moment, but also in recognizing the suitability of that moment for God’s 
plan, which Satan seems fundamentally unable to do. A.B. Chambers makes a similar 
observation a few years later, claiming “much of Satan’s argument is a devilish carpe diem, an 
insidious temptation to force the pace of Christian time, to confuse critical opportunities with 
untimely actions and with temporal means of accomplishing them” (194). For Chambers, Milton 
intentionally sets the incarnate Christ up as a “confused and potentially culpable man,” which 
makes the “kairoi described by Milton [to] begin to seem strange” (200). In my reading of 
Paradise Regained, the Son, expertly attuned to the operations of kairos, acts as a to Eve, whose 
unawareness of time and place in Paradise Lost is implicated in the fall. While the Son 
represents Milton as he would like to be, Eve might better represent how Milton actually 
perceived his own kairotic sensibilities. 
10 Similarly, John Knott remarks on the “critical tendency to characterize the labor of Adam and 
Eve as georgic,” claiming it “has served as a way of enhancing its importance, for example, by 
emphasizing its simplicity and dignity and by showing its continuity with labor in the 
postlapsarian world and thus suggesting that the arts of civilization have a place in paradise” 
(74). See also Anthony Low, The Georgic Revolution, wherein he says “there is no denying that 
Milton’s pastoral Eden has at least some of the elements of georgic—those that are most 
satisfying, and that define humanity as more dignified than the idle beasts” (318). My argument 
thus differs significantly from the case made by Joanna Picciotto in Labors of Innocence in Early 
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Modern England. Tracing the rise of experimental labor in the seventeenth century, Picciotto 
suggests that writers of various creeds participated in a new form of knowledge production that 
looked to innocent Adam as a model. Seeking the hidden material substance “behind fallen 
appearances,” these experimentalists, Milton included, subverted the active/passive dichotomy 
by rendering contemplation an active “Adamic delving” (13). I argue that Milton rigorously 
zones Eden into light and dark places, which correspond to ritual behaviors of thinking and 
doing, mind and body, pastoral and georgic.  
11 While I agree with Kristin P. McColgan, who writes that Milton uses light and darkness to 
“foreshadow […] action or comment upon it, sometimes through irony, sometimes through 
metaphor and/or symbol,” I would qualify her later claim that “even in the unfallen world” the 
light/dark imagery “possesses a doubleness, particularly when viewed from a postlapsarian 
perspective” (90, 94). By my understanding, this doubleness applies exclusively—not 
“particularly,” as she puts it—to our postlapsarian viewpoint, since prelapsarian paradise is anti-
allegorical and therefore without the metaphoric dualism to which she refers. For a 
comprehensive overview of Milton’s use of light and darkness, see Shirley Sharon-Zisser’s 
“Silence and Darkness in Paradise Lost.” Sharon-Zisser argues for a “double-valued” use of 
darkness/silence, in which “any positive attributed to silence and darkness in any of the spatial 
realms of the poem entails a negative aspect” (197).  
12 Crane claims critics tend to overemphasize the closet as a site of privacy because it better 
agrees with privacy’s modern definition. Not only do these critics misconstrue notions of privacy 
as understood at the time, but they also neglect the implications of outdoor privacy for early 
modern subjectivity (5). By imagining a subject fashioned, not indoors, but rather within a 
garden or bower, she claims, we arrive at a more accurate understanding of the early modern 
person, whose “self is not enclosed, but rather porous, open to the natural world, and openly 
expressive of its desires” (17). 
13 See also Patricia Parker, who makes a similar observation concerning twilight in Eden, which, 
according to her, functions “as the temporal figure for the suspended or pivotal threshold of 
decision” (321).  
14 For more on the recipient, as well as the letter’s occasion, see Stephen Fallon, pages 14-20. 
15 That Adam’s solitude in Book 8 begins not in shade but “In balmy sweat, which with his 
beams the sun / Soon dried” attests to its aboriginality (8.255-56). It also suggests that, initially, 
his is a solitude of body, not mind, a fact confirmed through the “quick instinctive motion” by 
which he jumps to his feet, described in my first chapter as animal-like in nature (259). Only 
later does Adam begin to contemplate his own solitude as a spiritual lack, at which points he 
enters shade. 
16 See also Andrew Mattison, especially 18 and 89, where he contends the separation scene to be 
a problem of place. “Eve describes Eden as being hurried,” he writes, which contrasts with 
“Adam’s description of ample room and leisurely work within a basically stable and predictable 
place.” In Mattison’s opinion, the fall results from a failure of description and a “rhetoric that 
succumbs to the discrepancy between the slowness of persuasion and the immediacy of 
description.” The urgency with which Eden is described as “tending to wild” runs counter to the 
slowness with which Adam and Eve are convinced of each other’s arguments. For Mattison, 
then, the real problem is how place is described, whereas the problem in my reading has to do 
with the emplacement of Milton’s characters. It is not what kind of place they are in that 
concerns me, but rather where they are geographically within Eden that seems most pertinent.  
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Notes to Chapter 4 
1 See also John M. Steadman, who similarly asserts that “Milton could effectively exploit the
imagery of darkness and blackness in order to hint at divine objects and modes of contemplation 
too lofty and too luminous for the human intellect” (76).  
2 See also Ryan Netzley’s “How Reading Works: Hermeneutics and Reading Practice in 
Paradise Regained.” Netzley suggests a plausible way out of (or rather into) what he poses as the 
poem’s strictly hermeneutic problem, arguing “the solution to the double bind that Paradise 
Regained offers, however obliquely, is that reading is not primarily valuable for the 
interpretations and knowledge that it enables, but rather for the habits that it produces” (6). In 
particular, he draws attention to the moments during the pinnacle scene in which the very 
presence of Scripture, having been explicitly cited by both Satan and the Son, proves crucial to a 
proper reading of the text: “the brief epic refuses to outsource interpretive authority, insisting 
instead that the practice of reading Paradise Regained and of rereading the citations from Luke, 
Matthew, and Deuteronomy within the poem itself produces the disposition that in turn 
authorizes and enables such circular hermeneutic activities. Any interpretive authority that exists 
at this moment is the result of a specific reading activity, not a privileged textual site or source” 
(7).  
3 The magic to which Quint refers is the magic of the spirit world, whereas I mean the magic 
infused into mystical Eden. Quint argues that “Milton follows Augustine’s logic in Paradise 
Regained in order to empty the world of nature spirits: that is, to end human belief in their very 
being” (184). In the end, he writes, “[w]e are cleansed by a new consciousness that nature has 
never been the home or possession of demons—of any kind” (193).
4 The “interior sequence” of the Son’s thought, Anderson writes, “leads to an actual place, the 
‘Desert wild,’ yet simultaneously triggers and neutralizes the shift in orientation from inside to 
outside and psychic to physical. The Son’s apparently physical steps are easily read 
metaphorically as well, however—as steps in meditation rather than only in the flesh. This 
notable, if unassuming, line thus pointedly connects the Satanic binaries real and allegoric, 
historical and figurative, mimetic and conceptual, and does so without also making them 
markedly distinct” (275). See also Brian Hook, “A Kingdom Real or Allegoric: Milton and the 
Uses of Allegory,” in which he argues that Milton would like to avoid allegoric language 
altogether when discussing God’s very real kingdom, but understands this as an impossibility 
given his own accommodating position as poet. “It is Milton’s brilliant solution,” he writes, 
“[…] that the kingdom of God is both real and allegoric” (15). While he “may be concerned by 
the allegoric in its extremes,” nevertheless Milton realizes that allegory “is the only mode of 
approaching Jesus’ kingdom and his heroism that is available to those who are temporal, fleshly, 
and fallen” (15).  
5 That “rousing” implies a storm finds precedent in Michael Drayton’s Mortimeriados, where the 
word describes a similar scene of stormy destruction. I contend that Milton uses the word 
“rousing” in a similar way, to mean the stormy motions Samson is about to unleash on the 
Philistines. Like the armies of Drayton’s poem, Samson also “casts” “upon heapes” a number of 
“bodies,” and he does so, according to the Messenger, “as a bustling tempest’s rousing blasts” 
(Mortimeriados, lines 386-392). In both poems, then, rousing and razing are linked together 
through stormy conceit. 
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6 We also learn from the Messenger that “The vulgar only scaped” Samson’s wrath, “who stood 
without,” which, if read as political allegory, might refer to figures that Milton himself pardons 
in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1659). “Milton reaches out” in that tract, writes Barbara 
Lewalski, to those who despise the king’s rule yet refrain from involving themselves in what had 
become the theatre of Charles’s trial and subsequent execution (230).  
7 Much earlier than David Lowenstein’s piece of a previous note is George Whiting’s “Samson 
Agonistes and the Geneva Bible,” which, like that of Lowenstein, seeks to place the play within 
its historical context. Whether more Hellenistic or Hebraic in its scope, Whiting warns that 
“When Milton’s indebtedness to the Renaissance”—which Whiting views as a return to 
Hellenistic values—“is exclusively studied and emphasized, his place in the Reformation and his 
fundamental religious character are disregarded” (21). Thus, Whiting encourages us to read the 
play alongside the Geneva Bible (likely Milton’s go-to Bible), arguing that “In both the Geneva 
Bible and Samson Agonistes Samson is presented as an individual acting in relation to God and 
within a scheme of religious values that are recognizably Protestant and Puritan” (23). Whiting 
thereby recovers the Hebraic element of Milton’s play, which forms the basis for much future 
criticism that sees Samson’s violent end as in line with seventeenth-century religious practice on 
the Protestant side of things.  
 
 
Notes to Chapter 5 
1 Elsewhere, Keeble acknowledges the debt John Hutchinson’s life owes to the writing of his 
wife, suggesting that she often “characterises her as his shadow when his surviving image is 
hers” (235). 
2 A model for the latter sort of mourning can be found in Catherine Parr’s 1547 Lamentations of 
a Sinner, a strongly anti-Catholic tract that resists auricular confession in favor of a public 
funeral in the wake of Henry VIII’s passing. 
3 Parts of the Memoirs were begun while the Colonel still lived. My concern here are those 
moments in the text in which Lucy Hutchinson addresses her widowed life after the Colonel’s 
death, which, it is safe to assume, were not written before 1664. 
4 For uses of anamorphism in Hutchinson’s text, see Jen E. Boyle, who finds anamorphic energy 
in “Hutchinson’s translation of Lucretius’s figures[,] [which] foregrounds images as a theory of 
baroque observation. In this sense, we are given a perceptual model that resists a 
conceptualization of Epicureanism as a precursor to the mechanical worldview of the later 
Enlightenment” (37). 
5 Unabridged, the quote from The Reason of Church-Government reads: “I cannot better liken 
the state and person of a King then to that mighty Nazarite Samson; who being disciplin’d from 
his birth in the precepts and the practice of Temperance and Sobriety, without the strong drink of 
injurious and excessive desires, grows up to a noble strength and perfection with those his 
illustrious and sunny locks the laws waving and curling about his god like shoulders” (YP 1, 
859).  
6 Many critics could be cited here, so I will limit my survey to some of the more negative 
epithets I have come across. For a more comprehensive list, see Derek N.C. Wood’s Exiled from 
Light, especially 99-110. Wood himself reacts against the negative portrait of Dalila among 
critics, claiming it is “fairly easy to make a sympathetic case for Dalila” (99). Samuel Johnson, 
who elsewhere acknowledges Milton’s misogyny, nevertheless deems Dalila the embodiment of 
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the “strategems and allurements of feminine hypocrisy” (107). More recent scholars have 
continued the trend begun by Johnson, with William Riley Parker designating her “a despicable 
creature who betrays her husband” (243), and, more recently still, Mary Ann Radzinowicz a 
“hardhearted taunter” (168). Barbara Lewalski describers her as “the Great Whore of Babylon” 
(1058), while Laura Morrow lists her as a “sensual Machiavel” (40). Achsah Guibbory claims 
she embodies “the lure of idolatry and monarchy” (195), while Irene Samuel labels her “bird-
brained” (248). While positive appraisals of Dalila do exist among Milton critics (in addition to 
Woods’ reading, see also William Empson’s article, in which he describes her as a “high-minded 
great lady, wholly committed to the values of ‘the world’”), as this list attests, many still adhere 
to Milton’s negative portrayal of his female character (255).  
7 “You make many anxious inquiries, even about what I am thinking. Listen, Diodati, but in 
secret, lest I blush; and let me talk to you grandiloquently for a while. You ask what I am 
thinking of? So help me God, an immortality of fame. What am I doing? Growing my wings and 
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